Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
War and Society (MA) Theses

Dissertations and Theses

Summer 8-2022

Modern American Propaganda: An Institutional History
Douglas Morrow
Chapman University, dmorrow@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/war_and_society_theses
Part of the Applied Ethics Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy
Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons, Public Affairs Commons, and the United
States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Morrow, Douglas D. "Modern American Propaganda: An Institutional History." Master's thesis, Chapman
University, 2022. https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000398

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at Chapman University
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in War and Society (MA) Theses by an authorized
administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.

Modern American Propaganda: An Institutional History
A Thesis by
Doug D. Morrow

Chapman University
Orange, CA
Wilkinson College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in War and Society
August 2022

Committee in charge:
Tom Zoellner, M.A., Chair
Mateo Jarquin, Ph.D.
Andrea Molle, Ph.D.

The thesis of Doug D. Morrow is approved.

Tom Zoellner, M.A., Chair

Mateo Jarquin, Ph.D.

Andrea Molle, Ph.D.

July 2022

Modern American Propaganda: An Institutional History
Copyright © 2022
by Doug D. Morrow

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I’d like to acknowledge my parents Dwight and JoJo Morrow, who
have been unfailingly supportive throughout my life. Next, I’d like to thank the members of my
thesis panel at Chapman University, including thesis chair Tom Zoellner, and panel members Dr.
Mateo Jarquin and Dr. Andrea Molle, for their support, mentorship, and advice. I’m also grateful
to other Chapman professors, particularly Drs. Claudia Julio-Fuentes and Riva TukachinskyForster.
At the Department of State, I’d like to recognize and thank Amelia Arsenault, Marta
Churella, Paul Kruchoski, and the indefatigable Lori Nierenberg, and at the Department of State’s
Ralph Bunche Library, Brook Bender, Jenny Gelman, Camille Majors, and Megan Sheils for their
unstinting research assistance. A special thanks as well to the deeply helpful research efforts of
Cate Brennan, David Langbart, and Linda Smith from the National Archives, to Talia Price at the
Pew Research Center, and to Dr. Nicholas Cull at the University of Southern California’s
Annenberg School for kindly reviewing and improving my draft. Thank you to Vivian Walker at
the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy for steering me in the right direction. My
gratitude goes out to the former USIA officials who generously gave of their time, including
Jonathan Cebra, Pat Kushlis, Judith Siegel, Paul Smith, Dan Sreebny and Ben Ziff.
Thank you to my kind colleagues at Chapman’s War, Diplomacy, and Society program,
including Victoria Castillo, Devin Clarke, Nick Durell, Talisa Flores, Megan Lee, Socrates
Mbamalu, Laura Neis, Vesper North, Nat Pendergraft, and Justin Reid, all of whom made classes
enjoyable and interesting. A sincere thanks to my professors of yore at Pomona College, including

iv

‘The Three Ricks,” Rick Elderkin, Rick Hazlett, and Rick Worthington, as well as Heather
Williams, all of whom profoundly helped shape me into the person I am today. Similarly, thanks
to my former State Department colleague and now Pomona professor Mietek Boduszynski for his
support. I am grateful to the Roth family, who kindly allowed me to retell the story of family
matriarch Julia Erdely, which furnished me with a deep understanding of the power of words. Last
but not least, thank you to both the U.S. Department of State and the Nixon Library for financing
a one-year sabbatical at Chapman University that allowed me to complete this work.
The views expressed in this thesis are the author’s own, and may not represent the views of the
Department of State.

v

ABSTRACT
Modern American Propaganda: An Institutional History
by Doug D. Morrow

The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy is the
primary government institution in charge of overt, foreign-directed propaganda. This paper
argues that the institutional culture of this institution was born and came to fruition in the period
1941-1953, and has not significantly changed since. That institutional culture includes a fierce
adherence to a “strategy of truth,” with aesthetic norms being reserved and largely unemotional
as a result of positioning themselves in moral and aesthetic opposition to Nazi and early Cold
War Communist propaganda. Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s decision to staff these nascent
institutions with artists, poets, playwrights and journalists – rather than political scientists,
advertising executives, and soldiers – was a second key explanatory reason for the birth of these
particular norms. Then and now, overt U.S. propagandists are ardently internationalist and
interventionist, convinced that U.S. political, social, economic and moral leadership is, on
balance, good for the world – not just the United States. Specifically, they believe that U.S.
leadership advances economic and political freedoms, as well as human rights, and have never
seriously challenged these assumptions, even in periods in which Americans writ large were
unconvinced. Despite evidence to the contrary, U.S. propaganda still rests on an assumption that
in the marketplace of ideas, the “best” ideas will find their way to the top, thereby leading to a
focus on rational and logical styles of argumentation. While some aspects of this institutional
culture, such as an ethical commitment to the truth, are laudable and worth maintaining, other
aspects, such as an aversion to social science research, have hindered the institution’s
vi

effectiveness. In this paper, I explore historical and scholarly meanings for the term propaganda
before advancing my own definition. Then, I explain the institutional history of modern day
propaganda. Finally, I offer suggestions on how to better adapt modern American propaganda to
the 21st century.
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Introduction

When Julia Erdely was 15, she stepped off a cramped train car in which dead bodies had
been stacked off to the side.

Already separated from her family, she waited in line, not

understanding what was happening. A Polish man in a pinstriped suit approached and, in Yiddish,
cryptically told her: “You’re 18.” The line slowly moved forward. At the front of the line, a Nazi
guard was directing the line into two. When she approached him, he only asked her age.
“Eighteen,” said the 15 year old. One word, as it turned out, saved her life: those under eighteen
were immediately sent to the gas chambers of Auschwitz, while adults were sent to labor camps.1
Fifty-three years later, she told her story to an auditorium full of high school students in
Illinois. I sat next to my best friend, Ron – Julia’s grandson, and after the event, reflecting on what
she had said, I burst into tears at the realization that Ron’s entire existence depended on a single
word that his grandmother had spoken so long ago. That one word gave life to a person for whom
I cared deeply, and this fact was terrifying. Though I had always been fascinated with language
and words, Julia’s story gave me a newfound understanding that they were more than just
interesting, but also potentially dangerous, and requiring of care and management.
Words carry power. Sometimes, even a single word can mean the difference between life
or death. This power imbues our use of words with a moral responsibility, none more so than in
the case of those who speak on behalf of powerful governments, whose military and economic
might can shape the fate of billions, spark wars or win the peace. As a U.S. government

Julia Erdely, “Interview with July Erdely,” July 28, 1995, from the series Survivors of the Shoah, Visual History
Foundation, Audio, 34:08.
1
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propagandist, I try to be thoughtful and deliberate about the words I use, and to use those words to
help reshape the world into one I consider “better.” Namely, a world that embraces liberal
democratic values including the respect for, and protection of, universal human rights.
I am not alone in this. My colleagues, I will argue, work from a shared ethical framework
that can be clearly traced to the period 1941-1953, when many millions of individuals fell under
the sway of genocidal Nazis and totalitarian Communists. Ardently internationalist, we remain
convinced by those events of the enduring need for American soft-power – and occasionally hardpower – intervention around the world to maintain the post-war legal, ethical, moral, economic,
and political order. This soft-power intervention is the focus of this study.
American soft power today is consciously advanced abroad most forcefully by the U.S.
Department of State and its Bureau of Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy. Embedded in every
U.S. Embassy and most Consulates around the world, the Bureau’s propagandists work to advance
political and economic freedom, and respect for and implementation of human rights norms and
laws. We also, of course, work to advance U.S. interests and influence, but we do so, I argue,
within a particular framework of values focused on truth-telling, and advancing political and
economic freedoms around the world.
Understanding the common negative associations associated with the term “propaganda,”
as terms of art we call ourselves public affairs officers, public diplomacy officers, cultural affairs
officers, information officers, spokespersons, and press officers, but in truth we ply in propaganda.
Propaganda, though, is just a tool – one much like a chainsaw. Powerful and with inherent dangers,
it can be used for good – chopping down trees to build homes for the homeless – or evil.

xv

In summary, my argument follows: modern-day American propaganda institutions and
practices were born during World War II and fully formed by the end of the Korean War. The
twelve years from 1941-1953 confronted the United States government with existential threats in
the form of totalitarian governments who were willing to unethically use propaganda to advance
their aims, purposefully and consciously fabricating lies to justify their actions. How, then, would
liberal democracies like the United States respond? Would it be possible to chart an ethical course
for propaganda, and could such propaganda even be effective? If so, to what extent do the lessons
those early American propagandists learned, or the norms they established, continue to live on
today among American government propagandists who follow in their professional footsteps?
I argue that those forces countering the United States at the time helped us develop a
uniquely American style of propaganda, with its own set of ethical norms, values, and aesthetics,
in direct response to Nazi and Communist propaganda of the time. For better and for worse, the
United States continues to practice this 1953-era propaganda today. The particular problems
caused by using a 1953 toolset to confront the problems of the 21st century requires a deep
examination of those foundational norms, values and aesthetics. Given significant shifts in the
global information environment, policy makers must now make a conscious decision to maintain,
discard, or modify them. This is essential to ensure that American government propagandists can
continue to work effectively to both advance U.S. interests, and hopefully to continue help building
a “better” world for all people.
To make this argument, we must first understand what the term propaganda actually means
– at least with respect to my argument. Chapter 1 will explore the meanings of propaganda as
they have evolved and changed over time, with a focus on the 20th century and the birth of
propaganda studies as a discrete area of inquiry. In this chapter, my sources will include
xvi

propaganda theorists beginning with public relations specialist Edward Bernays and political
scientist Harold Lasswell, who were essential contributors to the first serious studies on the subject
in the 1920s and 1930s. Moving through the 20th century, I will explore how mid-century theorists
like French sociologist Jacques Ellul and late 20th century scholars like linguist Noam Chomsky
redefined the term for their times. I also argue that the term propaganda – much like equally farreaching concepts such as liberalism, socialism, and communication – will never have one
complete and authoritative definition, but instead that propaganda theorists must explicitly redefine it for their specific purposes in any formal inquiry. In that light, Chapter 1 will conclude
with my own definition of propaganda, as well as my definition of ethical propaganda.
Having defined our terms, in Chapter 2 I argue that the U.S. government’s modern
propaganda organs and institutions – as well as their embedded norms, values, ethics, and
aesthetics – were born and grew to adulthood in the period 1941-1953, with significant
contributions from the administrations of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight
Eisenhower.

Of note, I am only making this case with respect to overt, foreign-directed

propaganda. The subject of covert, foreign-directed propaganda is beyond the scope of this
research, while formal domestic propaganda efforts were legally silenced in the 1940s.
Many scholars of history and propaganda might ask, why not begin this history in World
War I? This period, after all, saw the first instance of a centralized, U.S. government propaganda
office: the Committee on Public Information (CPI). I argue that although this was our first
institutional instance of semi-scientific propaganda aimed at mass audiences, those authorizing it,
and those executing it, did not believe that it was a phenomenon that needed to exist outside of
wartime. As such, the ethical norms they ascribed to it were completely different, as it was not
seen as something that could exist within the norms of peacetime democracy. CPI Director George
xvii

Creel, for example, wielded censorship against the press like a club, which was very different from
the almost entirely voluntary nature of press censorship in World War II. Not until the end of that
war did U.S. government, political scientists, politicians and academics broadly agree on the need
for a permanent “forever war” against totalitarianism, a propaganda apparatus that would live
forever, partially in service to the values underpinning liberal democracy.
Created in direct response to Axis propaganda efforts, and then evolved to counter early
Cold War Soviet propaganda, these institutions reached full adulthood by the end of the Korean
War. To make this case, I will explore the internal memos of, and executive orders related to, the
World War II-era Office of War Information, its precursor offices and agencies, and its successor
offices in the State Department and the later U.S. Information Agency. Several of the key players
in this history will speak for themselves through their own writings, memoirs, and biographies. I
will also use reports from the Congressionally-mandated U.S. Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy, and its precursor commissions, to demonstrate how a particularly American
institutional culture of propaganda was born.
The overt propaganda offices and agencies established in the 1940s were directed by artists,
poets, authors, and journalists, rather than, for the most part, advertisers, political scientists, and
soldiers. This choice – made directly by President Roosevelt – would have profound consequences
for the ethical values and norms employed both in that period, and in the present day. Playwright
Robert Sherwood essentially created the first World War II-era foreign-directed, overt propaganda
office in the form of the Foreign Information Service, and continued directing it when it was
renamed and re-housed as the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information (OWI). CBS
journalist Elmer Davis brought his media ethics to the OWI – the government’s first centralized
production and coordinating hub for propaganda – when he became its first director. Poet and
xviii

Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish first headed the War Department’s Office of Facts and
Figures before becoming an assistant director at the OWI. Journalist Lowell Mellett headed the
short-lived Office of Government Reports before taking over OWI’s Motion Picture propaganda
bureau. Newspaper publisher Gardner Powell also found a role as an OWI assistant director.
Following the war, OWI’s propaganda functions were transferred to the Department of
State’s new Bureau of Public Affairs. First headed by MacLeish, journalist Edward Barrett took
over its leadership in the crucial period from 1950-1952. One year later, Congress established the
U.S. government’s first permanent peacetime agency for overt, foreign-directed propaganda, the
U.S. Information Agency (USIA). Once again, it was a journalist who led the charge: radio and
film executive Theodore Streibert became USIA’s first director. Bringing along with them the
values of artists and writers, these propagandists centered their work around a “strategy of truth,”
and consciously framed the restrained aesthetic of their propaganda in direct opposition to that of
the sometimes shrill and emotional Nazi and Communist propaganda. Despite significant changes
to American society and values, and the information environment in which we operate, I argue
that the norms, values and aesthetics of this period’s propaganda continue largely unchanged
today.
In Chapter 3, I will tell the story of the United States Information Agency (USIA),
examining each decade in turn to demonstrate that the American institutional culture of
propaganda established by 1953 did not significantly change over time. While some aspects of
the work, such as the relative focus on long- versus short-term goals, attention paid to elite versus
mass audiences, and the respect paid to propagandists by senior policymakers changed over time,
at its root, the fundamentals remained the same. This did not change even in 1999, when USIA
was absorbed into the Department of State.
xix

In Chapter 4, I will explore the results of a survey on my fellow propagandists, in which
I test the hypotheses offered in Chapter 2. To what extent, for example, do 21st century American
propagandists continue to embrace the 1940s articulation of the “strategy of truth?” To what extent
do they shy away from propaganda that aesthetically evokes the artistic norms of Communism or
Nazism? How do they balance that which is effective versus what is ethical? How do they balance
U.S. interests against the promotion of our underlying democratic values, when these come into
conflict? What propaganda techniques and methods do they believe to be effective, regardless of
what social science has to say on the subject? And to what extent do they continue to accept the
post-war, internationalist consensus that the United States must remain a key player in the world,
and that our intervention leads to results that are, on balance, good?
In the final chapter, I will explore how the 21st century information environment has
almost entirely transformed when compared to the world in which these norms were born. There
are a number of problems that these changes pose to the effectiveness of our propaganda; we may,
in fact, be using that chainsaw long after the point when a 3D laser cutter is actually required. In
this concluding chapter, I will examine the methods used by modern American propagandists and
the assumptions they are built upon, and will question whether some of those assumptions or
practices need to be amended or abandoned – or alternatively, whether they continue to stand the
test of time.
The institutional culture of U.S. propaganda, I argue, got stuck in the early Cold War
period, and became dislodged from changes occurring in America’s psyche, its understanding of
itself, and of its proper place in the world. It continues to represent an idealistic 1950s vision of
America that no longer truly exists (if it ever existed at all) beyond which the United States has
already evolved new and more complicated understandings of our moral identity.
xx

Our

propagandists lightly acknowledge these changes in a variety of ways, but do not fundamentally
challenge the assumptions of the positive impact of American moral hegemony on the world. Are
U.S. government propagandists then somehow committed, in their “strategy of truth,” only to the
small and convenient truths, while ignoring larger truths about our nation, government, and
society? If so, is this ethical? If American propaganda never fully wrestled with the moral
ambiguity and uncertainty that Americans have often grappled with about our place in the world
from the 1960s onward, can that propaganda genuinely and ethically represent America? Chapter
5 will attempt to answer these questions, and provide some suggestions for how modern
propaganda may need to adapt to the modern information space.
For example, propagandists in the 1940s and 1950s made a conscious and deliberate choice
to focus on rational rather than emotional appeals to foreign audiences. In part, this was driven by
a reaction to fascist and Communist propaganda, which combined emotional appeals with false
narratives to advance their interests. In part, it was also an attempt to portray propaganda as
“serious” to a foreign policy establishment which largely rejected emotional reasoning as
inappropriate. However, given what neuroscientists and psychologists now understand about the
effectiveness of various persuasion methods, it may now be time to reexamine this unstated
prohibition against emotion-forward government propaganda.
Having covered what will be outlined in the following chapters, there are a number of
important questions that this thesis will not address, which should be made explicit. This thesis is
not:
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(1) an examination of the history or ethics of covert propaganda or, by extension, an
argument about the ethical norms of U.S. government propaganda as a whole. Rather, I
narrowly focus on foreign-directed, overt propaganda;
(2) an examination of the effectiveness of any particular method of propaganda, so much as a
study of the types and methods of propaganda that U.S. government overt propagandists
believe to be both ethical and effective. The effectiveness of any particular propaganda
campaign or practice is, first, dependent entirely on context, and second, extremely
difficult to measure;
(3) an examination of propaganda whose target audiences were American citizens and/or
soldiers, either by the U.S. government or by foreign powers. As alluded to earlier,
American government propaganda against its own citizens is actually prohibited by the
Smith-Mundt Act (1948), while the nature of foreign government propaganda is a
fascinating, but entirely separate area of inquiry;
(4) an examination of propaganda, covert or overt, directed at foreign soldiers, rather than at
foreign civilians. Though our civilian-directed propaganda institutions were born of war,
early propagandists successfully argued to make those institutions permanent by noting
the importance of winning the hearts and minds of civilian audiences in peacetime,
hoping to avoid future wars;
(5) an examination of propaganda by states other than the United States, though at times I
will briefly discuss them and their propaganda for comparative purposes;
(6) an examination of propaganda by non-democracies, as I am primarily interested in
exploring the contours of ethical propaganda, while non-democratic states have few
incentives to behave ethically when propagandizing their or other citizens;

xxii

(7) an examination of institutional censorship, although censorship may be considered the
converse of propaganda, given that what we refuse to allow to be said can be just as
important to understanding our message as what we insist on saying.
Beyond these questions unaddressed, I believe it is also important to articulate one key
assumption I am making about the validity of my sources. Namely, that over the decades, the
marching orders and internal memoranda found in official U.S. government archives, along with
the speeches, memoirs, and Congressional testimony by key U.S. propagandists, accurately
reflects the thoughts and values of those writing them. Essentially, I am forced to assume that
these individuals were honest brokers, not countermanding documents written to please the written
record with later verbal orders that violated their spirit. To some extent, the writings of those who
have already left government help effectively make this case: at a certain point, there would be no
significant reason to dissemble, other than to maintain one’s virtuous appearance. But more
importantly, here I can invoke my own experience as a twenty-first century government
propagandist. My fellow co-workers, I have found, are honest and earnest. They take extremely
seriously the law, executive orders, and internal policy memoranda, and make good faith efforts
to hew not only to their letter but their spirit. In fourteen years of service, I have never once been
asked to lie for my country, and am convinced that my colleagues would uniformly view such a
request as beyond the pale. I have faith then, but no objectively provable evidence, that my
propaganda forebears were similarly motivated, and am convinced as such by the memoirs of those
who continued to champion the “strategy of truth” longer after their government service had ended.
It is my hope that my fellow propagandists – whom I consider to be highly ethical,
idealistic, and highly competent professionals, will benefit from this examination of the history of
the cultural blinders we all wear. If I did not fundamentally believe in the positive transformative
xxiii

potential of the United States government to incrementally remake the world, reduce suffering,
and create peace – despite significant evidence to the contrary – I would not continue in this line
of work. It is my belief that by making our propaganda more effective – while continuing to center
it in a clear ethical framework appropriate to the 21st century – that we can continue to make the
world “better,” one day at a time.
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1

A Historiography of (Ethical) Propaganda

1.1

Introduction

This chapter discusses the origins and historical uses of the word propaganda, as well as how 20th
century scholars understood the term. Those uninterested in this particular story need only
understand the definition I am using in this paper: the selective and intentional use of information
via mass media by a politically, socially, or economically powerful institution to attempt to
persuade a specific audience to believe or do something in particular.
Propaganda, for English speakers at least, is a dirty word, but it hasn’t always been this
way. From its origins in the early 17th century, in fact, it maintained a neutral connotation, at first
closely associated with religious proselytizing. The term only gained a uniformly negative valence
at the close of the First World War, when the American public began to suspect that government
propagandists had manipulated them with overly emotional and sometimes false information, to
lure them into a war they now began to regret.
Despite the commonly held negative perception, I use the term deliberately to describe the
activities of the Department of State’s Bureau of Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy, which
manages outreach to, and persuasion of, mass audiences in 181 countries around the world. This
requires some explanation, as many of my public affairs colleagues within the Department of State
would likely flinch as such a characterization, perhaps unaware of the fact that their forebears
openly and consciously described themselves as propagandists, including in on the record,
Congressional testimony.

1

In this chapter, I will explore the history of the term propaganda and how it has been
understood over time by scholars, rather than the general public or even by U.S. government
propagandists, who have typically worked at a remove from theory. Second, I will explore the
question of whether propaganda can ever be ethical, and if so, what the characteristics of such
propaganda might be. My answer, in short, is an unqualified yes, which hopefully brings some
comfort to my fellow propagandists, whom I see as deeply committed to clear, but often unspoken,
ethical professional standards. Finally, I will compare various propaganda scholars’ definitions of
the both propaganda and ethical propaganda, and propose my own definition for use within the
scope of this paper.

1.2

Early Uses and Understandings of the Term
Almost every historian of propaganda begins with the same origin story. 1 In 1622, Pope

Gregory XV issued a papal bull2 called the Inscrutabili Divinae, which established the “Sacra
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide,” or, in English, the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of
the Faith. Its mission was to win back those lapsed Catholics who had converted to Protestantism
during the Reformation.3 Latin language enthusiasts will note that in its original usage, these forms
of propaganda had largely agricultural meanings, underscoring the later connotation of planting,
cultivating, and propagating ideas and metaphors.4 Colloquially, the Catholic group soon became

Use of the term propaganda actually goes back further. Propaganda scholar Nicholas Cull notes that “Ignatius
Loyala reintroduce[d] the term in 1538 or so in his formula for the Jesuit Order,” and that it was further used ‘in the
later 1500s within the Vatican.” Nicholas Cull in personal email with the author, May 2022.
2
A papal bull is a type of decree issued by a Catholic pope, named after the lead seal used to authenticate it. The seal
is called a bulla in Latin.
3
Guilday, Peter, “The Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide,” Catholic Historical Review 6, no. 4 (Jan 1921):
480.
4
Cunningham, Stanley, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction, (Westport. Praeger Publishers, 2002): 16.
1
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known as “the propaganda,” and for the next two hundred years the term was largely synonymous
with evangelical persuasion.5
By the middle of the 19th century, however, the term had started to expand in meanings,
not all of them positive. The 1842 edition of Brande’s Dictionary of Science, for example, defined
propaganda as “a term of reproach to secret associations for the spread of opinions and principles
which are viewed by most governments with horror and aversion.”6 That is to say, by this period
it was already being used as a synonym for what we think of as disinformation, though not yet
associated with government activity.
From 1850-1900, the New York Times published the term “propaganda” over 1,500 times,
though the vast majority of those instances referred specifically to religious proselytizing, typically
Catholic, though occasionally Mormon or Muslim.

Other articles used it in other senses,

concordant with what modern readers would understand as “lobbying” or “policy advocacy,” but
treated it as a neutral descriptive term.7 From 1900-1910, however, the New York Times’ use of
the term began to shift, often associating the term with violent activities and political movements,
though still maintaining its earlier uses as religious propaganda and political advocacy.8
In late December, 1919, however, propaganda came to see a much closer association to
Communism, with dozens of New York Times articles connecting the two, likely a result of Lenin’s
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use of the terms agitprop and propaganda as central to his revolutionary project.9 In the early
1920s, however, despite a still strong semantic relationship in Times articles between Communism
and propaganda, its use began to expand in the wake of World War I. Times authors now clearly
understood propaganda to have a link to other terms like insidious, dangerous, credulity, halftruths, forged, slandered, and malice, as well as to “provoking racial passions,” and “poison[ing]
the sources of intelligence.10 By 1923, however, the term had already been so overused by as a
term of derision by various opposing camps that one Times writer complained that “the distinction
between propaganda and information is logically almost impossible to draw.”11
Meanwhile, Times readers, through their experience with the World War I-era Committee
on Public Information (a U.S. propaganda agency), were now hyper-aware of foreign government
attempts to persuade them, with various Times articles charting League of Nations, Polish,
German, French, and Russian government attempts to sway American public opinion.12 This was
reflected in dramatically increased coverage of the term beginning in the run up to World War I.
The attention paid continued to rise in use of the term propaganda through the end of World War
II, immediately after which the New York Times’ use of the term plunged dramatically, bottoming
out in the 1970s-1990s before a brief uptick during the Second Gulf War.

Exemplar New York Times articles using the term propaganda include “Lenin Selling Jewels for Red Propaganda,”
December 24, 1919; “Martens Linked With Reds’ Plot,” December 28, 1919; “Reds Seek War With America,”
December 30, 1919; “American Refugee Leads Mexico Reds,” December 26, 1919; “Wide Plot of Reds to Spread
Chaos in This Country,” December 26, 1919; and “German Confesses Plotting in Mexico,” December 27, 1919.
10
“Propaganda in Japan,” The New York Times, November 27, 1921, 47.
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26.
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Figure 1-1: New York Times Mentions of Keyword Terms, 1851-Present

Note: A comparison of the frequency of the terms propaganda, apple, and corn over time within
the New York Times. Dummy terms apple and corn were used to differentiate between a general
increase in number of stories or words printed, versus actual frequency of use. Though both
propaganda and corn saw relative spikes at similar times, apple saw no such increase, implying
that greater coverage of these terms was not simply a matter of an increase in news stories overall.
By the end of World War I, the term propaganda had acquired a negative sheen, as
Americans began to re-examine the information and arguments that had been used by the
government propaganda bureau, the Committee on Public Information (CPI), to persuade them to
back U.S. entry into the war.13 This cynical valence continues to last to the present day, with most
native speakers of English considering the term to be equivalent to terms like disinformation, lying,
or manipulation.
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Figure 1-2: Synonyms and Related Words for Propaganda

1.3

Early Propaganda Studies and Scholars
Several of the consulting propagandists in the CPI went on to relative success in

advertising, public relations, or social science. Many of them, however, deeply disagreed with
each other on the lessons learned from the experience, the nature and definition of propaganda, the
ability of propagandists to meaningfully persuade publics, the dangers that propaganda posed to
democracy, the ethics of employing propaganda, and its necessity to maintaining public order.
They clashed on how to conceive of propaganda, with differing focuses on its content, impact,
intent, and techniques as central to propaganda’s definition. These academic arguments would not
greatly impact the public perception of the word propaganda, although they would open up new
avenues of research, and expose the fundamental difficulties in providing an objective definition
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of the term that would satisfy all parties in all contexts. Next, I will explore some of those key
voices in the historical, academic debate.
Edward Bernays
Edward Bernays was one of several key figures in the field of propaganda in the 1920s and
1930s, and is often credited with inventing the field of public relations. Though some of his claims
were overblown, he was a revolutionary thinker, many of whose ideas have survived to the present
day. He outlined what is today called the “magic bullet” theory of propaganda in his seminal 1928
work Propaganda, arguing that propagandists were an “invisible government which is the true
ruling power of our country,” which “pull the wires which control the public mind, … harness old
social forces, and contrive new ways to bind and guide the world.”14 Importantly, however, he
caveated this with an optimistic belief that the public, broadly speaking, could easily see through
blatant lies, and that propaganda could not make people want things that were manifestly not in
their interest.15
Bernays did not see propaganda as a negative, so much as inevitable, going so far as to
call it “an important element in democratic society” because it reduced the confusion associated
with living in an increasingly complex and technological world down to a few realistic and
meaningful choices.16

As a result, he saw propaganda not only as a right, but an actual

responsibility for those interested in maintaining the democratic project. Propaganda, he believed,
was the only means of focusing the attention of the public on the specific information required to
make meaningful electoral choices.17 Previewing a larger political conflict which would likely
14
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never be truly resolved, Bernays also argued that propaganda should not simply be limited to the
exigencies of wartime, but should rather be a permanent peacetime endeavor.18
Like most later propaganda theorists, he agreed that propaganda was born of, necessitated
and made possible by the birth of a mass communications society.19 Mass communications, he
argued, connected people to ideas and ideologies they were not prepared to intellectually manage
given their “local and sectional limitations.” Those same mass communications technologies
simultaneously provided propagandists with the means to reach those individuals with a clarifying
message.20
In this way, Bernays somewhat was somewhat prescient, foreseeing social scientist Leon
Festinger’s 1957 cognitive dissonance theory.21 That theory argues that when individuals are
confronted with multiple conflicting beliefs, an inner drive for ideological harmony causes us to
look for solutions that can reduce or eliminate that dissonance. Propaganda, Bernays argued, could
provide precisely those solutions. Accordingly, he was also one of the first propaganda scholars
to clearly connect social science research directly to the endeavor. That said, with social science
still in its infancy, many of Bernays’ beliefs were based on gut feelings rather than hard data.
Though seemingly obvious as propaganda tools today, Bernays was an early innovator of
techniques like audience analysis, the study and use of implicit associations when making word
choices, and the necessity of taking the message to wherever the people happened to be.22
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Well aware of the negative connotations of the term at the time of publication, Bernays
further argued, like a plurality of scholars after him, that propaganda itself was value-neutral. The
ethicality of any particular propaganda, he wrote, “depend[ed] upon the merit of the cause urged,
and the correctness of the information propaganda.” In this Bernays established the ethical criteria
of reasonable ends and truth as central to propaganda’s evaluation, though this was essentially
where his ethical analysis stopped.23 Fortunately for other later scholars, there were still many
important ethical questions left to explore.
Walter Lippmann
A contemporary of Bernays, Lippmann at first shared his elitist views toward society,
arguing in his 1922 work Public Opinion that “the mass of absolutely illiterate, feeble–minded,
grossly neurotic, undernourished and frustrated individuals is very considerable, much more
considerable there is reason to think than we generally suppose.”24 Based on this presumption, he
agreed that propaganda was necessary to the maintenance of a democratic society, channeling
Hamilton and Madison’s fears of mob rule overcoming democratic institutions.25 This was not
entirely due to an inherent intelligence or higher level of rationality among these elite
propagandists – or what he termed a “relative faculty of discrimination – but also due to their
privileged access to key context and information afforded them by their elite positions.26 Thus,
per Lippmann, the question of who should become a propagandist was essentially a sociological
one.
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His analysis, however, of whether propaganda could be successful rested more on the
methods of individual psychology. In agreement with Bernays, Lippmann argued that a successful
propagandist needed to know both their target audience as well as their capacity for understanding
a given level of complexity.27 But going beyond Bernays, Lippmann clearly articulated ideas later
proven by research about the ways in which deeply-held ideas can be intertwined with our sense
of identity, and thus highly resistant to challenge.28
Lippmann also further developed Bernays’ ideas of the inevitability of propaganda in a
highly technological society, writing that “because the human mind is unable to image the actual
complexity of the world, we reduce it through simplification and representative symbols. This fact
of the human mind is ultimately what makes propaganda possible, as it plays in the space between
actual reality and perceived reality.”29

It is of note that by 1919, Lippmann had become

significantly more skeptical of the dangers of propaganda to democracy.30 Following Bernays and
Lippmann, however, it would take another World War to inspire further scholarly work to
significantly advance the field.

Harold Elsten
Intrigued by the question of whether propaganda could co-exist comfortably with
democracy, during World War II scholars like Harold Elsten began exploring what that might look
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like, providing some of the first serious research into the ethics of propaganda.31 Adding to
Bernays’ formulation of reasonable ends and truth, Elsten added that ethical, democratic
propaganda needed to hew to several additional factors. First, it needed to respect the inherent and
equal dignity of all people, avoiding arousing negative passions against any group. Second, it
should focus on promoting equality of opportunity rather than equal outcomes. Third, it must not
privilege any group of citizens over another, and fourth, it must not try to monopolize the
communications space or censor alternative narratives. Unlike totalitarian propaganda, Elsten
argued, democratic propaganda should try to meet the people on their own terms, rather than
setting the terms. As to propaganda’s sister, censorship, he believed that it was only justified when
speech was being used to undermine or destroy democracy itself.
Leonard Doob
Other key scholars of the period, meanwhile, were busily focused on developing
propaganda studies into a somewhat empirical science. They tested various aspects of message
context and content to determine which combinations were the most persuasive. Eventually, these
scholars, like Leonard Doob, would go on to found the academic field of Communications.
Doob, who worked with the U.S. propaganda organization the Office of War Information
(OWI) during World War II, published his theories on propaganda in his seminal Public Opinion
and Propaganda (1948). Focused on how to break down propaganda into manageable parts to be
studied empirically, Doob proposed a six-aspect framework for studying communication:
1) who, 2) says what, 3) with what perceptual impact, 4) with what initial response, 5) leading to
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what changes in the audience, 6) leading to which actions by the audience.32 Oddly, he did not
include the key question of to whom, which became central to his contemporary Harold Lasswell’s
research (see below).
Doob was also one of the first to attempt to seriously tease apart the distinction between
education and propaganda, at least in a way that treated propaganda as a value-neutral term.33
Responding to educator and psychologist Everett Martin, who argued that “education aims at
independence of judgment [while] propaganda offers ready-made opinions for the unthinking
herd,” Doob saw the story as significantly more complex.34 Instead, he argued that education and
propaganda were intimately tangled, with propaganda determined relativistically, and primarily
by the ends in mind: namely, “ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a
particular time.”35
Foreshadowing a later significant thinker, Jacques Ellul, Doob was one of the first to argue
that propaganda need not be an intentional activity, but that individuals could easily be unwitting
propagandists. This contrasted with his contemporary Harold Lasswell, who disagreed with
Doob’s thesis that such propaganda “can be the consequence of social or economic events in which
intentional propaganda has played little or no part,” such as unintentionally sharing symbols
favored by Communists when such symbols were not recognized by the sharer.36
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Carl Hovland
Hovland was a research psychologist recruited to develop techniques for attitude change
and persuasion during World War II in the OWI. Notably, he was among the first to seriously
challenge the prevailing view that propaganda could have sizeable persuasive effects. He went on
to become one of the leading psychological researchers on the science of persuasion, discovering
the “sleeper effect,” for example, which showed that a particular propaganda intervention may
have no immediate impact, but that effects might appear after some period of time. He is also
credited with developing groupthink theory, as well as social judgment theory, which holds that
your ability to be persuaded by a certain group depends on the extent to which you see yourself as
belonging to that group.
One of his major wartime contributions was empirically debunking Bernays’ “magic
bullet” theory, by showing that even films developed specifically as pre-battle propaganda for U.S.
soldiers had no impact on their willingness to fight. One of his major studies focused on studying
the impacts of film propaganda on U.S. soldiers. Propaganda, he concluded, could effectively
inform, but could not necessarily persuade. Instead, he argued, propaganda was most likely to be
effective if it conformed to five separate factors: 1) it speaks to an individuals needs and wants at
the moment; 2) it does not conflict with valued group norms; 3) it comes from a trusted source; 4)
it packages the message in an form acceptable to the audience; and 5) it informs the audience how
to act and how to overcome any possible obstacles to the desired action.37 Hovland pushed
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propaganda researchers to question the previous assumption that it was possible to study the mass
audience as a whole, divorced from individual experiences, histories, and psychologies.
Harold Lasswell
Somewhat of a Renaissance man, Harold Lasswell bridged the gap between scientist and
philosopher, considering both how to define propaganda in a way that allowed it to be empirically
studied, but also questioning how to construct an ethical propaganda that made sense in a
democracy. Credited with the first use of the term “democratic propaganda,” Lasswell to some
extent channeled Bernays in his belief that “Americans should stop worrying and learn to love
mass persuasion as nothing more than a technique of modern governance that could serve a
benevolent purpose.”38 Or, in his own words, “men are often poor judges of their own interests,
flitting from one alternative to the next without solid reason, or clinging timorously to the
fragments of some mossy rock of ages.”39 Deeply impacted by widespread public disappointment
in the 1920s over the outcomes of post-war European democratization, Lasswell was convinced
that democracy itself required ardent defenders.40
Lasswell, like Bernays, was also convinced that propaganda was inevitable. From his
perspective, the primary ethical question for propagandists was whether to do their work overtly
or covertly, but he believed that this was also a moot point. When practicing genuinely democratic
propaganda, he wrote, “there is nothing to be gained by concealment, and there is a certain loss of
prestige for all that is said, when secrecy is attempted.”41 He also argued that propagandists should
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drive public policy, rather than responding to it.42 This was, in fact, a major sticking point that
later led to significant disruption in the OWI and the firing of many of its senior leaders.43
On the social science side, Lasswell came up with one of the most widely accepted 20th
century definitions of communication, which shared many features with the definition provided
by Doob: who says what to whom, with what affect, and later adding in which channel.44 Unlike
Doob, however, he believed that propaganda by definitional had to be conscious and intentional,
with clear objectives in mind, even if those objectives were not met.45 Propaganda, Lasswell
wrote, was “the manipulation of symbols as a means of influencing attitudes on controversial
matters.”46
With respect to ethics, he agreed with his contemporaries that “propaganda as a mere tool
is no more moral or immoral than a pump handle.”47 Unlike his contemporaries, though, he saw
no particular ethical issues with misinformation as propaganda; rather, he simply dismissed lies as
ineffective.48 Finally, he previewed significant later scholarly debates by arguing, as propaganda
theorist Jacques Ellul did twenty years later, that propaganda’s aims are always about behavioral
change, rather than simply about changing ideas or attitudes.49
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1.4

Later Social Science Perspectives
Perhaps sensing the negative perception of the term propaganda during the early Cold War

period, few social science researchers of the era focused explicitly on what made propaganda
effective. In fact, despite an overall increase in academic publishing, studies with the term
propaganda in their title actually decreased in the immediate post war period (See Figure 3).
Instead, within the burgeoning academic field of Communications, many experiments measured
either how to successfully persuade individuals on a one-to-one basis, or looked at the overall
impact of mass communications on society, without a particular focus on persuasion.
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Figure 1-3: Book and Scholarly Article Mentions of Keyword Terms, 1850-Present

Source: Data retrieved from Google Scholar for books and scholarly articles including
propaganda, apple, or corn in their title. Scale is set to show the post-war drop in publishing on
propaganda, as fluctuations in growth are later overshadowed by the overall dramatic growth in
publishing on all topics.

Joseph Klapper
One researcher to buck this trend was Joseph Klapper, whose 1960 work The Effects of
Mass Communication centered the question of how to persuade mass audiences through mass
communications technologies.

Building on Hovland, Klapper’s work primarily examined

laboratory studies, but used these results to attempt to extrapolate a theory of how and under what
conditions mass media could be used for effective propaganda.
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Klapper’s research findings buttressed Hovland’s ideas that “the effects of mass
communications are likely to differ, depending on whether the communication is or is not in accord
with the norms of the groups to which the audience belongs.” It also expanded on Hovland’s work
debunking “magic bullet” theory, arguing that mass communication on its own was not sufficient
to lead to persuasion, but rather depended on a network of “mediating factors and influences.”50
Klapper’s work highlighted the fact that “persuasive mass communication functions far more
frequently as an agent of reinforcement than an agent of change,” with actual opinion changes
being rare.51

According to Klapper, then, propagandists should primarily spend their time

preaching to the choir, rather than trying to win new converts.52
Klapper’s work did, however, highlight a new and previously understudied audience for
propagandists: youth. His research revealed that it was significantly easier to create new attitudes
than it was to change existing ones. He was also the first to establish that the most effective form
of argumentation, at least according to experimental research, was to present both sides of an
argument while also attacking the contrary viewpoint. Other important findings included the
importance of making conclusions explicit rather than implicit, the effectiveness of having
audiences make a public commitment to a desired behavior, framing desired behaviors as ways of
meeting an audience’s existing perceived needs, and making use of the bandwagon effect, the idea
that “everybody else is doing it.”53 In short, Klapper revealed that there was no meaningful answer
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to the question of whether a certain type of propaganda was “effective” – it depended entirely upon
the context, audience and methods.54

1.5

Ellul: A Conundrum Ahead of His Time
French philosopher, sociologist, and Christian anarchist Jacques Ellul shook the

foundations of propaganda studies in 1962 with his book Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s
Attitudes. Very few people seemed to notice, however, until the 1970s and particularly the 1980s,
when his radical challenge to orthodox thinking about propaganda finally began to be understood.
Rather than simply analyzing what was commonly understood to be propaganda, Ellul sought to
articulate an actual theory of propaganda.
Prior to Ellul, propaganda had been framed as something that powerful men (this was, after
all, the 1960s) did to less powerful audiences. Orthodox debates included whether this was
necessarily conscious and intentional, or also possibly unintentional; whether to focus on
techniques, content, or outcomes; and how, when and why propaganda was effective. Ellul rejected
this entire framework, along with the idea that propaganda could be broken down into constituent
parts and studied under laboratory conditions.55 Instead, he proposed that propaganda was a
sociological phenomenon – as opposed to an individual or small group act.56
There were, however, aspects of previous scholarship that he embraced, such as the
inevitability of propaganda in the context of mass communications, the idea that such propaganda
was substantively different than the forms of persuasion present in the pre-industrial era, and the
idea that study in the modern fields of psychology and sociology were required to properly

54

Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication, 2.
Ellul, Jacques, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, (New York. Vintage Books, 1973): 19-20.
56
Ellul, Propaganda, xvii, 7.
55

19

understand it.57 Ellul also rejected the World War I-era popular (but not scholarly) consensus that
propaganda could make individuals do things against their own interest, and instead argued that
propaganda was a joint, consensual – if often unconscious – construction requiring the efforts of
both the propagandist and the propagandee.58 He also argued that while propaganda could not be
broken down into parts, it was possible to separately analyze various sub-species of propaganda,
for example differentiating totalitarian from democratic propaganda.59
Ellul’s analysis had some serious shortcomings, however.

He often defined the

phenomenon as if it only included successful attempts at persuasion, and his various definitions of
the term sociological propaganda, or his synonym pre-propaganda, often seem a better match to
terms like socialization, education, acculturation or inculcation.60 He also, confusingly, describes
mass audiences at times as passive instruments, and at other times as active agents in their own
propaganda processes, without fully reckoning with this contradiction.61 Last, Ellul presumes the
existence of an authentic, pre-existing self, constituted of a network of ingrained and innate beliefs
and preferences which were in no way shaped by the society that individual grew up in: a self that
somehow exists outside of society, and whose purity can only be corrupted by it.62
Essentially, Ellul proposed a model in which psychological processes were fused into a
larger sociological context to try to explain a broad phenomenon of persuasive activities and their
outcomes. His work was a radical rethinking of the concept of propaganda, and of the appropriate
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way for scholars to engage the topic.63 Ellul’s work would influence scholars in the decades to
come, though other than Noam Chomsky, few significant propaganda theorists would fully
embrace Ellul’s vision until the 21st century.
Figure 1-4: Google Scholar Citations of Jacques Ellul: 1962-Present

1.6

The 1980s: A New Academic Interest in Propaganda
After propaganda was largely ignored by the academic community from the 1950s to the

1970s, academics such as political scientist Terence Qualter, the communications scholars Garth
Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, and sociologists David Altheide and John Johnson relaunched the
field’s inquiries into propaganda with their respective works Opinion Control in the Democracies
(1985), Propaganda and Persuasion (1986), and Bureaucratic Propaganda (1980). Qualter
provided an exposition on the history of thought regarding the practicality of mass democracy over
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and Christianity (2005) that he did not speak English, and was therefore likely unfamiliar with Easton’s work, which
appears not to have been translated into French up to the present day.
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elite-led democracy, and tried to provide definitions for the terms fact, lie and opinion, which had
previously been treated as obvious by propaganda scholars.64
Picking up where Lippmann and Hovland left off, he argued that focusing on persuasive
techniques was irrelevant unless combined with an understanding of the individual context and
psychology of the person to be propagandized.65 Qualter rejected magic bullet theory, embraced
an understanding of cognitive dissonance as essential to propaganda, and, like Lasswell, centered
the idea of intent within his definition of propaganda.66 Reviewing the works of other scholars
including Ellul, Altheide and Johnson (see below), Qualter further fleshed out the reasons why he,
like Bernays, Lasswell, and Ellul, believed propaganda was both inevitable and essential to a
democracy.67 His largest contribution, however, was reframing attention away from active
propaganda towards subtle forms of censorship, arguing that “withholding information [is more
influential than propaganda at] provok[ing] change in established, socially supportive attitudes,”
and that “the media do not apparently have much effect in telling us what to think, but they are
astonishingly effective in limiting the things we shall think about.” In this, he and Ellul helped
pave the way for later works by scholars like Noam Chomsky, who argued that media inattention
to certain stories was much more damaging to democracy than active propaganda measures.
Altheide and Johnson, meanwhile, provided the world with one of the first genuinely new
ideas about propaganda in two decades. Namely, that in addition to the “traditional” form of
propaganda in which elite actors try to persuade mass audiences, that institutions also engaged in
a parallel and entirely separate form of propaganda, which they called “bureaucratic
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propaganda.”68 The entire purpose of that propaganda was existential in nature: to convince those
making funding decisions, directly or indirectly, to continue to finance the institution’s operations.
Altheide and Johnson provided important context for Ellul’s theory of sociological propaganda,
by elucidating a plausible mechanism by which this informational propaganda might actually be
transferred through institutions based on their innate desire for survival. Altheide and Johnson
also foreshadowed later arguments from Chomsky about the means, mechanisms, and reasons for
which the mass media could act propagandistically.69

Finally, Jowett and O’Donnell’s

Propaganda and Persuasion tried to articulate the essential difference between those two terms.
They find their answer not in content, techniques, or outcome, but rather in purpose. Propaganda,
they argued, “is essentially self-serving,” while persuasion is ostensibly motivated by, and leads
to benefits for, both the persuader and the persuaded.70
Later, other authors – particularly in the field of communications, which had largely
ignored propaganda studies – also began to engage these questions. Communications scholars
Michael Sproule published Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and
Mass Persuasion in 1997, followed by his colleague Philip Taylor’s Munitions of the Mind: A
History of Propaganda in 2003. Sproule’s book provided an excellent summary of the field of
propaganda studies through the 20th century, and divided early propaganda into ideologicallymotivated categories, including humanism, professionalism, scientism, and polemical.71 Taylor
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retold much of that same historical narrative, while embracing Qualter’s formulation of intent and
benefit to the propagandist as central to propaganda’s definition. He also further articulated the
idea of “democratic propaganda,” advancing Lasswell and Elsten’s work, and like most 20 th
century scholars, argued that propaganda itself was value-neutral.72

1.7

Chomsky: Another Disrupter
Almost thirty years after Ellul’s seminal work, linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky

published yet another genuinely disruptive work, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy
of the Mass Media, with his co-author Edward Herman in 1988.73 Similar to Ellul, Chomsky was
frustrated that his academic colleagues seemed to be missing the propaganda forest for the trees.
Though scholars such as Jowett, O’Donnell, Qualter, Altheide and Johnson had incorporated some
aspects of Ellul’s work into their studies, their analysis and framing still essentially treated
propaganda as an intentional activity comprised of discrete units of propaganda, with a clear
division between propagandist and propagandee.
Chomsky, like Ellul, rejected this notion, arguing that the only appropriate frame of
reference to study propaganda was a whole-of-society perspective. Here, from 30,000 feet,
Chomsky told the story of how mass media institutions had been co-opted, he argued, to
propagandistically serve elite interests, almost incidental to the views, beliefs, or intent of any
individual actor within the system.74 Though Chomsky and Herman provide no bibliography, their
work also appears to build not only on Ellul but also upon Altheide and Johnson’s 1980 concept

72

Taylor, Philip, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 2003):
3, 6, 184.
73
Chomsky’s abridged 1991 follow up, Media Control, is so excruciatingly terrible that it should be avoided at all
costs.
74
Chomsky, Noam and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media, (New York.
Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1988): xiv, 1, 22, 31, 298.

24

of propaganda as an emergent property of a larger capitalist system, rather than orthodox ideas of
propaganda as a set of isolable, individual decisions.75
The weaknesses of other of Chomsky and Herman’s arguments comes into stark relief for
two reasons, however. First, though both are motivated by a passionate belief that anarchosyndicalism, rather than capitalism, should be the organizing principle behind human society, they
provide no means, mechanisms, or advice on how to move away from the problems they identify.76
Second, many of their claims have not survived first contact with the 21st century.77 Chomsky and
Herman argued that oligarchic control of the media was the source of problematic propaganda and
the reason that mass audiences were consistently duped as to the truth; yet in a social media world
in which anyone with a modicum of flair can attract millions of viewers to her point of view, social
fractures, wage disparities, disillusion with democracy, and war itself have expanded, rather than
contracted as Chomsky’s analysis would have predicted.

1.8

The Question of Ethics and Morality in Propaganda
Well over a dozen scholars have moved beyond attempting to define propaganda itself, to

an inquiry into when, whether, and under what circumstances certain forms of propaganda might
be ethical. These individuals came overwhelmingly from the field of communications, though
also include experts in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, and rhetoric. The
overwhelming majority of these studies did not begin until the 1990s, with a new golden age of
ethical research into propaganda occurring in the early 2000s. By the 2010s, deep dives into the
ethics of persuasive communication were becoming a standard part of that field’s textbooks.
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Before I begin describing the ethical controversies in propaganda, however, I want to make
clear why I refer exclusively to ethical, rather than moral issues. Many moral philosophers,
political scientists and historians conflate the terms ethics and morals when discussing the ethics
of international relations, but I am intentionally keeping the two separate. Though in a given
system, what is perceived to be ethical and what is perceived to be moral often almost entirely
overlap, the two concepts are distinct.
Ethics, in the sense that I am using it, refers to a system of rules or procedures that attempt
to lead to the highest overall utility within a system, or the highest overall justice, or level of
equality or fairness. Sometimes, what is ethical may conflict with what is moral. King Solomon’s
proposal to divide a child in two, for example, may have been ethical in that it leads to equal
outcomes for both aggrieved parties, but could hardly be considered moral.
A less extreme example might be a lawyer defending, and winning the case against a
murderer she knows to be guilty. While ethically bound to provide the best possible defense for
her client, it is unlikely that the family of the victim would consider the act moral. It’s in this same
sense that I seek to articulate an ethical code for public diplomacy practitioners. As with a lawyer
and her client, we share the same responsibility to be ethical vis-a-vis our work the government;
this rarely causes us concern, given that though the overwhelming majority of the time the ethical
choice for us will also be a moral (or at least morally neutral) choice. When we, as government
propagandists, have a moral conflict with a choice we are being asked to make, however, the only
ethical choice is to resign.
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1.9

The Question of Ethics: A Scholarly Perspective
A few scholars, such as philosopher Richard Paul and educational psychologist Linda

Elder, approach propaganda from the broader public perspective, and declare it essentially
unethical. Their purpose, however, lies primarily in helping audiences develop the critical thinking
skills necessary to identify disinformation and misinformation, not in developing a larger theory
of propaganda, or in helping propagandists become more successful at their work. Instead, their
2008 work The Thinker’s Guide for Conscientious Citizens on How to Detect Media Bias echoes
the 1930s era Institute for Propaganda Analysis, by highlighting techniques sometimes used by
propagandists, such as name calling, card stacking, and bandwagoning.78
Communications scholar Ted Smith began his 1989 compilation of essays Propaganda: A
Pluralistic Perspective with an overview of various ideological perspectives held among various
groups of early propagandists, and explored their differing ethical standards. The Humanists, he
writes, saw propaganda as inherently dangerous to democracy, and likely to be captured by
economic elites. In this light, they agreed with Paul and Elder, arguing that propaganda was
inherently unethical. The Professionals, like Bernays and his colleague Ivy Lee, argued that
propaganda was a helpful part of the marketplace of ideas, and that only a brief professional code
of ethical conduct was required, focusing on truth-telling and disclosing the source of information.
The Scientists, meanwhile, saw propaganda as ethically neutral, and focused on empirical studies
using content-analysis.79
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After a further exploration of the history of propaganda and its definitions, Smith concludes
that propaganda engages “the systematic use of irrational and often [but not always] unethical
techniques of persuasion.”80 Most of what he defines as unethical focuses on, like Paul and Elder,
techniques, rather than context, audience, or content. He cites, for example, historical revisionism,
selective truths that avoid pertinent facts, misuse of statistics, applying different standards to
different groups, and name calling as unethical instances of propaganda. 81 Other writers in his
book, however, also cite relevance and totality of truth as the primary arbiters of propaganda
ethics.82
Realpolitik philosopher Felix Oppenheim, meanwhile, argued in 1991 that propaganda was
essentially an amoral phenomenon, which could only be judged in light of a state’s ethical
obligation to act in its own material best interest. In Oppenheim’s reading, the truth of any
propagandistic statement, or the techniques used in advancing the claim, were irrelevant to its
ethicality. So long as a lie genuinely advanced a material interest, it was permissible.83
Directly challenging Oppenheim, political scientist Joel Rosenthal argued in 1996 that
foreign-policy driven propaganda could not be judged by a national interest-based rubric alone.
Rather, any such ethical checklist needed to consider “(1) how to balance justice and order; (2)
how to balance moral commitments with political realities; and (3) how to relate the insights of
philosophy and history to contemporary problems … while avoiding the perils of moralism and
absolutism on the one hand and empty relativism on the other.”84 Here, again, however, Rosenthal
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largely avoids narrowly focusing on specific techniques as the primary ethical guideline. In this,
I, as well as the following scholars, side with Rosenthal.
Philosopher Randal Marlin, in his 2003 Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion applied
Kantian ethics to the problem, and from Kant derived two specific rules. First, that what is ethical
must be something we can accept every other nation engaging in as well, and second, that it must
“show respect for people as ends in themselves rather than simply as a means to ends of our own.”85
After examining the traditions of utilitarianism, Marlin arrives at four basic ethical questions of
his own to be asked in each instance: 1) What is the motivation, and what are the outcomes?; 2)
Is the scope reasonable compared to the desired ends?; 3) Is it emotionally manipulative?; and 4)
Does the audience consent?86 In all of this, it is important to note that he treats propaganda as a
neutral tool, whose ethics can only be determined through examination.
Philosopher Stanley Cunningham, however, disagreed strongly with this point, arguing in
his 2002 work The Idea of Propaganda that propaganda is a priori an unethical activity, as
Cunningham’s definition centers on what he believes is its inherently deceptive nature. He argued
that “propaganda … exploits information; it poses as knowledge; it generates belief systems and
tenacious convictions; it skews perceptions; it systematically disregards superior epistemic values
such as truth and understanding; it corrupts reasoning and the respect for evidence, rigor, and
procedural safeguards [and is therefore] inherently a profoundly unethical state of social affairs.”87
Though Cunningham provides a truly masterful historiography of the idea of propaganda,
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ultimately, however, his definition of propaganda is so far afield of my own that I do not come to
the same conclusions.
Eight years later, communications scholar Denis McQuail proposed yet another ethical
rubric for propaganda, this time based on a compilation of principles found in codes for journalists.
This included nine key, though vaguely defined, points: 1) truthfulness of information; 2) clarity
of information; 3) acknowledgment of the responsibility involved in forming public opinion; 4)
respecting established standards for gathering and presenting information; 5) respecting the
integrity of sources; 6) a prohibition on race-, sex-, ethnicity-, or religious-based discrimination;
7) respect for individual privacy; and 8) the prohibition of bribes or any other benefits.

1.10

A Definition of Propaganda
It should be clear at this point that there are dozens of legitimate ways of defining the term

propaganda, varying primarily based on first premises as well as somewhat arbitrary choices as to
which potential aspects to include or exclude. Let us examine, then, the specific definitions
provided by various scholars over time to try to find a common ground (see Appendices A and G).
Thereafter, I will provide my own definition. My essential argument is that there will never be
one widely accepted, universal definition of the term, and that it is the responsibility of propaganda
scholars to clearly define their terms at the outset of their work, such that readers understand what,
precisely, is being discussed.
The differences in definitions provided by the eighteen scholars identified in Appendix A
can be broken down into roughly four categories: 1) the area of emphasis and framing of scholarly
study; 2) value judgments made about propaganda; 3) relevant mechanics and attributes of
propaganda; and 4) propaganda’s outcomes.
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Table 1-1: Differences in Definitions of Propaganda by Category

Scholarly Emphasis

1) The mass audience can be studied as a collective
(sociological approach) OR the mass audience must be
studied as a collection of individuals (psychological
approach);
2) A focus on tactics or behaviors OR a focus on outcomes
OR a focus on context;
3) Seen as identical to, overlapping with, or distinct from
other concepts such as education, advertising, and
persuasion.
4) A timeless phenomenon OR one enabled my mass society.

Value Judgments

1) Seen as inherently unethical;
2) Seen as amoral, with contextual ethics;
3) Seen as necessary and beneficial.

Mechanics
Attributes

and

1) Deliberate, conscious, and intentional OR this is irrelevant;
2) A top-down endeavor versus OR a two-way, mutualistic
endeavor;
3) Systematic OR disorganized and organic;
4) Always untruthful OR sometimes untruthful;
5) Concealed OR overt source;
6) Powerful institutional driver OR mass phenomenon;
7) Relies on specific, defined methods OR methods are
irrelevant.

Outcomes

1) Harms the target OR may or may not harm the target OR
beneficial to the target;
2) Always successful OR sometimes successful.
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Based on only the above matrix, there are almost 24 million mathematically possible,
distinct definitions for the term propaganda, none of which seem any more objectively correct than
any other. So how shall we make sense of this? Another way to try to define propaganda might
be to divide the practice of communication down into a sort of taxonomic key (see Figure 2).
Obviously, such a key should not be taken too literally, as certain sub-types of communication are
not clearly the descendants of other sub-types.

That said, such a framework can help

simultaneously express the complications of any definition, while also forcing scholars to be
precise about what definition they choose to use for any given purpose. It is important, however,
to understand that any such key applied to non-empirical systems such as communication must
necessarily be only a metaphor, not an authoritative guide.
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Figure 1-5: The Author’s Location of Modern, American Propaganda

Again, emphasizing that such a key should not be taken literally, using the above framework, I
am ready to propose and explain my definition of propaganda. The red circle shows an example
of one possible way to define propaganda, but a red line could be drawn and justified around almost
any combination of the above.
First, I side with those theorists who define propaganda as value-neutral. Like a chainsaw,
propaganda has inherent dangers associated with it, but can ultimately be used to benefit or harm
individuals, groups, and societies. I do not presume that falsehood is essential to propaganda, nor
33

do I believe that specific techniques are useful in its definition. I agree with most of the scholars
cited earlier that propaganda is essentially a modern phenomenon enabled by mass
communications technology, and that most pre-20th century activities sometimes so labeled are
instead propagandistic, but not propaganda in a useful sense of the term. I agree that, depending
on the context, education, advertising and persuasion can all be forms of propaganda, and in
contrast to Ellul and Chomsky, I define propaganda both as consciously intentional and as a topdown activity. Unlike Ellul and some other scholars, I do not agree that propaganda must be
successful to be so defined.
My definition of propaganda, for the purpose of this research, is as follows: the selective
and intentional use of information via mass media by a politically, socially, or economically
powerful institution to attempt to persuade a specific audience to believe or do something in
particular.

1.11

A Definition of Ethical Propaganda
Having chosen to define propaganda as a value-neutral proposition, it is still important,

however, to differentiate between ethical and unethical propaganda. Almost as many scholars
have attempted to tackle this problem as have attempted to define propaganda itself. A few
propositions, however, seem to be common threads.
A. Truth: Almost all definitions of an ethical propaganda (or inferring from definitions of
unethical propaganda) center themselves on the essential truthfulness of a message.
There is, however, widespread acknowledgement of the fact that truth itself is somewhat
subjective, and that a speaker cannot reasonably provide “the whole” truth of any given
matter, given time and resource limitations. In that sense, ethicists have focused on
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whether the propagandist gives the relevant truth to the audience, namely, all the
information a “reasonable person” would conclude that an audience would want to know
about a subject in order to make up their own mind. Cunningham further holds that it is
not enough to simply tell the truth; the propagandist must dearly hold truth as a cherished
value in order for the activity to be ethical (which he deems impossible.) Interestingly,
Ellul argues precisely the opposite, that to be an effective propagandist, one must
“abandon their confidence in the truth.” 88
B. Duty of Care: Sometimes focused on a duty of care to society, sometimes on the
individual, and sometimes on both, ethicists posit that the propaganda should not
negatively impact the propagandee, at least from the viewpoint of a neutral, third-party
observer. This would include inciting any form of group-directed hatred or social
division. Chomsky extends this analysis to any propaganda that advances the interests of
the powerful, but this is not a commonly held view. Others, like Qualter, argue that this
duty of care centers on propaganda that specifically advances democratic, rather than
totalitarian forms of government.
C. Overt Source: Several ethicists, as far back as Bernays and Ivy Lee, have posited that
identifying the source of information is another clear ethical guideline. Non-scholarly
propagandists, like Thomas Sorensen, however, have often disagreed.89
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D. Acknowledging Other Points of View: Some scholars, such as Henderson and Elston,
have argued that an ethical propagandist must acknowledge the existence of other
arguments, or at least make no attempt to censor them.90
E. Cultivates Reason: Cunningham, Smith and others have also argued that an ethical
propaganda must not undermine the ability to logically reason, and must have as its goal
understanding rather than confusion.91
F. Relevant Emotions: Larson argues that to the extent that a propagandist engages
emotional reasoning, that the emotions must be relevant to the cause in mind; for
example, it would be unethical to propagandize against a proposed dam project by
inciting hatred against the Korean-American owners, but it would be ethical to incite
anger about the likely loss of property.92
Essentially, I agree with all of the above formulations. Ethical propaganda, in my view, is
propaganda whose core values include truth, beneficence, reason, open information, and
relevance. This, however, requires further explanation. I argue that it is possible to ethically tell
the truth without telling the “whole” truth, an activity which is largely impossible. Further, I argue
that within the context of an open information society, it is not ethically mandated to present all
possible points of view; this becomes ethically more complicated, though, in a society with high
levels of government control over information.
Third, I argue that ethical propaganda can easily have the interests of the propaganda
institution at heart, so long as the propaganda can also reasonably be believed to lead to positive
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outcomes for those being propagandized. In this light, for example, a democratic propagandist’s
propaganda on behalf of democratic values would be considered ethical, so long as she is
convinced that these values and systems of governance are an improvement over the current
system. Fourth, ethical propaganda should embrace reason and be deeply skeptical of emotional
appeals, though there are also some ethical uses of emotion in persuasion, so long as they bring
clarity, rather than confusion to the issue at hand. Fifth, a propagandist cannot act ethically except
within a society with freedom of information, because the lack of free information itself creates a
state in which the principle of reason is violated. Finally, any emotionally persuasive appeals used
should be relevant to the question at hand.

1.12

21st Century Definitions of Propaganda
The scholars surveyed to this point have primarily been of the 20th century, with some work

within the early 21st century. However, the world has dramatically changed. As the internet and
social media became all-pervasive forms of communication, the idea of information gatekeepers,
in the form of major media stations and newspapers, became largely irrelevant. Any ethical
standards they applied were rendered similarly meaningless as major internet and social media
firms at first embraced a libertarian model of communication, assuming that the best arguments
would rise to the top. Instead, the world became increasingly polarized as thousands of fringe
thinkers found larger audiences, adapting propagandistic techniques to their work. In a semianarchic information space without even the pretense of fact checking, a respect for truth, or ethical
standards, to what extent do the propaganda theories of those like Ellul and Chomsky still apply?
As of yet, we are still waiting for a groundbreaking theoretician of propaganda, likely one
born into this social media world, to seriously grapple with these questions, and provide us with
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clarity on new and hopefully better ways to engage with these questions. In the meanwhile, the
overwhelming majority of the work done to date has focused on easier questions, such as tactics
used by internet propagandists, and strategies for internet users to recognize or avoid that
propaganda. As a product of the 20th century, I am manifestly not the thinker to answer those
larger questions, but I am hopeful that this work may find its way into her hands one day, to provide
a road map to a better understanding.
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2

The Origins of Modern American Propaganda

2.1

Introduction

This chapter discusses the World War II origins of overt, foreign-directed propaganda institutions,
the birth of a uniquely American institutional culture among propagandists, and how that culture
coalesced in 1953 into the first permanent, peacetime American propaganda institution: the
United States Information Agency.
With Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine, the post-war, U.S.-led international order is
being challenged at a level not seen since the heights of the Cold War. Putin, who famously said
that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century,
can best be understood as a revanchist leader determined to resurrect the Russian empire, even at
the cost of political and economic relations with the West.1 Concordantly, a creeping loss of
Russian media freedom over the past few decades has been capped by new, explicit censorship
laws criminalizing free expression and thought, in ways reminiscent of Russia’s Soviet forebears.
Meanwhile, a rising China recapitulates Kremlin propaganda narratives, as it seeks to extend
political, economic, and military control further and further afield.2 The Cold War, it seems, is
back.
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The Cold War, however, was in many ways a misnomer. Hot proxy wars and other deadly
conflicts were a constant feature of this timeline, in places including most of Africa, South and
Central America, the Middle East, and South, East and Southeast Asia. In point of fact, the only
places in which the Cold War remained relatively “cold” were the developed nations of North
America, Europe, and Oceania.3 But in refraining – through a combination of luck and leadership
– from bringing the world to nuclear annihilation, we see at least one important victory: one which,
hopefully, we can continue to maintain during this Second Cold War.
To the extent that the first Cold War was actually “cold,” what we mean to say is that its
combatants engaged in a propaganda war rather than a military war. To some extent, we can say
that the American propagandists were the “victors” in that fight, given the collapse of the Soviet
Union and several decades of American hegemony thereafter – though certainly, propaganda was
not the only important tool used.4 To ensure that we are well prepared to fight and win this modern
propaganda war, we would be well advised to examine how the United States waged the first one.
How did American propagandists tackle the challenge of combating totalitarian propaganda at the
outset of the first Cold War? How were its propaganda institutions formed, and what were their
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animating values and practices? Did American propaganda succeed in its mission in those first
confusing years, and if not, can we learn lessons from those failures? To help answer those
questions, I will present the institutional history of these Cold War propaganda institutions, what
early propaganda leaders learned about their craft, and explore the difficult decisions that had to
be made to create a uniquely American brand of propaganda.

2.2

How Did We Get Here?
At the very outset of American propaganda during World War II and the early Cold War

years, a number of key questions about the nature and scope of that propaganda had to be answered,
and by 1953, for the most part, they were answered. An exclusive focus on foreign, rather than
domestic, propaganda assuaged Congressional fears that propaganda would be weaponized to keep
a given political party in power. Congress would consistently make the choice to underfund
American propaganda compared to its Communist competitors, due to their deep skepticism about
the moral righteousness of propaganda, alongside an ongoing undercurrent of isolationist belief
that persuading foreign publics was irrelevant to Fortress America.
Overt American propagandists would embrace a “strategy of truth,” eschewing convenient
lies which were considered morally problematic and undermining of their credibility. They would
strongly prefer sober, journalistic language over powerfully emotional, even strident language.
Long-term cultural goals were made central, with short-term persuasion goals seen as a sop to both
Congress and the need to annually justify budgets. Propaganda would be government-led rather
than privately funded, and ultimately located (until 1999) in a quasi-independent agency with close
ties to the State Department, rather than in a number of different proposed forms and locations.
Critically assessing how these specific answers to these questions of how shall we propagandize
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were answered, I argue, is essential to understanding how U.S. propaganda succeeded and failed
in the early Cold War years.

Understanding that is critical to ensuring that current U.S.

propagandists are well-equipped to the task of fighting the next Cold War.
In this paper, I will show that these questions were answered in the context of two wars:
World War II and the early Cold War – specifically, the period from 1941 to 1953. In particular,
modern American propaganda was conceived in a number of competing organizations, coalescing
in the 1942 birth of the Office of War Information (OWI), which I locate as the origin of our
modern propaganda practices. Critical to the understanding of this history is not just the what, but
the who. While other scholars of this period, such as historian Holly Cowan Shulman, have made
mention of the fact that the founders of modern American propaganda were poets, playwrights,
and journalists, I argue that this choice of who early American propagandists were is central to
how these questions were answered. The language these early propagandists used to talk about
their work, and the values they expressed therein – deeply rooted in their professional backgrounds
– have been repeated over and over by successive propaganda leaders and practitioners, both in
word and in deed. In this sense, they are the founding fathers of modern American propaganda.5
In an alternate timeline in which early American propagandists were political scientists,
advertising executives, and military officers, those early propaganda efforts would likely have
been very different, and it is highly plausible that we would be at a very different place in history
today.

I use the term “fathers” deliberately. Though women have been nominally allowed to serve in the Department of
State since 1922, opportunities for genuine leadership roles were few and far between at both State and the United
States Information Agency (USIA). The first female Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Carole Laise
Bunker, was not appointed until 1973, and the first female Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, began her role only
in 1997. In its 46 years of existence, USIA quite literally never had a female director before it merged with the State
Department in 1999.
5

42

2.3

Terms and Scope
It is important to note that I am specifically excluding several important kinds of American

propaganda in this discussion. Military public affairs officers, for example, took and continue to
take center stage with foreign audiences during times of active military conflict. The Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) and their successor agency’s CIA officers presumably were also
operating in the same propaganda space as the propagandists I discuss here. But the modes,
operating assumptions, ethics, and practices of these two sets of American propagandists are so
fundamentally different from those of the early overt propagandists – and modern-day State
Department public affairs officers – that they require a separate treatment beyond the scope of this
paper. I will argue that these ‘species’ of propaganda diverged within a year of the birth of modern
American propaganda, and have remained fundamentally incompatible ever since, operating in
separate, parallel spaces, largely unaware of each other’s existence. In particular, the ‘strategy of
truth’ that has almost without exception animated overt U.S. government propaganda since the
early 1940s has not been a consistent component of either military or intelligence service
propaganda.
In this light, when discussing this ‘strategy of truth,’ a term coined by early modern
American propagandists, I do not mean to claim that all American propaganda has been truthful,
sober, or respectful of the human dignity of its audience.6 A direct comparison of “honest”
American propaganda to “dishonest” Soviet propaganda is, for example, to some extent
disingenuous, given that the Soviets never treated white (overt) and black (covert) propaganda as
separate entities, but rather as simply tools in the same toolbox. What is unique about American
propaganda is that it has, almost since the institutional birth of American propaganda, obsessively
6

MacLeish, Archibald, A Time to Act: Selected Addresses, (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1943): 28.
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separated black and white propaganda into entirely different institutions, between which there is
little to no awareness or coordination.
Though I have been an overt State Department propagandist for 14 years, I have never once
been aware of even a single CIA propaganda campaign, nor am I aware of any of their propaganda
goals. There is, at least at the working level, a profoundly strong firewall between America’s overt
and covert propaganda practitioners. When tracing the history of overt American propaganda –
which we politely call public diplomacy – I am tracing the institutional history of one particular
type of propaganda, namely overt and foreign directed, without claiming that it is representative
of all American propaganda. To the extent that any statements made in this work appear to be
making such sweeping claims, I sincerely apologize in advance for the oversight. Certainly, from
the perspective of foreign audiences, it is impossible to differentiate between the various types of
American government propaganda. Nevertheless, the operating assumptions and institutional
cultures at work are extraordinarily different.

2.4

The Origins of American Propaganda
The story of American propaganda writ large goes back at least as far as the Revolutionary

War, but I argue that the roots of modern, overt American institutional government propaganda
are firmly situated in the period 1941-1953.7 This propaganda can be characterized as being: (1)
public rather than private sector; (2) permanent rather than temporary; (3) truthful rather than
dishonest; (4) overt rather than covert, (5) generally sober and rationalist rather than strident and
emotional; (6) respectful of the intelligence of its audience, rather than dismissive; (7) generally

7

See Berger, Carl, Broadsides and Bayonets: the Propaganda War of the American Revolution, (Philadelphia.
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1961): 21.
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more persuasive rather than purely informational; (8) rooted in narrative rather than dialogue
format; (9) internationalist and interventionist rather than isolationist; (10) firewalled from
censorship activities, rather than combined; (11) presumptive that increased exposure leads to
increased liking; (12) based on on-the-job learning, gut feelings and past practices, rather than
skills-based training or a foundation in the social sciences of persuasion; (13) unwilling to ask
audiences to put themselves in harm’s way to advance policy goals; and (14) evangelical about
democracy, rather than focused exclusively on more limited or transactional goals. Understanding
how American propaganda came to be so characterized requires unearthing the complicated
history of the United States’ propaganda institutions in World War II and the early Cold War, and
exploring the biographies and values of those who led these institutions.
In this chapter, I will explore the numerous World War II propaganda institutions
established by the United States government, how they coalesced into the single Office of War
Information, and how and why the decision was made to separate covert from overt propaganda.
To do so, I will cite the writings and Congressional testimony of senior wartime propagandists
including Robert Sherwood, Edward Barrett, Elmer Davis, Wallace Carroll, Wilson Dizard, James
Warburg, and others engaged by the U.S. government to document their work, such as the U.S.
Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, in the first decade following the war. In so doing,
we will better understand key factions who actively fought for competing answers to the questions
central to this paper, and learn who ultimately won and lost those ideological battles, and how.
In the next chapter, we will hear from senior U.S. propagandists of the early 1950s to see
how the U.S. government ultimately agreed to create a freestanding, permanent propaganda
institution in the form of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953.

Key

propagandists of this period such as Thomas Sorensen and John Henderson, and period academics
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like Ronald Rubin, help illuminate the key battles over U.S. propaganda in the early Cold War
period. Further insights come from a number of Congressional committee reports on U.S.
propaganda institutions and practices, along with published criticisms from the private sector and
academics on what they believed ought to change.
To preview my argument, I hope to show how modern American propaganda was born and
came to adulthood in the period of 1941-1953, and to assess how specific choices made vis-à-vis
ethics, practices, and the hidden assumptions about, prioritizations of, and preferences for certain
types of propaganda impacted early propaganda efforts. While the location of propaganda within
the U.S. government changed several times during this period, this did not significantly influence
what I define as the core features of this propaganda: that it is a permanent, publicly run persuasion
activity which largely eschews emotional language and argumentation to advance democratic
ideology. Interwoven within these core features are other aspects that fluctuate over time,
including: (1) a preference for long-term over short-term planning and goals; (2) the relative power
given to propagandists abroad to determine their agenda in line with foreign policy’s overall policy
goals; (3) the relative importance of persuading versus informing; (4) whether policy makers invite
propagandists to the discussion table; (5) and a preference for persuading elite opinion leaders
versus reaching mass audiences. But even these features, I argue, have fluctuated within a fairly
narrow boundary, in which the answer to those questions is always both, but in changing
proportions.
Most of the core features outlined above are now, based on my experience, so accepted by
modern American propagandists that alternative ways of doing propaganda are not within the
conscious realm of possibility. Though I argue that most of these core features have served us
well over time, I believe it is dangerous to the post-war order – particularly at the dawn of a new
46

Cold War – to leave these early operating assumptions unexamined. We have a responsibility to,
at least generationally, question these hidden assumptions to ensure that they continue to serve us
well, and to be willing to entertain the possibility that some of these core features may need to
change as the geopolitical context in which we live continues to evolve. This paper is an attempt
to do just that, to ensure that the U.S. propaganda service is as well placed as possible to be as
effective in the 21st century’s Cold War as it was in the 20th.

2.5

The Birth of American Institutional Propaganda
Before we get to the main story, we must first understand why, in contrast to some scholars,

I do not include the American government’s institutional propaganda efforts during World War I
as meaningful precursors to our modern institutions.

Within days of the April 6, 1917

Congressional declaration of war against Germany, President Wilson named his friend, journalist
George Creel, as head of the newly-established Committee on Public Information (CPI),
responsible for both domestic and foreign propaganda operations, as well as domestic censorship.
As the first in his field, Creel and his team had to learn on the job; of this period, Creel felt deeply
unprepared for the task, later saying: “it was as if the Babylonians were asked to invent the
threshing machine.”8 But invent they did, and importantly, many of those on Creel’s team,
including Edward Bernays, Walter Lippmann, and Charles Merriam, would go on to be major
early thinkers in propaganda theory.
Beyond advancing U.S. interests in the war, CPI staffers believed that their activities
“provided an ideal opportunity to promote an ideology of American democracy [which could]
provide a unifying cohesion for a country as diverse as America at a time of war and social

8
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change.”9 They worked to pull America from its isolationist traditions into an internationalist
sensibility, to “justify intervention as an American mission to bring democracy to the Old
World.”10 This was an important preview of what I term the “evangelical democratizing” mission
which has, unlike many other aspects of CPI, remained with us to the present day.
At the same time, however, CPI also practiced what was later considered to be heavyhanded press censorship, and insisted on a significant level of influence over Hollywood releases.11
More damagingly to their reputation, they occasionally provided information later shown to be
false to the media, such as a report that U.S. forces had sunk several German submarines, and used
their powers to locate and threaten government employees suspected of leaking information to the
press.12 Ultimately, they also failed to win the trust of the foreign policy establishment: notably,
the State Department refused to cooperate with the CPI in any way.13
For many of these reasons, the CPI, more commonly known as the Creel Committee, was
not to last. Just four months after the November 11, 1918 Armistice ending the war, President
Wilson issued Executive Order 3154, abolishing the CPI. Clearly, Wilson saw institutional
propaganda as a temporary measure justified by wartime, which had no purpose in a peacetime
world. Other nations, however, were not so sanguine. The Soviet Union launched international
radio propaganda in 1926, with the Germans, British, and Japanese following their lead in the early
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1930s, giving them a significant head start on infrastructure, audience development, and research
before the United States finally restarted its own propaganda efforts during World War II.14
The CPI’s reputational problems, ironically, extended even beyond its own death.
Following the end of wartime censorship, Americans began critically reevaluating the actions of
the CPI in light of their democratic values, and came to unfavorable conclusions.15 Scholars such
as Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell have argued that though CPI succeeded at creating a “war
psychosis” in the United States, that “when contrasted with the loss of so many American lives
[and] disillusionment with the settlement of the war,” Americans became deeply suspicious of
propaganda itself.16 Collectively, with the long-standing American tradition of isolationism again
ascendant after the war, Americans and their government decided that institutional propaganda
was both unsavory, unnecessary, and likely dangerous to democracy. As Congressman Frederick
H. Gillett (R-MA) put it in 1918, “a propaganda bureau […] is a very dangerous thing in a
Republic, because if used in […] partisan advantage of the administration, it has tremendous
power, and in ordinary peace-time I do not think any party or any administration would justify or
approve it.”17
At first reading, the CPI seems a sensible place to begin to tell the story of American
propaganda, and scholars such as Robert Jackall, Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, James
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Myers, Ted Smith, Philip Taylor, and Allan Winkler have done just that, without, in my view,
sufficiently reckoning with the fundamental differences between CPI propaganda and what I term
modern American propaganda.18 Though the CPI was the first instance of institutional American
government propaganda, I agree with scholar John Henderson that it was so fundamentally
different than later state organs of American propaganda that it is not the right place to look for
the origins of modern American propaganda.19 First, the CPI sought out advertising specialists
and made use of advertising techniques, rather than the much more journalistic approach employed
by later American propagandists. Second, it saw truth as instrumental, rather than a core value.
Third, it was meant to be an impermanent response to a temporary war, and fourth, its primary
focus (at least early on) was on domestic audiences, rather than foreign audiences. 20 For these
reasons, I argue we must look further down the road to locate the actual birth of today’s propaganda
traditions.

2.6

Propaganda Agencies in the Late 1930s and Early 1940s
From the end of the Great War until the late 30s, the United States government simply

didn’t engage in institutional propaganda. After almost two decades without institutional organs
of propaganda, however, President Roosevelt began to see the writing on the wall in terms of likely
U.S. engagement in the growing European war. As a result, he began to establish a number of
small offices and agencies with various propagandistic functions as early as 1938. Roosevelt’s

Jackall, Robert, “Propaganda,” in America’s First Propaganda Ministry: The Committee on Public Information
During the Great War, ed. Robert Jackall and Janice Hirota (New York: New York University Press, 1995): 157;
Jowett and O’Donnell, 128-129; Myers, James, The Bureau of Motion Pictures, 6-7; Smith, Ted, Propaganda: A
Pluralistic Perspective, (New York: Praeger, 1989): 6; Taylor, Philip, Munitions of the Mind, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2003): 184.
19
Holly Cowan Shulman’s excellent The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945 does brilliant
work outlining the ideological disputes on this paper’s themes during the war period, but her masterly analysis –
unfortunately for readers – did not continue to the present day.
20
Henderson, John, The United States Information Agency, 28.
18

50

essential management style was to create a new agency to deal with every problem, while
expecting them to sort out their own powers between them.21 This, in a few words, was an
unsuccessful management style.
In many ways, these agencies played a game of existential whack-a-mole with Congress,
who often quickly moved to kill them, angry that Roosevelt was moving funds around without
Congressional approval.22 In fall of 1938, Roosevelt launched the U.S. Film Service under the
New Deal-era National Emergency Council (NEC)’s U.S. Information Service, to create
government films, among other functions. This was headed by journalist Lowell Mellett, who
later became a key player in World War II propaganda efforts.
The Film Service moved into the Office of Education’s Federal Security Agency in mid1939 when the NEC was abolished, and did not, in the end, produce very much before being itself
abolished in 1940.23 Much like its CPI forebears, Congress saw it as a potential domestic threat to
democracy, with Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) saying “I do not care who is controlling the
Government, if it is to produce films and put them out, they are bound to become propaganda.”24
Mellett soon moved on to become the first head of the newly-established Office of Government
Reports (OGR) in September, 1939, monitoring domestic press, and working to explain U.S.
government activities to the general public.25 None of these smaller agencies, however, were
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meaningfully comparable to the modern, global, overt, foreign-directed propaganda currently
practiced by the United States.
Another potential contender for the origin story of modern American propaganda
institutions is businessman Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA), which
Roosevelt established on August 16, 1940 to “assist in the preparation and coordination of [Latin
American economic stabilization], to secure and deepen U.S. influence in the region, and to combat
Axis inroads into the hemisphere, particularly in the commercial and cultural spheres.”26
Originally saddled with the unwieldy title of Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural
Relations between the American Republics (OCCCRBAR), the organization had a wide remit
which included but did not center upon propaganda, and a narrow geographic scope, extending
only into Latin America.
The OIAA’s major activities were fairly broad, including “economic warfare, economic
cooperation, transportation, health and sanitation, food supply, information and propaganda, and
cultural and educational activities.”

Its employees were largely drawn from American

businessmen who had lived in Latin America for many years, given its economic rather than
propaganda focus, and did not necessarily look at the Department of State or its Embassies as the
final arbiter of correct foreign policy. Unlike a half-dozen other U.S. propaganda and information
agencies created in 1940-41, in large part due to Rockefeller’s influence with President Roosevelt,
OIAA was not subsumed into the later umbrella organization the Office of War Information,
though on April 10, 1946, OIAA was abolished with its remaining functions integrated into the
Department of State. For the reasons listed above, I argue that the OIAA was not the precursor
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agency to modern American propaganda. Essentially, its geographic focus was regional rather
than global, and its purposes too broad compared to later propaganda agencies, despite the fact
that its propaganda functions were later absorbed into those very same institutions.

2.7

1941: Roosevelt Throws Things at Wall, Sees What Sticks
Suspecting that U.S. involvement in Europe’s war was likely to come sooner than later,

despite widespread isolationism, Roosevelt began constructing a widespread, but haphazard,
information and propaganda apparatus.27 He established the Division of Information under the
Office for Emergency Management (OEM) in March 1941, to explain defense activities to the
general public. Two months later, he set up the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) to handle
“civilian protection, national morale, and public opinion.”28
In June of that year, friend, businessman and former General William “Wild Bill” Donovan
pitched Roosevelt with the idea for a new centralized intelligence agency, which would include
foreign radio propaganda broadcasts. That same month, on June 25, Donovan was appointed the
Coordinator of the Office of Strategic Information, renamed one month later as the Office of the
Coordinator of Information (OCOI). Interestingly, he immediately brought on Robert Sherwood
– a playwright and screenwriter – as chief of OCOI’s new Foreign Information Service (FIS), to
handle foreign propaganda operations. That same month, the Army established a “Special Study
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Group” within military intelligence to plan for psychological operations, later morphing into the
Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB).29
Just three months later in October 1941, realizing more public support was needed for a
U.S. entry into the war, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8922, carving out part of OCD to create
the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) to focus on that specific task.30 His choice for chief of the
new OFF was not a military officer, a political scientist, a journalist, or an advertising executive,
but rather Archibald MacLeish, a modernist poet and writer, whose liberal values and ethical
commitment to truth would, along with Sherwood’s, forever put their stamp on modern American
propaganda.

2.8

Pearl Harbor and the Separation of Propaganda from Censorship
By November of 1941, there were five major competing propaganda organs operating

uncomfortably in the same or overlapping spaces: Lowell Mellett’s Office of Government
Reports, Nelson Rockefeller’s OIAA, Sherwood’s Foreign Information Service within Donovan’s
OCOI, MacLeish’s Office of Facts and Figures, and the military’s PWB, along with several other
smaller offices in other government bureaus, agencies, and departments. 31 This, as it turned out,
would be untenable, a fact brought into stark relief by the bombings of Pearl Harbor on December
7 of that year.32
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The surprise attack “accelerated pressures to mount a major offensive against domestic
apathy and the increasingly effective propaganda machinery of the Nazis,” and it was clear that
with no one in charge, this goal could not be met.33 Indeed, “after Pearl Harbor […] there was an
obvious and increasing battle among various government agencies for the attention and support of
the public, [which] confused the public […] in a way that was both inefficient and embarrassing.”34
Hollywood insiders, among others, asked Roosevelt to find a solution – something he had
successfully avoided since spring of 1941 – by which point the Budget Bureau had already been
clamoring for re-organization of the wartime information agencies.35 Crucially, following Pearl
Harbor, longstanding Congressional opposition to institutional propaganda also melted away
overnight. This would re-establish a long-standing pattern that continues to operate to the presentday: Congress understands the need for propaganda operations only when faced with a clear
national security threat.36
When the House and Senate both passed the First War Powers Act on December 16,
Roosevelt was freed to conduct both censorship and propaganda, with Congress’ blessing. Rather
than consolidating existing agencies, however, or expanding their powers, he simply created even
more of them. Roosevelt signed the Act on December 18, and the following day he signed
Executive Order 8985 establishing the Office of Censorship, which explicitly had no propaganda
function.37 In so doing, he set a new precedent that – unlike under CPI – censorship and
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propaganda would forever remain separate activities in the United States, unlike in both Axis and
Allied countries, including the UK’s Ministry of Information and the Nazi Ministry of
Enlightenment and Propaganda. In this, Roosevelt charted a course for a distinctly modern
American, as opposed to simply democratic practice of propaganda.38
Two months later, sometime in February of 1942, Donovan’s deputy Robert Sherwood and
Romanian actor John Houseman launched the first Voice of America (VOA) broadcast, while in
April, Mellett’s OGR opened a film branch in Hollywood to directly coordinate on propaganda
with the industry.39 As propaganda activities and agencies continued to burgeon in the early
months of 1942, however, ideological differences between civilian propagandists came to the fore.
In particular, OCOI chief Bill Donovan argued that propaganda should serve short-term, tactical
goals, acting “as the initial arrow of penetration for covert actions. He did not care about standards
of truth,” as his focus was on battlefield subversion.40 As Donovan himself wrote to Roosevelt,
propaganda needed to have “a judicious mixture of rumor and deception” to be effective.41
His deputy, FIS chief Robert Sherwood, however, argued that although propaganda was a
legitimate weapon of war – as important as military battles, in some cases – that a “strategy of
truth” would be the only effective, credible, and ethical strategy.42 As a playwright, he was deeply
motivated by the power of words, writing that “there is a new and more decisive force in the human
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race, more powerful than all tyrants [which] is the force of massed thought – thought which has
been provoked by words, strongly spoken.”43 Sherwood further wrote that “truth is the only
effective basis for American foreign information.”44
The military, meanwhile, was setting up an entirely parallel propaganda apparatus. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff established created their own Joint Psychological Warfare Committee in
March 1941, and in April, the Army published its first edition of the military newspaper Stars and
Stripes, whose propaganda target was not foreign audiences but rather U.S. soldiers. Yet despite
the proliferating branches of institutional propaganda, turf wars, and an increasing sense that clear
lines of authority needed to be established, Roosevelt waited six months after Congress’ war
authorization to consolidate many (but not all) of these government organs. Several historians
agree that Roosevelt “had absorbed the temper of the 1930s on the subject of wartime propaganda.
He didn’t like it,” and only acted to establish a centralized propaganda agency when it was clear
that the existing situation was both overly chaotic and ineffective.45

2.9

OWI and the 1942 Propaganda Consolidation: the Triumph of the
Strategy of Truth
Finally, on June 13, 1942, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9182, a first – but insufficient

– effort to give meaningful guidance to the future shape of the U.S. propaganda program. In a
stroke, Roosevelt separated those who believed that truth was merely instrumental from those who
believed it was essential. The truth-relativists clustered under Donovan in his new Office of
Special Services (OSS), which would later go on to become the Central Intelligence Agency.46
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The truth-absolutists, on the other hand, gathered together under the new Office of War
Information (OWI), to be led by respected CBS journalist Elmer Davis. OSS would take on the
intelligence functions begun under OCOI, and, housed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would work
hand-in-glove with the Psychological Warfare Committee (chaired by Donovan, and absorbed by
OSS six months later) and military intelligence more broadly. OWI, on the other hand, would
absorb MacLeish’s Office of Facts and Figures from OEM, along with OEM’s Division of
Information, Mellett’s Office of Government Reports, and OCOI’s Foreign Information Service
and its chief Robert Sherwood. The one major exception which landed in neither camp would be
the OIAA, whose politically connected leader Nelson Rockefeller managed to retain independent
control over Latin American propaganda throughout the war.47
In the new OWI organization, poet MacLeish would head policy and planning, journalist
Mellett would lead the Bureau of Motion Pictures, and playwright Sherwood would manage the
Overseas Branch, primarily responsible for overseas propaganda. It is in the OWI that I argue
modern American propaganda was finally born, in a form roughly analogous to that which is
practiced today. Notably, OWI also appears to be the origin for several descriptive terms of art
for American propaganda and propagandists used for several decades thereafter, including the first
use of “United States Information Service” to describe the American propaganda institution’s
activities abroad, and “public affairs officer” for chief country propagandist.48
Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s order did not make clear who – and which underlying ideology
– actually had what authorities vis-à-vis foreign propaganda operations, much less which ethical
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standards would be applied. Social scientist Charles A.H. Thomson, who served as a U.S. military
propagandist during World War II, explained:
The struggle for control of overseas propaganda continued between
OWI and OSS. […] It rested on differences between those who
believed that propaganda should form part of the program of
subversive operations, and should consist of any action, true or
untrue, responsible or irresponsible, which would effectively
hamper the enemy at that point; and those who believed that
propaganda should be a public, responsible, government operation
to tell the truth about the war, about the United States and its allies,
as a means of describing democracy and freedom, our war aims, and
our determination to win both war and peace.49
As Thomson explains, “it took nine months after OWI’s creation to define and divide foreign
propaganda responsibilities between OWI and OSS, and during this period they spent almost as
much time fighting each other as fighting the enemy.”50
Davis, frustrated by the perception that OWI was being undermined, ignored, and left out
of the loop on critical information by both OSS and military intelligence, took his case to the
President, who on March 12, 1943 issued Executive Order 9182, confirming “OWI’s authority
over the federal program of information and propaganda, as against the encroachments of OSS.”51
The ability of the military to independently run its own battlefield propaganda campaigns,
however, was not significantly curtailed by this order, though military leaders were advised to
keep OWI in the loop. In this sense, the success of this order was mixed, as military leaders – as
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well as the State Department – distrusted OWI’s ability to maintain operational security during
the war, particularly in the early years, and still regularly kept critical information from them.52

2.10

The End of Domestic Propaganda
One of the key questions to be answered about the nature of modern American propaganda

was whether and to what extent it would address domestic audiences versus foreign audiences. To
the surprise of early OWI leaders, this was answered in the negative early and forcefully by
Congress, despite a clear and apparent need. As historian Allan Winkler explains:
Americans appeared unclear about the broader purposes of the struggle in which
they were engaged. In the first months after Pearl Harbor, it seemed obvious that
the United States was fighting in self-defense. By the middle of 1942 public
opinion analyst Jerome Bruner found that significant numbers of people were not
as sure why they were involved. In July, 30 percent of those responding to the
question, “Do you feel that you have a clear idea of what this war is all about —
that is, what are we fighting for?” answered negatively, while in December the
number had risen to 35 percent. Other polls in the fall of 1942 showed that
approximately a third of people interviewed were willing to accept a separate peace
with Germany, and even after the announcement of the policy of unconditional
surrender at Casablanca, the percentage remained almost as high. Other surveys
too indicated significant public mistrust of America’s allies. OWI clearly had its
work cut out for it if it was to educate the public about the war.53

The poet MacLeish, whose pre-OWI Office of Facts and Figures had already come under
widespread attack as domestic propaganda, remained undeterred and primarily interested in
engaging the American public rather than foreign audiences.54 He and his team in OWI’s policy
and planning office “wanted to convey the evils of fascism, the insidious way it had infected enemy
populations, and the desperate need to destroy all traces of the disease,” while “contrast[ing]
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American values to those of the fascists, and thereby to show the stake that every American had
in the outcome of the struggle, as a way of justifying the sacrifice and personal expense involved
in winning the war.”55
OWI’s domestic propagandists also had to wrestle with important questions about “the
nature of propaganda in a democratic society at war.”56 To what extent would they seek national
unity, even if should compromise values such as diversity and independence which were
fundamental to American identity? Should they take a leadership role in interpreting the war for
the American public, or follow the lead – if one existed – from the White House? To what extent
should their goals be to prod a disinterested public into support for the war? Senior leaders of the
OWI found that there were no easy answers.
MacLeish, for example, often clashed with OWI Domestic Branch chief Gardner Cowles
– a former newspaper publisher – over these issues from OWI’s birth in mid-1942 until the
essential demise of the Domestic Branch on June 18, 1943. Neither Cowles nor MacLeish saw
eye to eye on style or methods. Though MacLeish (along with Overseas Branch Director Robert
Sherwood) argued that Americans were largely persuaded by rational, weighty, evidence-based
appeals, Cowles believed that simplified, pictorial arguments were more effective.57 Further,
though MacLeish favored a journalistic approach, Cowles brought in a number of advertising
executives to “sell” the war in February 1943, leading to mass resignations that April among
MacLeish’s acolytes, who believed it was unethical and “phony” to justify the war to Americans
“the same way they were sold toothpaste.”58 OWI Director Elmer Davis backed Cowles, but the
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mass resignations of well-connected former journalists brought unwelcome Congressional and
media attention to the Domestic Branch.
But Congressional ire was particularly directed at the OWI’s Bureau of Motion Pictures,
which focused on domestic audiences. Its chief Lowell Mellett had infuriated Hollywood with a
carelessly worded statement on December 8, 1942, suggesting that the film studios run all scripts
through OWI for approval, raising concerns of censorship.59 Though Mellett attempted to calm
the waters with an explanatory missive that May, his “extraordinary capacity for amassing
opposition” did him no favors, and cries of censorship continued.60

Following a Senate

investigation, on June 18 the House of Representatives actually abolished the Domestic Branch by
a vote of 218 to 114, fearing it was more pro-Roosevelt than anti-Axis.61 The Senate overturned
that decision, but returned only a small percentage of its original funding, resulting in the closure
of most domestic publications, all motion picture production, field operations, and regional
offices.62 This was, for all intents and purposes, the end of institutional domestic government
propaganda in the United States.

2.11

Policy-Driven, or Policy Drivers?
Another early point of contention was the essential question of who was in charge. Not

only, to be clear, of the propaganda organization, despite the fact that the directorship was vested
at least in title in journalist Elmer Davis. A second debate also took place regarding who set the
policies that the propagandists advanced. To modern American propagandists, that this was ever
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in question is likely shocking. But several early key propaganda leaders believed it was they, not
Washington, who were best equipped to determine and convey abroad what American foreign
policy would be.63 Compelled by a deep conviction that the war was an existential battle between
freedom and slavery, they believed the Department of State was overly slow and conservative in
its approach, and so they simply took matters into their own hands.64 Needless to say, this
infuriated the Department of State, the traditional home of foreign policy making.
At first, OWI leaders such as James Warburg, the Deputy Director for Psychological
Warfare Policy, attempted to bring the existing foreign policy establishment on board. Feeling
shut out of not only the policy making process but even of knowing what the policy actually was,
“by the fall of 1942 he began writing [draft] propaganda policy,” making a weekly trip from OWI’s
New York-based Overseas Branch office to meet with key Washington decision makers.65 If
Washington didn’t immediately edit Warburg’s proposals, then from his perspective, they became
approved policy. As historian Holly Cowan Shulman explains, perhaps understating the case,
“Warburg incurred resentment because of his independent procedures. He was admired, but often
not trusted.” His New York-based deputies, however, including journalists Joseph Barnes and Ed
Johnson, and dramatist John Houseman – the first Voice of America (VOA) Director – were
thrilled by Warburg’s forward-leaning, ideologically pure clarity.
This tension eventually came to a head when the VOA, on Italian radio, called Italian King
Victor Emmanuel a “moronic little king” in late July 1943, deeply complicating Allied efforts to
get the king to renounce his support for the fascist government, then led by Marshal Pietro
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Badoglio.66 The radio statement sprung from the conviction of the Warburg wing that moral clarity
about good and evil was required when addressing the public. Facing a public rebuke from
President Roosevelt after widespread media coverage of the scandal, OWI Director Davis sought
to

bring

the

New

York-based

Overseas

Branch

back

under

his

control.

Problems, however, continued. London branch chief Wallace Carroll – a former foreign
correspondent – was becoming increasingly infuriated with Robert Sherwood’s leadership of the
New York-based Overseas Branch, to which he reported. That December, Carroll resigned over
his frustrations with Sherwood and Warburg’s lack of guidance and communication, as well as
over his disagreement over who made policy.67 For Carroll, it was clear that the State Department
and the White House were the only democratic and legitimate source of propaganda policy, and
that they as propagandists had no right to overrule that policy, even if they disagreed with it.68
Picking up on Carroll’s departure, American media began digging into, and reporting on,
ongoing disputes between OWI Director Elmer Davis and Overseas Branch Director Robert
Sherwood, who ideologically sided with Warburg. (Modern American government propagandists
know one cardinal rule by heart: never become the story.) Davis hired CBS “hatchet man” Edward
Klauber to get Sherwood’s office in New York back in line with government policy, and in early
1944 Klauber proposed a reorganization of the Overseas Branch. Sherwood would become
director of propaganda and information policy, replacing Warburg, while a new leader would be
installed as Overseas Branch Director. Warburg, Johnson, and Barnes – whom Davis held
particularly responsible for many of the ongoing issues – would be terminated.
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Sherwood balked. Following the press leaks, the two took their respective cases to
Roosevelt on February 2, 1944. The President eventually sided with Davis, resulting in Sherwood
being effectively “exiled” to the London office, and the Overseas Branch returning from New York
to Washington, where it could be more closely supervised.69 Most of the team who questioned the
centrality of the State Department’s role in determining policy was fired, settling that question
once and for all.70 Sherwood resigned from the London office in September of that year – though
returned to government service later in a variety of roles.

2.12

1944-1948: An Institutional History and the Question of Permanence
In order to understand the context in which the answers to other questions were decided –

or left undecided – we must first explore what happened to American institutional propaganda in
the period 1944-1948. Following the departures of Sherwood, Barnes, Johnson and Warburg, and
the return of the Overseas Branch to Washington, “the new, more politically accommodating
leaders of the Overseas Branch withdrew propaganda from controversial liberal positions and
moved the Voice toward ‘straight’ news and information.”71 This allowed the OWI to begin to
build a meaningful trust and cooperation with the State Department and the Department of
Defense, including better coordination with the London-based, interagency Psychological Warfare
Branch (PWB), comprised of OWI, OSS, U.S. military, and British Political Warfare Executive
officials.72
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Having resolved some of the key questions plaguing the propagandists, the remainder of
World War II played out in relative peace between the various propaganda institutions. As with
earlier eras, within weeks of the end of World War II, neither the president nor Congress saw
further need for propaganda institutions in an era of peace, re-opening the question of institutional
permanence. On August 31, 1945, Truman issued Executive Order 9608 transferring the functions
of both the OWI and the OIAA into an Interim International Information Service (IIS) located
within the State Department, as recommended by senior OWI leaders, but to the great skepticism
of those at State, which remained deeply distrustful of propaganda or the utility of influencing
public opinion.73
Truman appointed William Benton, an advertising executive and university vice-president,
as the first ever Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs to lead the IIS, a transitional agency
meant to last six months with the handover from OWI and OIAA. He also led the newly created
Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) by Departmental Order 1336, to
distinguish it from the extant Office of Public Affairs, a small office handling Department of State
press releases. Though the OWI and OIAA had already begun the process of dramatic budget cuts,
Benton, “sensing the Congressional mood,” cut propaganda programs even further, eliminating
almost all wartime magazines, most of the news service, radio programming, and personnel.74
Unfortunately for Benton, Congress did not see this as sufficient, perhaps sensing blood in
the water. The Budget Bureau and Congress gave him no credit for what he had already
accomplished, but instead worked to further slash and burn U.S. propaganda operations to the
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bone.75 “But by painstakingly explaining the program to one Congressman after another, Benton
stemmed the tide. In a long and drearily complex series of Congressional proceedings, Benton
barely managed to save his skeleton operation.”76 In particular, Benton argued cogently, and
successfully, against a widely-held belief that the private sector would be both able, and more
capable, of representing the United States abroad than the U.S. government, with limited
coordination functions at the Department of State.77

Modern American propagandists can

effectively thank Bill Benton for the continued existence of their profession today as a government
endeavor.
In the fall of 1947, for no ostensible reason – a recurring theme for post-war propaganda
institutions – the OIC was renamed again, as the Office of International Information and
Educational Exchange (OIE). The OIC-turned-OIE “operated for over two years without any legal
authorization other than that of appropriations acts,”78 which caused no problem in its first year of
operations. In its second year, however, reasserting their prerogative to control the purse, Congress
deeply slashed OIE’s funding, leading to significant reductions in staffing and programs. This
came despite vigorous intervention by President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall,
one of the first examples of genuine buy-in from State Department leadership on the value of
propaganda programs.79
In the end, however, long-term funding for overt, foreign directed U.S. propaganda was
likely secured by the launch of the Marshall Plan and its impacts abroad. The plan was first
publicly announced by Secretary Marshall on June 5, 1947 in remarks at Harvard University,
75
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leading to a significant backlash by Soviet propagandists, who characterized it as “dollar
imperialism.”80 A Congressional delegation headed to Europe in the summer of 1947 on a factfinding trip to learn about the on-the-ground situation, and whether fears of growing Communist
influence were warranted.81

They returned chastened, with a new and experience-based

understanding of the importance of winning hearts and minds, and immediately set to work
drafting the Smith-Mundt Act.
This law would establish permanent funding for educational and professional exchange
programs, which would bring foreigners to the United States – and send Americans abroad – to
better develop “mutual understanding.”

It also promised a permanent peacetime overseas

information program. Notably, despite what the Congressmen understood to be a clear and
continuing threat from Communist propaganda, the law did not call for an aggressive propaganda
campaign to persuasively, explicitly bolster democracy abroad, largely because of their ongoing
fears of the risks of propaganda institutions to democracy.
The controversial law was enacted on January 28, 1948, as the first-ever Congressional
imprimatur for peace-time propaganda. This was not, however, without significant concern and
opposition. The draft law attracted more than one hundred amendments, and consumed “more
days of debate and more pages of the Congressional Record than the previously contentious TaftHartley labor legislation,” which had weakened the power of unions.82
As a result of Smith-Mundt, OIE was renamed and reorganized yet again on April 28, 1948,
by being split into two offices with separate functions: the Office of International Information
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(OII), and the Office of Educational Exchange (OEX.)83 “The former office retained the mass
media functions: radio, press, and publications, and motion pictures. The latter office got the slow
media jobs: exchange of persons and support for libraries and institutes.”84 Modern American
propagandists will be no doubt pleased to note that the constant, continuing renaming and
reorganization of their institutions has been a feature from the very beginning, and is therefore
unlikely to ever end. More importantly, however, peacetime propaganda as an institution was now
secure as a permanent feature of the American government. As Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs George Allen said in a 1949 speech at Duke University, “Propaganda on an immense
scale is here to stay.”85

2.13

1948-1953: The Korean War, McCarthyism, and the Birth of USIA
Despite having once again having fought off the existential threat to its existence, modern

American propaganda continued to suffer from relative skepticism from Congress, and was
accorded only a minimal budget. World Wars I and II had clearly shown that once an immediate
threat – of war, Communism, etc – had receded, there was little appetite for funding foreigndirected propaganda. In this sense, only another war would be able to once again loosen
Congressional purse strings. The wheels of history would soon provide just such a chance.
With Stalin backing the North Korean invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, it became
clear to all concerned that the State Department’s propaganda department was deeply underfunded
given the scope of the task at hand. In FY1949, Congress ultimately allotted only $27 million for
foreign persuasion activities – approximately $330 million in 2022 dollars, or roughly 15% of
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modern funding levels.86 Through additional appropriations in FY1950, propaganda spending
increased by 76% to $47.3 million ($544m in 2022 dollars), and then more than doubled to $103.5
million in FY1951 ($1.1b in 2022 dollars), or approximately half of modern day spending.
With increased spending, of course, came increased oversight. In Truman’s second term,
a great number of people came together to try to chart a clear and compelling vision for the future
of American propaganda, and to answer those questions which had not yet been fully answered.
This felt particularly urgent given the rise of McCarthyist hysteria, with the State Department
propagandists’ very loyalty to the nation under question.
First, as part of the deal-making in 1948 prior to the Smith-Mundt Act, Congress had
legislated a permanent Advisory Commission, which would examine overt U.S. government
propaganda each year and provide its report to Congress on its effectiveness. Though the Advisory
Commission’s report in April 1951 had recommended that these propaganda functions remain
within the State Department, following McCarthy’s deeply demoralizing attacks, mass
resignations, and the inability of propaganda leaders to focus on anything other than responding to
Congress, by February of 1953 the Commission recommended that propaganda be moved into an
independent agency.87 This was, in fact, already partially underway at the State Department. On
January 16, 1952, Assistant Secretary Barrett had ordered yet another reorganization – just before
he resigned – creating a new “United States International Information Administration (IIA or
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USIIA) as a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State, reporting directly to the
Secretary.”88
Second, a staunchly anti-Communist former Army Undersecretary, Tracy Voorhees, had
created his own private sector commission dubbed the Voorhees Committee to lobby the
government on how to best fight the global spread of communism. Their report of June, 1953,
came to similar conclusions about propaganda as the Advisory Commission, though it argued that
exchange programs should remain within the State Department. This was ostensibly to keep such
programs free of the “taint” of propaganda, but in fact also calculated to help win the support of
influential Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), who, as a deep skeptic of the value of propaganda,
opposed such a move.89
Still four other commissions led inquiries that year. Eisenhower appointed newly-elected
Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), a twelve-year veteran of the House of Representatives, to lead a
committee to advise him on the best way forward for propaganda. Simultaneously, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee appointed newly-elected Senator Bourke Hickenlooper (R-IA), an
ardent conservative and isolationist, to conduct its own inquiry. Senator McCarthy was meanwhile
running his own witch hunt investigations through the Senate Government Operations Committee.
And the House of Representatives, not to be left behind, ran its own investigation.90 Of these, the
Jackson and Hickenlooper reports carried the most traction, with the Jackson Committee report
concurring with both the Advisory Commission and Voorhees Committee reports on the need for
a new, separate agency. Hickenlooper’s report, meanwhile, concluded that either the current IIA
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needed significantly more autonomy within the State Department to be successful, or it needed to
become its own agency.

Mirroring Voorhees, though, it also recommended separating

“information” programs from cultural and educational exchange programs, with the latter
remaining at the State Department.91
The reports largely agreed that the Department of State was a hostile environment in which
propaganda could not succeed. Deemed overly inflexible, too conservative about trying new ideas,
and either lacking enthusiasm or overtly opposing the work of the IIA, it was clearly time for a
change. Faced with largely unanimous voices – and no real opposition from the State Department
– President Eisenhower submitted a report to Congress on June 1, 1953, recommending the
creation of a new agency: the United States Information Agency (USIA). Just three months later,
the Agency began operations in September of 1953, headed by Theodore Streibert, a film and radio
executive.92
In institutional terms, the story of overt American government propaganda more or less
stops here. Despite a brief name change in the late 1970s, USIA remained the single organization
responsible for overt, foreign-directed American propaganda for the next 46 years, when – no
longer faced with the existential threat of the Cold War – Congress, following a predictable pattern,
determined that propaganda was no longer likely necessary, and in 1999 returned propaganda
functions to the Department of State. Needless to say, just two years later, Congress would again
come to understand the ongoing need for such work.
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2.14

Emotion or Reason? Dialogue or Narrative? Persuade or Inform?
With the institutional history clear, we may now return to the original narrative, in the year

1942, to answer the origin story of other fundamental aspects of modern American propaganda,
whose questions took much longer to answer, to the extent they were answered at all. Having
decided where propaganda would live, and that it would be government-run, foreign-directed,
fundamentally honest in nature, divorced from censorship, and driven by State Department
defined-policy objectives, how to go about framing and selling the message was another important
question yet left to answer. The Voice of America’s first director, dramatist John Houseman,
experimented in the early 1940s with an artistic movement called German Expressionism, using
nameless but recognizably distinct voices to articulate various ideologies in conversation with each
other.93 This was intended as what Lenin refers to as “agitprop,” or propaganda intended to
provoke an audience toward a certain end: in this case, uprisings against the Nazis.
Houseman, however, left VOA at about the same time as the “moronic little king” scandal,
and three months later, on September 26, 1943, VOA programming director Werner Michel issued
formal guidance ending the agitprop era of U.S. propaganda. Propagandists and policy-makers
had become increasingly skeptical as to the effectiveness of Houseman’s techniques, particularly
given that his audiences were believed to be starving for news, rather than entertainment. Michel
instead directed the VOA to employ the sober, fact-based, rational narrative format common in
news broadcasting instead.94 As historian Holly Cowan Shulman explains, this was part of a larger
trend in which “Allied propaganda took a more sober and less emotional, moralistic, or didactic
approach to the problem of persuasion, muting overt statements of ideology and dropping most
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allusions to enemy bestiality.”95 This was another aspect of the short-term “victory” over
Sherwood, Barnes, Warburg, Johnson, and Houseman, who also represented the viewpoint that
“news alone could not produce effective propaganda.”96
This inform-don’t-persuade viewpoint would remain the standard through the post-war
institutional transitions until early in the Truman presidency. Truman himself, in moving OWI
functions to the State Department, argued in Executive Order 9608 that the U.S. would “not
attempt to outstrip the extensive and growing information programs of other nations [but] rather
… endeavor to see to it that other peoples receive a full and fair picture of American life and of
the aims and policies of the United States government.”97 In early 1950, however, Truman
received intelligence that the Kremlin was planning on launching proxy wars around the world,
and worked with the senior-most U.S. propagandist at that point, State Department Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs Edward Barrett, to launch a “Campaign of Truth,” with four primary
goals. First, to create a strong, U.S.-based international community able to respond to the threat
of Communism. Second, to fairly present the United States and counter misinformation about it.
Third, to discourage “aggression by showing that America wants peace but is prepared for war.”
And fourth, to reduce Soviet power by demoralizing its civil servants.98
Deeply motivated by the existential belief that they were promoting “the cause of freedom
against the propaganda of slavery,”99 the campaign led to a shift away from the staid, immediate
post-war journalistic ‘just the facts’ style at VOA, toward a more clearly persuasive style. The
VOA, wrote contemporary propagandist John Henderson, shifted “from an emphasis of attempting
95
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to give the peoples of the world an adequate and fair pictures of the United States to greater
emphasis on a program of hard-hitting propaganda.”100 But this shift was at odds with Congress’s
express intent for U.S. propaganda, which they had outlined in the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act. This
law allowed only for U.S. propagandists “to promote a better understanding of the United States
in other countries, and to increase mutual understandings between the people of the United States
and the people of other countries.”101
Enduring Congressional skepticism toward propaganda had not entirely melted away after
the end of World War II, and neither Barrett nor Truman were convinced they would be able to
get sufficient Congressional appropriations to fund their proposed campaign. Helpfully toward
that end, in June of 1950 when Stalin helped start the Korean War, the administration capitalized
on the threat to justify to Congress a massive increase in propaganda spending.102 As the U.S.
prosecuted the war, however, questions increasingly arose as to the effectiveness of the strident
style of propaganda being employed.103
In the end, however, it was the excesses of McCarthyism that sealed the fate of overly
emotional and strident overt American government propaganda into the dustbin of history, with a
few notable exceptions. McCarthy’s vitriolic attacks on State Department propagandists had led
at first to “a frenetic effort on the part of the program managers to demonstrate their loyalty to the
anti-Communist cause by devoting an increasing share of program outputs to attacks on the
Communist bloc, with less content focused on positive aspects of U.S. policies.” 104 At about the
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same time, Congress had launched several inquiries into the Truman administration’s efforts to
conduct propaganda and psychological warfare, including the aforementioned 1953 Jackson
Committee. Among other recommendations, the committee’s final report recommended scaling
back on language perceived to be overly “propagandistic,” and walking a finer line between
persuading and informing.105
When the United States Information Agency was established in August 1953, its first
director, Thomas Streibert – previously a film and radio executive – tried to straddle this line. On
the one hand, Streibert promised to “concentrate on objective, factual news reporting” such that
“in presenting facts […] their selection does not misrepresent a given situation.”106 For the agency,
this theoretically meant “the elimination of polemics from its broadcasts and written output [and]
the careful and scrupulous regard for a truthful and balanced account of events.” Yet sensitive to
criticism that USIA was not doing enough to persuade, Streibert sometimes swung in the opposite
direction. In 1954, for example, he described his work as such: “To the enslaved people of the
satellites, our news and commentaries from the outside world can also continue to bring evidence
of our interest in their freedom and hope for their ultimate liberation.”107
Streibert’s successor George Allen – who had headed the propaganda program at the State
Department in the late 40s – essentially put the nail in the coffin for overly emotional
argumentation, however. Whereas Streibert pushed for a hard-sell, Allen preferred a passive
information sharing approach. Ultimately, Allen believed that foreign opinion of the United States
depended almost entirely on U.S. policy, not the spin that propagandists later applied to it, and

105

Rubin, The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency, 107-138.
Meyerhoff, Arthur, The Strategy of Persuasion: The Use of Advertising Skills in Fighting the Cold War,
(New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1965): 89; Henderson, The United States Information Agency, 56.
107
Rubin, The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency, 43.
106

76

therefore there was little reason to invest deeply in emotional persuasion techniques.108 Though
several examples can be found of later U.S. government overt propagandists using emotional
persuasion rather than rational persuasion techniques, for the most part this was a minority
approach from 1953 to the present day, with some notable exceptions – particularly in the Reagan
era. Alternatively, however, every Director following Allen – most notably journalist Edward R.
Murrow in the 1960s – emphasized the importance of working clearly to persuade rather than
simply inform foreign publics, albeit in a reserved, journalistic tone of voice.

2.15

Questions Never Fully Resolved
While many of the fundamental issues facing any propaganda agency were satisfactorily

asked and answered in the period 1941-1953, many other questions have defied consensus, and
may in fact never be fully resolved. First, to what extent will U.S. propaganda focus on informing
versus persuading? This, though various USIA directors had divergent views and emphases, was
largely dependent on context. Which propagandist was in what country, during what time, in what
cultural context, with which achievable goals, in the midst of which major events? To the extent
that this question was ever answered, the answer was in the hands of each Embassy’s public affairs
officer, or chief country propagandist. Similarly, questions as to whether propaganda should focus
on long-term or short-term goals, on elite or mass audiences, or on quantitative or qualitative goals
have all defied a universally applicable answer. Though in my experience, State Department
propagandists marginally value long-term over short-term goals, reaching elite over mass
audiences, and setting quantitative over qualitative goals, in the end, we do both, to varying degrees
depending on context.
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2.16

Conclusion
In this chapter, we explored how and why modern American propaganda institutions first

became (1) public rather than private sector; (2) permanent rather than temporary; (3) truthful
rather than dishonest; (4) overt rather than covert, (5) generally sober and rationalist rather than
strident and emotional; (6) generally more persuasive rather than purely informational; (7) rooted
in narrative rather than dialogue format; (8) internationalist and interventionist rather than
isolationist; and (9) firewalled from censorship activities, rather than combined. Essentially,
propagandists have largely been able to justify their professional existence only in the face of clear
national security concerns.

The choice to be rational versus emotional, persuasive versus

informational, narrative- rather than dialogue-based, internationalist rather than isolationist, and
truthful rather than mendacious was largely driven by the ideological beliefs of early
propagandists, in concert with some anecdotal evidence about how well their propaganda was
succeeding in the field. These choices, along with propaganda’s separation from censorship
activities, were also driven by deep Congressional and presidential hostility toward and fear of the
power of propaganda.
In the next chapters, I will attempt to answer how and why modern American propaganda
became (1) presumptive that increased exposure leads to increased liking; (2) based on on-the-job
learning, gut feelings and past practices, rather than skills-based training or a foundation in the
social sciences of persuasion; (3) unwilling to ask audiences to put themselves in harm’s way to
advance policy goals; and (4) evangelical about democracy, rather than focused exclusively on
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more limited or transactional goals.

I will also explore unresolved questions surrounding

American propagandists’ changing focus on elite versus mass audiences, preferences for long
versus short-term goals, and briefly, the extent to which policy makers have included
propagandists to the policy table.
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3

The Institutional Culture of Modern American Propaganda

3.1

Introduction

This chapter covers the history of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its institutional
culture, from its birth in 1953 until its merger into the Department of State. Here, I argue that the
institutional culture established by 1953 did not significantly change thereafter.
In this chapter, I will attempt to answer three primary questions: (1) what changed – or
more importantly, didn’t change – in the institutional culture and behavior of overt American
government propaganda institutions from 1953 to the present; (2) why did these institutions come
to rely on on-the job training rather than social science expertise when designing persuasion
programs; and (3) how did these institutions come to become evangelical promoters of democracy?
In the next chapter, I will explore the results of a survey of current U.S. propagandists, which
confirms that the institutional culture born in the 1940s and early 1950s is still very much operative
today.
Having explained the institutional history of modern American propaganda through the
birth of the USIA, we must now turn to what came after. Though several top propagandists in the
1960s continued the tradition of writing memoirs of their time in government service, this abruptly
came to a halt in the late 1960s. This greater reticence may have been due to increased negative
attention on U.S. government statements and propaganda in light of the Vietnam war, and on the
misleading statements made by senior government and military officials. As a result, in this
chapter, while I rely on similar sources to those in the previous chapter – the writings and remarks
of senior U.S. propaganda officials – for the period 1953 to 1968, thereafter my source material
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shifts significantly. At that point in the story, I rely much more heavily on the annual reports of
the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, as well as upon oral interviews I conducted
with six USIA officials, both mid-level and senior, who served from the 1970s to the 1990s.

3.2

The 1950s: The More Things Change…
With the establishment of USIA in 1953, there still remained fluctuations over time

between directors, and depending on historical circumstances, in many aspects of how propaganda
was conceived and executed. These included the relative importance that key USIA leaders
accorded to short-term versus long-term programs, the emphasis they placed on persuasion versus
information, and the extent to which they were invited to the policy-making table alongside senior
State Department and Defense Department leaders. However, I argue that the overall institutional
culture described in the previous chapter remained relatively constant. Those intimately familiar
with how overt American government propagandists operate today will be struck by how familiar
the operative beliefs of 1953 feel and sound.
For one, the institution was still committed to its wartime internationalist ethos, which was
not a given following repeated Congressional attempts to defund the entire program. Illustrating
this point, in 1953 former OWI deputy director and later State Department chief propagandist
Edward Barrett published Truth is Our Weapon, explaining the ongoing need for a sustained
strategy of global, truth-based propaganda to counter the Soviet Union’s ideological and military
expansion efforts. If anyone had any doubts that America, or its overt propagandists, might retreat
into post-war isolationism, Barrett argued, Eisenhower quickly put that idea to rest: “President
Eisenhower’s inaugural address of 1953 [was] probably the most internationalist speech ever
delivered by an American president,” winning “plaudits from virtually every political and
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journalistic voice this side of the Chicago Tribune.”1 In fact, Barrett wrote, by 1953 “old-style
isolationism no longer exist[ed] as a political force.”2
Those in charge of that global propaganda campaign were also committed to the sober and
journalistic approach pursued by the OWI after 1943. In rejection of both McCarthyism and his
own recent Campaign of Truth (see Chapter 2), Barrett argued that a winning strategy had to be
rationalistic to be effective: “We have no wise choice but to master the techniques of international
persuasion. This does not mean going hog-wild, misconstruing propaganda as a substitute for
action. It does not mean adopting, under pressure from immature headline-hunters, such shrill and
strident techniques as to alienate at the outset those we seek to win over. It doesn’t mean confusing
volume with effectiveness.”3
Early USIA officer Wilson Dizard later made the same points in his 1961 book The
Strategy of Truth, noting that the stentorian tone of the Campaign of Truth finally met its end with
the birth of the new agency: “In the sober-sided reappraisal that took place in the 1953 when the
USIA was set up, [the previous] pugilistic tone was changed,” terminating the “strident, highpitched program[s] that delighted in making sophisticated political points without concern for the
reaction of the average listener.”4
George Allen, the USIA Director from 1957-1960, reiterated this point: “We want the
program to be factual, straightforward and dignified, to avoid flamboyance in tone, or voice, or in
phraseology. […] We have sometimes raised our tone, in excitement or in anger, but I hope we
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shall do it as little as possible.”5 Allen even went so far as to issue a “USIA Basic Guidance Paper”
on October 22, 1957, forbidding “drawing obvious morals,” “all kinds of polemics and
denunciation,” and “anything “sarcastic or boastful or self-righteous.”6
Barrett argued the sober truth was crucial for two key reasons. First, it was important that
the United States develop its own unique style of overt propaganda, which could not easily be
confused with that of the Soviets: “Subtlety is essential. By being too shrill, propaganda can
defeat itself – as the Soviets’ output, happily, has sometimes done.”7 Second, Barrett reiterated
the wartime view that “truth and truth alone should be America’s weapon in official propaganda,”
as this was the only ethical and practical course.8 Barrett argued that this uniquely American
propaganda had to shy away from trying to create an emotional mass movement because it was
dangerous to democracy. American propaganda, as a result, was constitutionally unable to create
simplistic creeds as the Communists did, like arguing that Communism would lead to a worker’s
utopia, as such statements violated the strategy of truth.9 Interestingly, other challenges that Barrett
described in those early years are precisely the same as those that have bedeviled American
propagandists up to the present day. He describes, for example, how a hostile Congress latched
onto reports of one poorly thought-through art exhibit in their attempts to defund the entire
program.10
Much like many later propaganda directors and operatives (see Appendix J), Barrett also
believed that in a competitive marketplace of ideas, the American truth would rise to the top,
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arguing that “we are convinced that America stands up well under examination and that knowledge
of this nation fosters respect for it and confidence in it.”11 (This was also one of the early
formulations of the enduring, but scientifically unsupported, belief that the more they know us, the
more they like us.) Just three years later in 1956, former OWI Director Elmer Davis made the
same scientifically dubious point about how rational facts would ultimately prevail of their own
power: “This nation was conceived in liberty and dedicated to the principle … that honest men
may honestly disagree; that if they all say what they think, a majority of people will be able to
distinguish truth from error; that in the competition in the marketplace of ideas, the sounder ideas
will in the long run win out.”12 USIA Director George Allen (1957-1960) also agreed, generally
arguing that informing was equivalent to persuading.13
Barrett, like his OWI forebears, shared the evangelical belief that the idea of democracy
was so compelling and obviously superior that it would be enough to simply share The Good Word
with others, rather than investing over several generations in inculcating the social beliefs required
for a democracy to succeed: “The U.S believes that democracy is the best form of government yet
devised. […] We should illustrate how democracy works here and let our audiences reach their
own conclusions.”14 Moreover, he argued, that evangelism had to be active: “The United States
Government can no longer be indifferent to the ways in which our nation is portrayed by other
countries, but is obliged to give a full and fair picture of the United States.”15 This, Barrett wrote,
was implemented by propagandists with “a sort of missionary zeal that contrasted sharply with the
average man’s idea of a government bureaucrat. Voluntary work after hours and on weekends was
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more the rule than the exception.”16 Barrett’s dedication page read, in its entirety: “To Mason,
my wife – and to hundreds of other wives who have tolerated and encouraged propagandist
husbands in the frustrating toil of trying to convert men to the cause of freedom.”17
Finally, on an organizational level, even when examining USIA in 1953, modern American
propagandists would easily recognize the clear reflection of their own institutions. Just five years
after the birth of Congressionally-approved exchange programs, Barrett already confidently
describes sending journalists on exchange programs such as the International Visitor Leadership
Program (IVLP) to attempt to generate more favorable coverage for the United States. He also
describes multi-media, multi-audience campaigns on specific policy issues, such as a campaign to
highlight what has happened in countries where Communists had already taken over – tactics
which have not changed to the present day.18 On a structural level, Barrett also outlines many of
the key organizational structures so familiar to modern day American propagandists, including
Country Team, and by different names, the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), and the Public
Diplomacy Implementation Plan (PDIP).19 1953 was also the year that, organizationally, USIA’s
first director Thomas Streibert vested a great deal of power in “geographic bureaus.” In this
arrangement, which continues to the present day, propaganda funding was first funneled to offices
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which oversaw, for example, operations in Sub-Saharan Africa or East Asia, rather than having
such funding allocated from one global office.20

3.3

The 1960s: The Age of Murrow
Famed journalist Edward R. Murrow took over as USIA chief on March 21, 1961, just two

months after President John F. Kennedy took office. Three years earlier, Congress had cut USIA’s
budget by 10% due to their displeasure with short-lived director Arthur Larson, and Murrow
sought about rebuilding USIA’s relationship with Congress. To do so, he had to explain why
propaganda was still relevant, and therefore, with Kennedy’s backing, worked to ensure that the
entire agency clearly understood its mission was not only to inform, but also to persuade.21 In this,
he was backed by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, whose February 1963 report
stated clearly that “merely purveying information is not enough. The United States must engage
in

ardent

persuasion

which

by

its

nature

is

aggressive

and

creative.”22

Murrow’s efforts, however, were only so successful. One of his successors as USIA
director, Leonard Marks, was later chastised by the Advisory Commission, whose 1968 report
noted that “there is still uncertainty as to whether greater thrust and emphasis should be placed on
information and persuasion or behind education and persuasion.”23

By this point as well,

American propagandists were also attuned to the risk of inciting their audiences to risk life and
limb in pursuit of American policy goals such as democratization, particularly in the wake of the
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1956 Hungarian uprising.24 Both USIA and VOA were careful thereafter not to potentially lead
audiences to believe that if they risked their lives for democracy, the United States would assuredly
come to their aid.
In 1960s, the USIA also found itself in the Congressional hotseat for, in one case, not being
assiduously truthful, and in another, for not disclosing that it was funding a particular program. In
1963 and on Murrow’s watch, Congress was livid to discover that USIA had funded 2,000 copies
of arch-conservative Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s anti-Communist book The Strategy of Deception for
distribution abroad, as some copies of it had made their way back to domestic markets in violation
of Smith-Mundt.25 Then, on January 13, 1965 under Director Carl Rowan, the Associated Press
revealed that a USIA-funded propaganda “documentary” film about Vietnam had staged fake
fighting scenes. Rowan immediately ordered an end to any such tactics.26
Meanwhile, USIA began to attract criticism from the private sector, in particular the
advertising industry, that its persuasion efforts were largely ineffective. In 1963, journalist Walter
Joyce called American propaganda “a disappointment,” laying out five key criticisms. First, the
program was so underfunded compared to its adversaries that it could not plausibly compete.
Second, it had no clear goals in mind. Third, Joyce objected to the strategy of truth as fighting
with one hand behind one’s back. Fourth, Joyce pointed out the long-standing inability of key
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propagandists to get a seat at the policy-making table. And fifth, he argued that there was far too
much information, and not nearly enough persuasion.27
Advertising executive Arthur Meyerhoff made similar points in his 1965 book The Strategy
of Persuasion, arguing that USIA efforts suffered from a clear lack of understanding of proven
techniques of persuasion. “As a result,” he wrote, “the message which they bear does not reach
the people for whom it is intended in a form that has meaning for them.”28 Meyerhoff excoriated
what he perceived as an overly factual style, noting a few counterexamples, such as USIA’s
dubbing of the Berlin Wall as the “Wall of Shame,” as best practices. He rejected Murrow’s
formulation that “to be persuasive, we must be believable; to be believable, we must be credible;
to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.” Instead, Meyerhoff argued that
“ultimately it is not that simple. While it is true that believability is vital to persuasiveness, it is a
mistake to equate news with the truth.”29 The solution, he wrote, was a dramatic uptick in funding
for market research, and hiring subject matter experts from the field of advertising.30
None of these criticisms, however, were lost on the actual propagandists themselves.
Murrow’s Deputy Director Thomas Sorensen wrote in his 1968 memoirs, for example, that
“merely informing people was not enough. We had to make a case for our views, as others were
doing for theirs. We had to be advocates, persuaders – propagandists. We did not lie, or distort
the news, or subvert the media, but neither were we disinterested.”31 However, even Sorensen
admitted to an ongoing confusion about how clearly to tie educational and exchange programs to
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policy-driven persuasion goals.32 But USIA was clearly responding to some of these criticisms:
in the 1960s, the Agency created its own polling service called the Office of Research, “to analyze
foreign issues, attitudes, audiences, and media.”33 Under Murrow, the USIA also created, in
October 1961, the first Foreign Correspondents’ Center in New York, which continues to operate
to the present day.34
The ethical issues that continue to confront overt, modern American government
propagandists were already clear to USIA officials in the 1960s. USIA had, since its inception,
banned “buying space in news columns or on the radio, or paying journalists to do its bidding.”35
The already global network of 223 American government libraries had to walk an ethical tightrope
between providing the full scope of information and ideas, without angering host governments so
much that they were shut down.36 And though the strict firewall between intelligence work and
overt propaganda at the working level remained in place, senior USIA and CIA leaders began
deconflicting their major operations to avoid overlap.37 Deputy Director Sorensen reiterated that
the strategy of truth was still very much in place, though he also made it clear – as had his
predecessors – that truth needed to be contextualized for it to be meaningful.38 Citing Murrow,
period academic Ronald Rubin also restated the argument for a specifically American style of
truthful propaganda, noting that “the USIA must mirror the diversity in American political life
[and] cannot practice the deception in which a propaganda machine freely engages. […] Instead,
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the USIA must make a virtue of national pluralism in publicizing the American message
overseas.”39
Despite its occasional missteps, and even when confronted with the difficult task of
defending the Vietnam War, the organizational culture remained true to its World War II ethos
throughout the 1960s. The employees of USIA in its second decade remained eager, truthful,
internationalist evangelists for democracy, who ensured that their efforts at persuasion remained
largely sober, dispassionate, and American, even when under attack by Congress and the private
sector. On the other hand, they remained aloof from best practices from other fields such as
advertising, as well as from contemporary social science research on persuasion.

3.4

The 1970s: Directors Shakespeare, Keogh, and Reinhardt
In the 1970s, the senior leaders of USIA essentially stopped communicating directly with

the public through memoirs following their public service. Outside of a few specialist press
articles, Director Frank Shakespeare (1969-1973) published a single article in U.S. News & World
Report, while his successor James Keogh (1973-1976) similarly published but one article, and that
in the same magazine.40 The next director, John Reinhardt (1977-1980) published nothing at all
aimed at the public – though he surely made waves with his article “United States government and
international communication” in International Educational & Cultural Exchange’s Winter 1978
edition.41 None of them published memoirs following their government service, nor does it appear
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did any of their deputies. Limited scholarly work from universities continued to assess USIA
strategies, successes, and failures, but the voices of the senior propagandists themselves fell silent.
As a result, to bolster the case that the cultural fundamentals of modern, overt, institutional
American propaganda did not change in the 1970s, I necessarily turn to reports from the
Congressionally-mandated Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD), as well as oral
interviews from several USIA officials who served in this period.42 ACPD reports are akin to
reports from corporate management consultants who identify issues, problems, and inefficiencies
for the organization to solve. In this light, they are not primary sources that can give us the views
of the propagandists themselves, but rather a secondary source from those who have closely
studied the operations, beliefs, and motivations of the propagandists. These reports shine a
spotlight on ongoing policy questions such as the extent to which propagandists need a seat at the
policy table to be successful, and inefficiencies such as deficient research capabilities. However,
they do not specifically address embedded cultural questions like the extent to which practitioners
continued to embrace the strategy of truth; for those questions, we must turn to oral interviews.
ACPD reports in the 1970s, at least on the propaganda program, were sporadic, typically
being released every three years rather than annually as is mandated by law. They highlighted
many of the perennial, never-answered questions, and often took conflicting views depending on
which year’s report one reads: should USIA remain independent or return to the State Department?
Should public affairs officers in the field have more or less decision-making authority? Should
propaganda programs hew closely to the political winds, or should they chart a more stable course
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founded upon the foreign policy principles that both Democrats and Republicans were likely to
agree upon? How would success be measured? How important was it for propagandists to have
a seat at the policy making table? To what extent should propagandists maintain the long-standing
‘warts and all’ approach to describing America, even in the face of some Congressional
opposition? How should propagandists prioritize outreach to elite versus mass audiences?
More importantly, however, they treated as unquestioned some of the salient points of
America’s institutional propaganda culture. None of these reports even approached questioning
the strategy of truth. They treated internationalism as a given in the Cold War context of
competition with both the USSR and China, and treated the permanence of the institution as
obvious. There was not a single suggestion that persuasion techniques become more emotional,
strident, or vivid, and ACPD reports fully supported the evangelical mission of the United States
to advance democracy in the face of totalitarianism.
The reports in the 1970s also called out several of the ongoing weaknesses of American
propaganda culture, including the presumption that increased exposure leads to increased liking,
and the lack of grounding in social science research on persuasion. The 1970 report explicitly
questioned the prevailing idea that the more they know us, the more they like us, calling this
assumption “hazardous.”43 Echoing previous decades’ criticism, the reports further characterized
USIA’s research efforts as “primitive, timid, and stumbling in the past,” noting that its research
was both underfunded and not grounded in existing social science, and that its results were not
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effectively communicated to the field.44 Finally, all reports from this period agreed that the USIA
had not established credible means to measure program success, with its 1974 report providing an
entire how-to manual on how to do so in its appendices.45
Oral interviews with period USIA employees confirm that in the 1970s, modern American
propagandists shared the same institutional culture as both their forebears and successors. Pat
Kushlis served from 1970-1998 in a variety of roles, including both domestic positions as well as
in Helsinki, Moscow, and Bangkok. Highlighting the ongoing tension between the extent to which
American propagandists should inform versus aggressively persuade, Kushlis noted that “I
wouldn’t say [we were] selling policy. That would be too much. I would say explaining policy.”
Moreover, the tone of U.S. propaganda was sober and reasoned: “I don’t remember strident
language.” In this period, Kushlis also notes that USIA programs were still driven by foreign
policy, and animated by the strategy of truth: “In my own experience, I was never given anything
that was disinformation. Yes, we were doing propaganda, but I was never given anything that was
a lie.” The truth required contextualization, but also included facts that were less favorable to the
United States: “[The] warts and all [approach] was never frowned upon. Really it was more
important to focus on knowing who you’re talking to [and] to try to explain this is what the official
is saying and the context in which it was said.”46
Paul Smith, who served with the USIA from 1973 until 1999, and then with the State
Department until 2002, had similar memories. In his 30-year career, which included serving as
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Consul General in St. Petersburg and Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow, he remembered using
neutral rather than strident language in his persuasion efforts: “We were to avoid anything that
would create conflict, [and] get the message across but downplay the emotional dimension.” Smith
also noted that long-term goals were prioritized over short-term goals:
Long-term goals were the focus of the country plans. Meeting people was
meant to build long-term relationships. Exchange programs were meant to
send people to influence policy over the long term on their return.
Establishing long-term working relationships with the media to get the
message out. Not focusing on why were not supporting this or that trade
issue, but bigger things like we’re a democracy. Issues were always there
and we always had to be prepared to articulate the U.S. position, but it wasn’t
that we spent a lot of time doing that. The key was to develop relationships,
positive relations.47

3.5

The 1980s: The Charles Wick Era
Though the standard tenure for ‘successful’ USIA directors from the 1950s to the 1970s

was 3 years, Hollywood film producer Charles Wick broke the mold by remaining in office for the
entirety of Reagan’s presidency, setting a to-date unbroken record for longest serving chief
American propagandist. Backed by a president whose own Hollywood history had shaped him
into a man known as the Great Communicator, Wick was anxious to make it clear that the USIA
was not here simply to inform, but to persuade, and often in dramatic fashion.48 Though the public
affairs officers at various Embassies had become accustomed in the 1960s and 1970s to more or
less running their shops, so long as they conformed to larger foreign policy goals, Wick saw
himself as an orchestra director, and insisted that – at times – all USIA posts play the same tune,
even if local audiences found the sound a bit dissonant.
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Wick insisted, for example, that every USIA post around the world screen a U.S.
government-funded musical film called “Let Poland Be Poland,” and that every Embassy
pressgang local media into televised press briefings, whether or not local media was interested.49
This was, as one of Wick’s deputies explained, because Reagan wanted to “inject new vigor” into
American propaganda, or, as National Security Advisor Carnes Lord put it, to “shake up this whole
backwater of U.S. government policy,” which disturbed the Reaganites with its “lack of fresh
thinking in approaching the mission, and its World War II mentality.” 50 Wick insisted that USIA
reframe from the propaganda détente of the 1970s to a more aggressive anti-Soviet stance,
aggressively countering Soviet disinformation efforts.51 Mirroring Truman’s ill-fated Campaign
of Truth, Wick called this new effort Project Truth, but later folded it into an expanded Project
Democracy as the first title was deemed too propagandistic.52 This “multi-agency programming
initiative [was] designed to advocate the principles of democracy abroad,” part of the longstanding democratic evangelism of U.S. propaganda efforts.53
ACPD reports largely took up this charge as well, focusing more narrowly on specific
tactics and program ideas rather than long-standing issues related to USIA’s institutional culture.
However, almost every ACPD report in the 1980s made specific mention of the need for increased
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funding for, and integration of, research into program decisions. The 1989 report in particular
castigated the “largely ritualistic … commitment to public opinion research.”54
Despite the changes referenced above, the core propaganda culture, including the strategy
of truth, again remained remarkably stable. Though USIA’s director for television and film
grandiosely claimed in his book Warriors of Disinformation that he and his peers became
“unknowing warriors of disinformation, and then we became knowing ones,” his book is bereft of
even a single example of USIA knowingly promoting disinformation. Instead, at times, the CIA
or the National Security Agency “duped [USIA] into transmitting lies – disinformation – without
[us] realizing it at the time.”55
Oral interviews with period employees confirm that the “World War II mentality” so
disliked by the Reagan appointees was still alive and well, for better and for worse. Judith Siegel,
who served for 25 years in USIA and the State Department (1981-2006), including in a position
equivalent to Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Information Bureau, confirmed that the strategy of
truth was just as active as it had been previously: “Everything in our publications was balanced
and accurate, and to the extent possible, non-propagandistic.”

Further, “because some

Congressional staff believed that the Reagan administration attempted to politicize USIA funding
decisions for civil society grants,” Congress added reporting guidelines to ensure that [Information
Bureau] grants did not serve domestic political concerns. 56
Dan Sreebny, meanwhile, served for almost 30 years in USIA and the State Department,
from 1980 to 2009, and has continued working with certain State Department propaganda
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institutions even into retirement. Sreebny confirmed that despite the change in tone at the very top
under Wick, USIA language remained, for the most part, sober and journalistic. “The idea,” said
Sreebny, “was not to adopt a journalist approach because we’re journalists – we’re not – but
because we need credibility with the target audience in order to influence them. […] I wouldn’t
say journalism versus emotion, but there’s a consistent approach of needing to be credible. In a
speech you want to include stories, feelings, a sense of what matters, but you want to ensure it’s
grounded in credibility. But there’s that tension sometimes, like Iraq and Afghanistan, if we just
yell it loud enough, we are right, they are wrong. We are good, they are bad, and we did sometimes
get suggestions to do some of that.”57
Ben Ziff joined USIA in 1988, and following its integration into the State Department in
1999, worked his way up to senior level positions including Deputy Chief of Mission in Bogota,
and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the European bureau. Like Siegel, he confirmed that in the
1980s “USIA focused on more long-term relationship building, less on immediate communication
responses [because] you just didn’t have the situational awareness,” despite the fact that policy
makers in Washington did not “think about a year from now, five years from now, fifteen years
from now. It’s our job to think about that.” Ziff also confirmed the ongoing commitment to the
strategy of truth, as well as to relatively sober communication styles: “Emotional language was
generally avoided because we didn’t think it would work. It was more thoughtful and sober, and
we talked about it in terms that [the audience] would think was respectful.” Further, “we were not
lying, cheating, and stealing,” as “the thing we always had going for us was our credibility.” Much
like the OWI of the early 1940s, Ziff explained that USIA even into the 1980s and 1990s attracted
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“mavericks, the authors, the poets, the dreamers, the artists, the academics, who were interested in
the subject matter and engaging with foreign audiences.”58

3.6

The 1990s: The Collapse of Communism, and USIA Integration
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its regional empire posed existential questions for

American propagandists. To what extent would they still be needed in this post-Cold War world?
So much of 1980s-era U.S. propaganda had been directed at combating Communism that Ziff, who
joined in 1988, understood USIA as “not this general [public diplomacy] organization,” but one
instead “set up to counter the bulwarks of the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent China.” Ziff saw
USIA “struggle in the time after the Wall fell [as] it just couldn’t find a purpose, because it was
designed to counter the Soviet Union.”59 Judith Siegel concurred: “For so long [public diplomacy]
was called the war of ideas, but then supposedly we won – so what were we fighting?”60
Perhaps sensing pending budget cuts, the ACPD report in 1990 sought to head off this
eventuality by arguing that USIA was needed now more than ever, particularly to fulfill the
evangelical role of democratization in those countries recently freed from authoritarianism. That
report argued the “USIA is not a creature of the Cold War, its work now finished. The Agency’s
worldwide mission will become more, not less, important,” with its efforts “vital to the success of
democratization in Eastern Europe.”61 Regardless, USIA’s budgets decreased throughout the
decade (see Appendix I), as unfortunately did funding for the ACPD, which largely stopped
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producing annual reports for the next twenty years, albeit with a few enlightening special reports
appearing at intervals.
Jonathan Cebra joined USIA at this tumultuous time, officially in 1997, though after having
worked in Warsaw for the State Department from 1992-1993, and then for a major USIA grantee
which administered several of its exchange programs. Debra, Smith, Siegel, and Cebra all
described an institution with clear long-term goals in which programs were driven by foreign
policy.62 Siegel elaborated: “When I supervised these programs in the Clinton and second Bush
administrations, the focus was on information that would make foreign publics understand us
better,” including understanding the context of specific policy goals.63 Cebra and Paul Smith
concurred that the strategy of truth, including the ‘warts and all,’ and other significant aspects of
the institutional culture were very much intact.64

3.7

1999 and Beyond: Integration with State
Despite massive budget cuts to the propaganda apparatus as part of USIA’s integration into

the State Department – a 33% drop from 1999 to 2000 – as well as a perceived loss of status, my
interviewees confirmed that the institutional culture remained largely intact in the next decade, up
until my own hiring in 2008. That said, there were significant changes noted by the propagandists
who chose to remain with State. Cebra reported a lessened sense of independence at the working
level, particularly in the ability to tell the Ambassador ‘no.’ Shockingly, he noted that it “took
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about five years after consolidation before we started getting Department Notices,” the State
Department’s preferred method of communicating policy changes to its staff.65
Siegel concurred with Cebra’s assessment, saying that “within the Department, [public
diplomacy] is a diminished presence compared to what USIA was. USIA was able to be much
more of a force because the Department couldn’t kill things.” According to Siegel, the educational
and cultural programs did not significantly change post-merger thanks to their separate legislative
charter, and in any case, the Department of State was more interested in administering the
information programs.66
Ziff noted that in part due to technological limitations such as the absence of social media
and the internet, USIA was much more focused on influencing elites than mass audiences, as
compared to modern public diplomacy at the State Department. Further, he argued that Embassies
in general have lost autonomy due to the technological ability through email for policy makers in
Washington to engage with posts on a minute to minute basis. As a result, “some of the long-term
stuff got deprioritized because of this new ability to focus on the short-term stuff.” Ziff also
describes how the meaning of “policy-driven” has taken on a much more narrow definition in the
State Department era:
Younger officers might say that you’re not using State Department channels
to move tactically day by day, hour by hour, to move the needle. The
Department now believes it deploys public diplomacy in a much more
narrow, mechanistic way. The older Public Diplomacy officers were much
more broad-brush, and much more focused on shifting sentiment by suasion,
and who you engage with, not how you engage with them. It wasn’t about
getting these three words into a speech by the Prime Minister, which is what
Washington [now] thinks is a success.67
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Though there is much to recommend about the enduring institutional culture of modern
American propaganda, there are also significant weaknesses in that culture. Next, I will explore
three specific issues that have their roots in that same institutional culture, dating back to 1953:

3.8

Institutional Weakness A: Lack of Training
The lack of meaningful training for public diplomacy officers has been an issue identified

by many critics since the establishment of the USIA, and that deficit continues to hamper the ability
of such officers to meaningfully advance U.S. foreign policy to the present day. Distressingly, the
time allotted to training for U.S. propagandists has dramatically decreased over the decades.
Recently, for example, the State Department’s training school – the Foreign Service Institute –
combined two separate three-week courses, on information and cultural programs respectively,
into one three-week course, despite the necessarily reduced course outcomes.68
As early as the Eisenhower administration, there was significant discussion about creating
a “National Foreign Affairs Academy” or “Freedom Academy” to provide long-term, pre-service
training to U.S. government propagandists.69 Spurred by concurring recommendations from
ACPD reports in 1952 and 1954, that discussion continued throughout the 1950s, until in May of
1962 Assistant Secretary of State Frederick Dutton told Congress that the Department of State
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actively opposed the idea.70 This was despite a presidential committee on propaganda having
determined that such an institute was “essential.”71
In 1967 and 1968, the ACPD raised the issue again, calling training for U.S. propagandists
insufficient, and by 1968 proposals were once again floated for a propaganda training academy.72
USIA itself was well aware of the deficiencies of relying entirely on an apprenticeship model:
Agency planners liken[ed] the status of [USIA] training [in 1969] to that of
the medical and legal professions in the early nineteenth century. At that
time, the apprentice system was the principle method of training, but the
professions had begun to draw together their accumulated knowledge and to
create schools where this collected information was stored, analyzed, and
imparted to students. Similarly, the Agency has relied on developing
apprentices into skilled propagandists, but it is now moving toward a more
formalized arrangement.73
Sadly, that prediction did not bear fruit. Perhaps sensing that they were unlikely to make
meaningful headway pushing increased training given budget realities, ACPD did not significantly
address the issue again for several decades, until 2014, when the issue again became a steady,
annual drumbeat.
In particular, a 2015 ACPD special report called “Getting the People Part Right II: the
Human Resources Dimension of U.S. Public Diplomacy” and a 2020 special ACPD report called
“Teaching Public Diplomacy and the Information Instruments of Power in a Complex Information
Environment” spotlighted the gap in practitioner knowledge compared to their private sector and
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academic peers, and the dangers this created for U.S. foreign policy.74 Helpfully, both provided
road-maps as to how to effectively move towards a more training-based model.

3.9

Institutional Weakness B: Insufficient Research
A second major deficit in the institutional culture of American propagandists has been a

lack of understanding of, appreciation for, and commitment to employing research outcomes to
improve their practices. In 1953, USIA commissioned a private sector study to help it identify its
major challenges moving forward. The bulk of the book-length report pointed out that USIA was
not using any valid scientific theories of communication or persuasion, while setting goals which
were so vague as to be useless. This was in part due to the fact that within its first year of operation,
USIA had cut a research staff of over 150 down to five, and abolished the separate research staffs
of the Voice of America and other media units.75 As far as one of the report’s authors could tell,
USIA leadership never actually read the report they had commissioned.76 Certainly, they took no
efforts to implement its recommendations.
This failure to give research its due place within the institution was not for lack of trying
on the part of ACPD. Year after year, using almost the same language, it excoriated the USIA for
not adequately funding research, reading private sector or academic research, or using even their
own research to steer the way in which they organized their propaganda activities. ACPD annual
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or special reports in 1961, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1983,
1985, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993, 2005, 2010, and annually from 2014-2022 each brought attention
to the issue, but until very recently, appear to have been entirely ignored. 77 Indeed, even for the
years missing from the list above, in almost every case the explanation is not that the report did
not cite research as a problem, but rather that no report was issued that year.
ACPD believed that this lack of attention to research was not solely about lack of funding,
but rather due to a deeply ingrained hostility among government propaganda executives. Its
March, 1966 report argued that “unlike most private practitioners in foreign communications,
USIA managers are not disposed to organize and develop their programs and their budgets around
facts as established by research. ... There appears to be little desire to utilize the facts that research
has made available. The use of research has been seriously neglected to the detriment of the
program.”78 The February 1973 report brought up the same charges: “There appears to be little
disposition on the part of most of the Agency’s senior personnel … to either call for research as
an aid in decision making or to use the results of research studies that have been initiated by others.
… Too many decisions continue to be made on impression and hunch.”79 In that report, ACPD
members went so far as to recommend that USIA executives be required to have a background in
research, to try to remedy the problem.
Sensing that USIA leadership hadn’t perhaps understood their point, ACPD spent 12,
single-spaced pages of the May 1977 report trying to explain the importance of centering the
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results of scientific research on persuasion within the profession of propaganda.80 ACPD’s 1989
report complained that “Commitment to public opinion research in foreign policy decision-making
remains largely ritualistic.” Decades later, ACPD was still making the same points. As late as
2018, ACPD was essentially reprising their Sisyphean task with yet another well-argued special
report, “Optimizing Engagement: Research, Evaluation and Learning in Public Diplomacy.”81

3.10

Institutional Weakness C: Insufficient Evaluation
Related to, but separate from, the issue of centering scientific research outcomes in

program design is the question of how to measure success. Much like the previous two identified
issues, this problem has bedeviled American propagandists since the early 1950s – despite many
attempts by the ACPD and other critics to provide meaningful, accessible solutions over time.
Defining part of the problem, ACPD’s July, 1969 report complained about the murkiness of
“mutual understanding” as a metric, noting that “the plain fact is that in too many cases the Agency
does not know why it is doing what it is doing.”82 Five years later in 1974, little had changed.
According to the ACPD:
USIA efforts to assess the impact of its programs have been handicapped by confused
notions as to what constitutes effectiveness in a communication agency and by doubts that
effectiveness in any really meaningful sense can be measured. ‘No cash register rings
when a man changes his mind,’ one Agency Director has said. The present paper argues
that the effectiveness of USIA programs can in fact be clearly defined in terms of a set of
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reasonable criteria and can be objectively and quantitatively measured through the
techniques of behavioral science.83
The report went on to give thirty-seven pages of detailed notes on how, from a public diplomacy
perspective, to meaningfully evaluate dozens of different types of programs. It does not appear
that this advice was implemented, however, despite similar ACPD recommendations in 1980,
1989, 1993, 2010, and then annually since 2015. The ACPD even drafted two special reports on
the topic, the first in 2010, called “Assessing U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Notional Model,” and the
second in 2018.84
In the first report, ACPD partnered with the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
at the University of Texas, Austin, because – in typically understated fashion – “the Department
does not regularly employ replicable quantitative methods capable of measuring the extent to
which we are achieving the desired foreign policy outcomes on the basis of our public diplomacy
efforts.”85 It noted that outputs such as numbers reached were measured, but not actual outcomes,
and went on for 151 pages providing yet another how-to manual for the Department of State. The
second report provided more of a primer on public diplomacy research methods, but also some
important work on implementation best practices.86
Though the Department of State’s propaganda research and policy unit, dubbed R/PPR,
has taken strides in the past two years towards these goals, they have not yet filtered down in a
meaningful way to the propagandists operating abroad. Communicating Washington’s knowledge
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to “the field” has long been an issue: as far back as 1974, the ACPD report criticized USIA’s
research office for not effectively ensuring that practitioners knew what it was doing, or knew what
it knew. This state of affairs has not yet meaningfully changed at the Department of State, though
there is hope that this is changing.
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4

Modern American Propagandists’ Ethics, Beliefs, and
Behavior

4.1

Introduction
This study explores whether modern American propagandists continue to embrace the

same ethical and aesthetic values and norms established by their predecessors in the period 19411953. These norms include an adherence to the “strategy of truth,” a preference for rational
reasoning over emotional reasoning, insistence on disclosure of the U.S. government as the source
of information, a preference for clear links between programs and policy, and a preference for
long-term over short-term goals.

A total of 240 individuals currently employed as public

diplomacy-coned State Department officers were anonymously surveyed in April and May, 2022
through a snowball sample, out of an approximate total of 1,000 such officers overall. The study
tested twelve separate hypothesis, of which eight were supported, two partially supported, with
one receiving weak support and one unsupported. Overall, this study lends credence to the thesis
that modern American propagandists’ norms and values have not significantly changed over time,
but rather that a particularly American culture of propaganda has perpetuated itself for over 70
years. It also demonstrates that this particular culture is one that is, at its core, ethical in nature.

4.2

Background
In the previous two chapters, I laid out a historical argument for how modern American

propaganda (public diplomacy) came to be. Beginning in 1941, President Roosevelt established
the precursor institutions to modern day public diplomacy. These organizations were led largely
by political progressives including writers, poets, playwrights, and, in largest number, journalists.
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Those leaders’ ethical values, preferences and practices went on to create a uniquely American
style of propaganda, and an institutional culture that largely survived moves between several
parent organizations.
In Chapter 2, I explored the origins of these institutions, and how they came of age in the
early Cold War period with the 1953 establishment of the United States Information Agency
(USIA). To do so, I employed books and articles written by these leaders, scholarly histories of
these institutions, Congressional testimony, various U.S. government reports, and reports from the
Congressionally-mandated U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (ACPD).
In Chapter 3, I explored the history of these institutions up to the present day, arguing that
the key ideological decisions made in the early growth period went largely unchallenged. Here, I
again worked with books and articles written by period propaganda leaders and other scholarly
histories, ACPD reports, and oral histories conducted with USIA employees who served in the
1970s, 80s, and 90s. To further bolster the case that this particularly American propaganda culture
has not dramatically changed since 1953, in this chapter I present the results of my research into
currently-serving public diplomacy officers.

4.3

Study Design
An online, anonymous survey asked a series of validity, demographic, and survey-specific

questions aimed at currently serving, public diplomacy-coned Foreign Service Officers with the
U.S. Department of State. I reached out to such officers both through private Facebook groups,
individual State Department emails for known colleagues, and through Department listservs which
reached the overwhelming majority of potential participants. Though 360 users began the process,
37 did not successfully pass the validity questions, which used public diplomacy terms of art
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unlikely to be known to those outside the field to ensure that only public diplomacy officers
completed the survey. Surprisingly, another 83 respondents exited the survey after successfully
passing the validity questions, without completing any further demographic or survey questions,
resulting in an N of 240 survey participants.
Demographic questions included only gender identity, time in service, whether the
participant had previously served in a public diplomacy role in a warzone, and whether the
participant had previously been employed by the U.S. Information Agency, the precursor
propaganda agency to the U.S. Department of State. Demographic questions were kept limited in
order to help maintain full anonymity, and because I do not posit other demographic factors as
significant response predictors. For a full list of survey questions, please see Appendix K.
Research Question 1: Have the ethical, aesthetic and behavioral norms of foreigndirected, overt U.S. government propaganda (public diplomacy) which were established in the
period 1941-1953 persisted to the present day, largely unchanged?
Research Question 2: Given that these norms were born in periods of “hot” war, do they
remain resilient for public diplomacy officers during U.S. military conflicts today?

110

4.4

Hypothesis

H1: U.S. Public diplomacy practitioners (PDPs) will self-report that they do not deceive foreign
publics, with no significant differences between demographics.
H2: PDPs will self-report that they rarely conceal themselves as the source of information, with
no significant differences between demographics.
H3: Service in a war zone will not impact results in H1 or H2.
H4: PDPs will self-report that they do not engage in methods of propaganda often used by
totalitarian regimes, such as name-calling, sarcasm, emotional reasoning, or selecting one ethnic
as a featured enemy.
H5: PDPs will self-report ambivalence about telling partial truths.
H6: PDPs value and believe in an objective reality that can be agreed upon by disinterested
observers.
H7: PDPs believe that propaganda should be driven by foreign policy goals.
H8: PDPs believe that moral and rational arguments are preferred forms of persuasion, while
emotional arguments are less preferred.
H9: PDPs believe that some propaganda techniques are effective, but unethical, and do not use
those techniques considered unethical.
H10: Overall, PDPs value long-term goals over short-term goals.
H11: PDPs believe U.S. involvement in the world, particularly regarding democratization, is a net
positive.
H12: PDPs rely on outdated social and behavioral science vis-à-vis persuasion.
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4.5

Results
To test H1, I asked whether survey participants either misled or lied to foreign audiences,

and whether they perceived such behavior as either effective or ethical. Respondents uniformly
rejected this behavior, with 235 (97.9%) and 236 (98.3%) respectively saying that they rarely or
never mislead or lie to foreign audiences. Similar margins rejected the premise that these behaviors
were either effective (96.4%) or ethical (98.0%). The first hypothesis, that PDPs embrace a
strategy of truth, is supported.
To test H2, I asked whether PDPs concealed the U.S. government as the source of
information, and whether this behavior was effective or ethical. Survey respondents reported that
concealing the source was relatively rare, with 171 (71.2%) of respondents saying that they rarely
or never engage in this behavior. Another 51 (21.3%) respondents reported that they sometimes
engage in this behavior, with 18 (7.5%) reporting that they usually or always conceal the source.
Efficacy was rated low, with 136 (56.6%) reporting that concealment is rarely or never effective,
with 87 (36.3%) calling it sometimes effective.
Results for perceptions of the ethicality of concealment were almost identical, with 133
(55.4%) calling it rarely or never ethical, with 85 (35.4%) calling it sometimes ethical. No
statistical differences were observed for gender. However, PDPs with fewer than 5 years of service
were more likely to report ambivalent (“sometimes/neither agree nor disagree”) feelings toward
concealment than other cohorts, who more uniformly rejected the practice. I propose that this is
due to having spent less time becoming acculturated to State Department norms, rather than a
sudden shift in ethics likely to lead to long lasting change. The second hypothesis, that PDPs
rarely conceal themselves as the source of information, and that this should not vary based on
time in service, is supported.
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To test H3, I compared whether service in a warzone impacted results to the previous sets
of questions, as well as whether such respondents differed in their response to the statement “When
in a warzone, what is ethical to do in public diplomacy changes.” A majority of all participants
(56.7%) somewhat or strongly disagreed with the idea that wartime changes ethical considerations.
The next largest group (29.8%) believed this to be sometimes true. Only 13.5% of respondents
agreed that this was usually or always true. No statistical difference was observed between PDPs
who had or had not served in warzones for any of these questions.
Notably, however, male respondents were more likely to be ambivalent about the question
than women, and women were more likely to disagree with the statement than men. Among male
PDPs, 38.3% responded that they neither agreed nor disagreed, compared to only 20.2% of women.
Meanwhile, 31.9% of women somewhat disagreed with the idea, compared to only 14.8% of men.
Responses for strongly agree, somewhat agree, and strongly disagree were, however, comparable.
A similar pattern was observed for PDPs with fewer than 5 years of service, who were much more
ambivalent (50%) than their older cohorts, for whom between 23.0% and 33.3% neither agreed
nor disagreed with the statement. As with the gender differential, this was due to few new officers
responding that they “somewhat disagreed” with the proposal, while other categories showed
comparable responses among cohorts. The third hypothesis, that wartime service does not impact
ethical perceptions or behaviors, is supported.
To test H4, I asked whether survey participants participated in behaviors often associated
with totalitarian state propaganda, such as self-righteousness, name-calling, sarcasm, and use of
stereotypes. As with other questions, I also asked their views on the effectiveness and ethicality
of these behaviors. Respondents almost uniformly denounced behaviors such as self-righteous
argumentation and the use of stereotypes. PDPs gave moderately less strong, but still negative
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responses on name-calling and sarcasm. Among all respondents, 90.6% reported rarely or never
making use of stereotypes in their work.

Similar scores were found for self-righteous

argumentation (86.6%), sarcasm (80.1%) and name-calling (79.8%).

Similar views on the

effectiveness and ethics of these practices were also reported.
A gendered difference was again observed. In general, for most questions, women were
more likely to strongly disagree, while men were more likely to somewhat disagree or to report
ambivalence. This indicates that at least for these questions, female PDPs surveyed showed a
stronger sense of moral clarity on what they perceived as right and wrong. There was, however,
no clear or consistent relationship between time and service and moral clarity. The fourth
hypothesis, that PDPs do not engage in negative emotion-based techniques often associated with
totalitarian regimes, is supported.
The “strategy of truth” as outlined by early modern American propagandists did not
presume that it was possible to tell the “whole” truth, and there were significant debates among
the institutions about which facts were relevant and ethically required to be presented by these
propagandists. As a result, I hypothesized in H5 that PDPs would report ambivalent responses on
the question of telling partial truths, particularly when other relevant facts are in conflict with clear
policy goals. To test H5, I asked whether telling PDPs told whole or partial truths to advance
policy goals, whether these practices were either ethical or effective, and also whether they told
the ‘whole truth’ when it conflicted with policy goals.
PDPs, in fact, reported less ambivalence than expected, with clear majorities stating that
they simply tell the whole truth, thus avoiding moral ambiguity. Among those surveyed, 59.2%
said that they always or usually tell the whole truth to public audiences, with another 35.2% saying
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they sometimes do so. PDPs agreed that telling the whole truth is effective (57.5% strongly or
somewhat agreed) and ethical (77.25%). No respondent reported that they always tell partial
truths, and only 9.9% reported that they usually did so. PDPs reported that partial truths are neither
ethical nor effective, with only 11.6% and 8.15% strongly or somewhat agreeing, respectively.
However, in cases of clear policy conflicts, a clear split emerged. In this case, surveyed
PDPs were unlikely to report telling the whole truth, with only 23.1% reporting that they would
always or usually do so, 38.4% reporting that they would sometimes tell the whole truth, and
38.4% reporting that they would rarely or never tell the whole truth should it conflict with policy
objectives. These results did not vary significantly by time in service, with one exception: PDPs
with fewer than 5 years of service were less than half as likely as other cohorts to state that they
would tell the “whole truth” should it conflict with policy goals, possibly due to their lack of tenure
and associated labor protections. The single area of significant gender difference was to the
question, “I tell the whole truth to foreign audiences to advance U.S. foreign policy goals,” wherein
women (43.8%) were almost twice as likely as men (24.3%) to respond that this was sometimes
true, with men being more likely to report that they always or usually did so. The fifth hypothesis,
that PDPs will demonstrate moral ambiguity about the strategy of truth as regards partial versus
whole truths is partially supported, particularly in cases in which the whole truth is unhelpful to
policy objectives.
In order to determine to what extent the ‘truth,’ in the eyes of PDPs, was based on a solid,
objective, commonly understood foundation, rather than a perspective that truth is relative,
respondents were asked for H6 whether they agreed that “from a foreign policy perspective, there
is an objective reality that can be agreed upon by third party, disinterested observers.”

I

hypothesized that PDPs would overwhelmingly support this statement, particularly given the daily
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frustrations faced by those in this field with state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, and our
fact-based responses to those campaigns.
There was significantly greater ambivalence on this question than predicted. A slight
majority, 50.6% somewhat or strongly agreed with this statement. However, 24.3% neither agreed
nor disagreed, and 25.1% either somewhat or strongly disagreed. Neither time in service nor
gender strongly predicted responses. The sixth hypothesis, that PDPs accept the idea of an
objective reality which can be agreed upon by neutral observers for the purpose of foreign policy
promotion was only weakly supported.
By 1943, PDPs who believed that they should drive, rather than implement, foreign policy,
had been largely driven from government. To test whether this remained the case for H7, I asked
survey participants whether propaganda should be clearly linked to foreign policy, and whether
“the best” such programs had no clear policy component. This would test two ideas: one, that they
understood the principle, at work, and two, that they agreed that the principle of linking foreign
policy to propaganda can be effectively implemented.
There was overwhelming consensus on these two points. Among respondents, 86.4%
agreed that “public diplomacy should be clearly linked to, and driven by, foreign policy,” with an
almost identical number (85.54%) somewhat or strongly disagreeing with the proposition that “the
best public diplomacy programs have no policy component.” Within this broad consensus,
however, there were some significant differences. PDPs with fewer than five or fewer years of
service almost monolithically strongly agreed on these points, while more seasoned PDPs were
roughly split between strongly and somewhat agreeing. This may be explained by two separate
processes: 1) entry level training for PDPs may be doing a more focused and therefore successful
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job of inculcating this belief in new officers; and 2) experience in the field may temper the strength
of this belief over time – though significant differences were not observed between cohorts with,
for example 6-10 years compared to greater than 15 years of service. A moderate gender difference
was also observed. Women were marginally more likely to strongly or somewhat agree (90.8%)
with the importance of linking policy to programs than men (81.6%), though no significant
difference was observed regarding whether policy-linked programs were better.
Finally, previous employment at USIA was a moderate predictor of support for linking
policy to programs. Only 64.7% of those who reported prior USIA employment strongly or
somewhat agreed with the idea that public diplomacy should be linked to, and driven by, foreign
policy, while 88.1% of those who had worked only at the State Department agreed. This did not
imply, however, that previous USIA employees disagreed with the premise – most of the
remainder (23.5%) was simply ambivalent. As to the question of whether propaganda programs
were better without any clear policy link, 70.6% of those who reported prior USIA employment
disagreed, while 86.7% of those only employed by State disagreed, and strongly (54.6%). The
seventh hypothesis, that PDPs agree that policy should drive programs, and that such programs
are successful, is supported. Newly-minted employees, women, and those who had never served
at USIA were the most likely to agree.
The next question at hand in H8 is whether, as predicted, PDPs prefer rational and logical
arguments over emotional or moralistic forms of reasoning. I asked participants whether they used
each of these three argumentative styles with foreign audiences, and whether the use of these styles
was effective and ethical. I also included a separate question on whether “U.S. public diplomacy
outreach is too drab to be effective” to discern whether there was any discontent with the presumed
rationalist style of argument employed.
117

As expected, a significantly greater number of respondents reported usually or always
using rational arguments (79.4%) compared to moral arguments (39.3%) or emotional arguments
(50.43%), though the use of moral and emotional argumentation was significantly higher than
predicted. Though 61.8% of respondents strongly or somewhat agreed that moral arguments are
ethical, only 38.5% considered them effective. A similar number (63.4%) found emotional
arguments to be ethical (63.4%), though respondents were more likely to find emotional arguments
effective (60.8%) when compared to moral arguments. Though the numbers of those using moral
argumentation is statistically identical to the number of PDPs who believe it is effective, there is a
10% gap between those who believe emotional argumentation is both ethical and effective, but
choose not to use it. I argue that this gap is further evidence of a longstanding, embedded cultural
antipathy towards emotional argumentation styles, above and beyond the 29% difference between
those using rational versus emotional arguments.
Some surprising gender-based differences were revealed. Men were significantly more
likely (50.5%) to agree that moral argumentation is effective, while only 28.7% of women agreed.
Men also perceived moral argumentation as more ethical (72.5% agree) compared to women
(52.7%), and as a result more likely to make use of moral arguments (54.3% versus 26.3%).
Similar but smaller results were found for all questions regarding rational argumentation as well
as emotional argumentation, almost entirely because women were more likely to answer “neither
agree nor disagree” to each of these questions than men. Those serving five or fewer years were
moderately more likely to prefer moral argumentation, but there were no significant differences
for rational or emotional reasoning preferences.
On whether current programs are too drab to be effective, there was no consensus, though
respondents were slightly more likely to disagree with this statement than to agree. Slightly over
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a third (39.7%) somewhat or strongly disagreed, 34.5% neither agreed nor disagreed, and the
remainder (25.9%) somewhat or strongly agreed. The eighth hypothesis, that PDPs prefer
rational and moral argumentative styles over emotional ones, regardless of perceptions of ethics
and effectiveness, is partially supported. Rational arguments are strongly preferred, though
emotional arguments were preferred to moral ones. A strong majority (74.2%) were not
convinced that this preference leads to ineffective outcomes.
H9 posited that PDPs find some forms of argumentation to be effective, but unethical, and
therefore choose not to employ them. For all three argument styles above, PDPs found them to be
more ethical than effective. For styles of argument associated with totalitarian regimes, there was
agreement that these were neither effective nor ethical. This hypothesis was not supported.
In H10, I asked whether long-term goals were more important than short term goals. To
follow up on H8, I also asked whether “colorful, emotional” arguments were perceived as effective
in the short- or long-term, presuming that PDPs would respond to earlier questions (as they did)
that they prefer rational over emotional arguments. This would help further clarify the extent to
which emotional arguments may be seen as effective, even if less frequently used. A plurality of
45.4% strongly or somewhat agreed that long-term goals are more important than short-term goals,
with 37.0% neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Only 4.7% of respondents disagreed with this
statement. Respondents were much more likely to see colorful, emotional arguments as yielding
short-term benefits, perhaps yet another reason that rational argumentation styles are preferred,
given the preference for longer-term goals. While 53.5% of respondents agreed that emotional
arguments yield short-term effects, only 25.5% agreed that they also bring about long-term effects.
The tenth hypothesis, that PDPs prefer long-term to short-term goals, is supported.
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To test H11, that PDPs have an “evangelical” belief in promoting democracy, I asked four
questions. A strong majority of 80.8% somewhat or strongly agreed that “one main function of
my job is making the world safe for democracy.” Meanwhile, an even greater number (90.2%)
agreed that “lessons from the United States are valuable for the rest of the world.” There was
almost universal agreement (96.2%) that “United States engagement in the world is a good thing,”
with 71.0% strongly agreeing. To tease out the extent to which this agreement was tempered by
military action, I also asked about “U.S. intervention.” Still, clear majority (57.9%) strongly or
somewhat agreed that U.S. intervention was a net positive, with most of the remainder (32.8%)
ambivalent. Only 9.4% of respondents disagreed with U.S. intervention being beneficial.
To clarify any potential researcher bias on this point, allow me to state that I agree with the
majority on all of these points, even as I reckon with the dramatic failures of some U.S. military
interventions in the 21st century from a democratization and foreign policy perspective. I point
out these figures not to chastise this “evangelical” belief – which I share, to a large degree – but
rather to document it as a perhaps unquestioned or invisible assumption among PDPs. The eleventh
hypothesis, that PDPs hold a ‘messianic’ belief in promoting democracy, is supported.
The final hypothesis, H12, posited that PDPs rely on outdated social science theories, or
the absence of any theory or research at all, when conducting their work. First, I tested support
for an idea which is part of the received wisdom at the State Department, which has not been borne
out by social science research: namely, that “the more that foreign audiences know about us, the
more they like us.” This idea is a significant part of the justification for many of our cultural and
exchange programs, though even these are now also clearly tied to other, more concrete policy
goals. A majority of respondents (60.7%) agreed with this sentiment, with another third (30.3%)
neither agreeing nor disagreeing. Only 9.0% disagreed.
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I framed this idea in two additional ways. First, to test the belief that providing information
would result in more positive sentiment among foreign audiences, I asked whether respondents
agreed that “the more accurate information that foreign audiences have about us, the more they
like us.” In response, a full two-thirds (66.1%) somewhat or strongly agreed, with 27.5%
ambivalent, and 6.4% disagreeing.
Next, to test the beliefs that personal experiences in the United States such as exchange
programs or study abroad would result in more positive sentiment among foreign audiences, I
asked to what extent respondents agreed that “the more personal experience that foreigners have
with the United States, the more they like us.” Here, an overwhelming majority of 92.7% agreed,
with 51.1% strongly agreeing. Again, this widespread belief is not based on empirical evidence,
demonstrating that some core PDP beliefs are founded either in outdated science, or in no evidence
at all. To further test this hypothesis, I asked about previous experience with, and level of comfort
with, social science and academic theories of persuasion. Only 26.9% of respondents somewhat
or strongly agreed with the premise that they are well-versed in the latest social science on
persuasion, with slightly fewer (20.6%) expressing knowledge of theories of persuasion.
Slightly more than a quarter of respondents (28.44%) said that they had received training
in persuasion theory and science outside of the State Department, with 17.6% reporting some State
Department training in these areas. PDPs reported the belief that such training, however, was both
of interest and would make them more successful in their positions. Over 85% of respondents
indicated they would be interested in additional training on persuasion theory and science, with
56.5% strongly interested, while 72.0% believed such training would make them more effective.
The final hypothesis, that PDPs rely on outdated social science, or do not have adequate social
science knowledge, is supported.
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Unrelated to the listed hypotheses, I also asked a few open-ended questions to gauge what
practices PDPs believed were unethical. When asked “what are some things you would never do
as a PD officer because you see them as unethical,” by far the most popular answer was to lie or
mislead, with 74.8% of respondents mentioning this. A distant second, 15.3% of respondents cited
financial malfeasance including bribery, theft, paying for news coverage, or inappropriately solesourcing grants. A comparable number, 12.3%, cited anything that could lead to harm or endanger
lives, such as exposing information sources, expressing racism or prejudice, or making threats. A
small minority (3%) said they would never conceal the U.S. government as the source of
information, and 1.8% said they would never employ bot farms to spread a message. When asked
whether they had personally done anything as a PDP they later considered unethical, only 12.0%
said yes.
Finally, I was curious as to whether PDPs considered themselves propagandists. In my 14
years at the Department of State, I have only rarely heard this term used to describe our work.
However, early leaders of public diplomacy were quite forthright, even in Congressional
testimony, in describing their work as propaganda. A slight majority of 50.6% somewhat or
strongly agreed that “Public Diplomacy is a kind of propaganda,” with 19.2% ambivalent, and
almost one-third (30.2%) disagreeing. Those with sixteen or more years of service were the least
likely to agree (38.5%), while less seasoned cohorts reported between 50.9%-59.7% agreement.
There were no significant gender differences, though those previously employed by USIA were
much less likely to agree with the characterization of public diplomacy as propaganda. Among
such employees, a majority of 52.9% disagreed that public diplomacy was a form of propaganda,
while only 28.4% of State Department employees who had never worked at USIA shared those
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views. This is a fascinating result, as USIA leadership well into the late 1960s publicly described
their work as propaganda in books and Congressional testimony.

4.6

Conclusion
This study helps bolster the thesis that present day modern American propagandists

continue to embrace the same ethical and aesthetic values, norms, and behaviors that were first
established in the period 1941-1953. In particular, such propagandists have profoundly embraced
the “strategy of truth” as a core value, and one that transcends even the existential implications of
wartime. This is moderated, however, in cases in which the “whole truth” is antithetical to U.S.
policy objectives.
Second, these practitioners agree that propaganda programs should be linked to, and driven
by, foreign policy, and embrace the idea that they are evangelists for democracy. They also
continue to embrace the journalistic and rational style of argumentation which developed in sharp
counterpoint to early fascist and Communist propagandists of World War II and the early Cold
War era. Next, they continue to prefer long-term goals over short-term objectives.
Third, public diplomacy officers maintain some core beliefs about how persuasion works
that are not evidence-based. They are aware of their lack of knowledge and training in this field,
and would strongly welcome additional instruction, which they believe would make them more
effective.
Finally, this survey helps demonstrate that public diplomacy officers are, by the definition
I earlier provided of “ethical propaganda,” themselves enacting a fundamentally ethical project.
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Namely, their behavior and activities share the core values of truth, beneficence, reason, open
information, and relevance.
The full data-set, which is anonymized, can be downloaded at: tinyurl.com/PDKnowledge
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5

Conclusion: A New Way Forward?

The last chapter is merely a place where the writer imagines
that the polite reader has begun to look furtively at his watch.
-Walter Lippmann

5.1

Introduction
In the previous four chapters, I attempted to demonstrate that modern, American overt

propagandists trace their ethical, aesthetic, and behavior norms, practices and values back to the
period 1941-1953. At that time, the senior-most U.S. government propagandists were drawn
largely from the arts, including journalists, playwrights, and poets, rather than from commerce or
the military. This choice led to the development of a particularly American institutional culture
among propagandists, which has been successfully perpetuated to the present day. Further, I
argued that this American propaganda culture is fundamentally ethical in nature, as it is centered
on certain core values including truth, beneficence, reason, open information, and relevance.
Some aspects of the question, “How shall we do propaganda,” however, continue to resist
firm answers, and will likely never be fully resolved. Indeed, it may be better for these questions
not to be answered at an institutional level, but rather to allow individual propagandists in the field
to make their own decisions about how best to advance American foreign policy. That said, the
institutional culture of American propaganda has long suffered from a few key weaknesses,
identified very early on, and yet which remain stubbornly unresolved to this day. I argue that
American foreign policy would be best served by the Department of State implementing the
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following suggestions from four key areas: (1) training; (2) communication; (3) standards,
practices, and technology; and (4) strategic development.

5.2

Recommendation One: Provide Significant Professional Training

A) Implement universal, pre-service public diplomacy-coned foreign service officer (PD FSO)
training in the social science of persuasion, including best practices from the applied field of
advertising.
In a world of infinite resources, ideally all PD FSOs would receive a full year of pre-service
training, including all of the elements in this section. Realizing that that is budgetarily unlikely,
there are still significant improvements that can be made to our currently insufficient training
model, first through online, self-paced courses, and second, through the introduction of additional,
mandatory short courses at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), particularly for first and second
tour officers. That said, the current trend at FSI, to dramatically cut training time for PD FSOs, is
deeply discouraging.
The Department of State should concentrate on developing a core of experts in both the
academic field of communication as well as in advertising, ideally bringing in or hiring consultants
from those fields, to then develop these courses on the social science of persuasion. Such courses
would make explicit the assumptions of our institutional culture, and would disabuse current PD
FSOs of several scientifically unsupported ideas currently widely held, such as the idea that “the
more they know us, the more they like us.” These courses should endeavor to teach the fact that,
according to research, a number of different factors intermingle to influence levels of persuasion,
and that there is no magic bullet. They should also, however, teach the few apparently universal
findings on persuasion, such as that an individual who presents both sides of a story, but rebuts the
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opposite position, will be more persuasive than an individual who either presents only one side of
a story, or presents both sides with no rebuttal.
B) Implement universal PD FSO training in rhetoric.
Though rhetoricians largely abandoned propaganda to social scientists in the 20th century
in favor of a narrow focus on English literature, there has been a resurgence of interests from the
field in the 21st century.

Providing a firm grounding in the art of rhetoric – such as an

understanding, at the very least, of how to understand and apply logos, ethos and pathos – would
provide a common reference language for PD FSOs to discuss persuasion strategy.
C) Implement PD FSO universal skills training on graphic design, photography, and video
production and editing.
Though FSI offers several of these courses, they are often oversubscribed, aimed at entrylevel skills, and PD FSOs’ obligations to their departing and gaining posts often prevent them from
taking these allegedly “non-essential courses.” These skills are anything but non-essential, and it
is deeply damaging to the ability of PD FSOs to effectively and persuasively present the American
government point of view in the 21st century, while still relying primarily on the occasional, unpaid
graphic design intern to create compelling images and videos. This is one of the few seriously
damaging aspects of having maintained a largely unchanged institutional culture among American
propagandists since 1953. Frankly speaking, PD FSOs should no longer be able to serve in the
field without this training, or without additional funding to each Public Affairs Section to regularly
contract out graphic design work.
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D) Implement skills training on survey design and implementation, and basic statistics, for Public
Affairs Officers (PAOs) and Locally Employed Strategic Content Coordination Specialists.
Though ideally provided to all PD FSOs, at a bare minimum, all outgoing PAOs and
locally-employed Strategic Content Coordination Specialists should be required to have training
in survey design, implementation and statistics, in order to do meaningful evaluation work on their
otherwise extremely well thought-through programs. This would, in part, obviate the need to
depend on high-priced local polling firms, though such contract work would still be required for
national surveys. To the extent that PD FSOs are required (and they should be required) to
effectively “measure success,” it is unethical to implement such a requirement without meaningful
training.

5.3

Recommendation Two: Increase Communication to the Field

A) Create a position within R/PPR whose purpose is, at least in part, to survey the latest in social
science research on persuasion, and effectively communicate it to the field.
About 25 positions have been created in the State Department office which handles public
diplomacy research, policy, and evaluation (known as R/PPR) that may already be responsive to
this recommendation, in part in anticipation of the ultimate passage of House Resolution 1253 –
the Public Diplomacy Modernization Act of 2021 (HR 1253). Though this bill appears not to have
moved past Committee since February, 2021, it is still deeply encouraging that R/PPR is taking
such proactive action to attempt to address the issues raised by the draft law. The law itself requires
improvements in research and evaluation of PD programs, as well as “support [of] United States
diplomatic posts’ public affairs sections,” and “shar[ing] appropriate public diplomacy research
and evaluation information within the Department.” I am not aware of any other legislation that
has so meaningfully addressed these shortcomings in the institutional culture of modern American
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government propaganda, at any time in U.S. history. As a practitioner in the field, I have
unfortunately not yet seen communications from this office, but I am hopeful that, once fully
staffed, such communication will be regularized.
B) Annually survey all public diplomacy officers to assess their needs and knowledge base, to help
better shape future FSI trainings and R/PPR information content.
Though periodic Survey Monkey polls are sent to PD FSOs, it would be helpful to annually
poll all PD FSOs on issues such as those covered in Chapter 5, to establish whether there continue
to be any significant gaps in training, research, evaluation, or ethics. Ideally, this would take place
in more sophisticated polling software, such as Qualtrics, which can easily tease out relationships
(or the lack thereof) between any two measured factors.
C) Make it standard practice to send the annual ACPD report to all public diplomacy officers
upon publication, and encourage supervisors to review and discuss it with their subordinates.
Designate one special assistant to the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
(R) to devise and propose ways to implement its suggestions.
In my 14 years as a Public Diplomacy Officer, I have never once received, or been
encouraged to read, an ACPD report. This is a remarkable wasted opportunity. Part of the reason
that the ACPD has, at times, spent 70 years recommending literally the same changes, year after
year, is that they have no enforcement capability, and as a result, their reports can be ignored. The
Undersecretary for Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy (known as R) should designate, in its
position description, at least one special assistant to ensure that each ACPD report is widely read
in the field, and to work towards implementing their suggestions. Ideally, the OIG would also
apply ACPD recommendations in their inspection reports.

129

5.4

Recommendation Three: Develop Standards, Practices, and
Technology

A) Clarify the purpose behind, and metrics for success for exchange programs.
The 1969 ACPD report rightly complained about the murkiness of “mutual understanding”
as a measurable goal, yet PD FSOs remain wedded to the term by law, particularly in the area of
exchange programs. In my discussions with PD FSOs, few seem to take this seriously as a goal at
this point, given its imprecision, but what do we replace it with? Several of the ACPD reports
over the decades have wrestled with this question, and generally argued in favor of long-term shifts
in public sentiment as the most meaningful measurable outcome. While the Department of State
has legal cover to continue to operate exchange programs solely on the basis of the fundamentally
immeasurable “mutual understanding,” PD FSOs have gone above and beyond this, seeking to
specifically tie programs to concrete foreign policy goals. Unfortunately, we still continue to
largely measure outputs (individual participation) rather than outcome (changes in, or wrought by,
a participant.) The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has of late implemented one very
positive change, performing interviews with certain exchange participants and providing interview
summaries back to the sponsoring Embassies. Yet a meaningful measure for success for exchange
programs remains elusive. If the Department chooses to measure output as outcome, this should
be made clear; alternatively, other standards for success should be developed and widely
disseminated.
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B) Develop a standard package of metrics for success that the field can use for the most common
types of programs.
The draft bill HR 1253 also requires R/PPR to “design and coordinate standardize research
questions, methodologies, and procedures.” As part of their expansion of the research and
evaluation unit, this is well under way, and I look forward to seeing results in the near future.
C) Bring senior PD leaders to discuss whether across-the-board evangelical democracy
promotion is serving us well, or whether we can create a type of Maslow’s hierarchy to help
officers best direct their efforts towards what is achievable. Communicate these findings to the
field.
A successful democracy requires specific cultural elements to be present, including
tolerance of those with differing political beliefs, demanding transparency, acceptance of free and
fair elections as the legitimate arbiter of temporary power, an acceptance of the same underlying
fundamental reality as one’s other citizens, and a willingness to put the health of the system itself
above one’s party. Some foreign policy scholars have also included factors such as a certain level
of stability and security, and also literacy. Department of State propagandists often continue
operating under the presumption that we should be promoting and discussing democracy
everywhere, yet this is likely unrealistic and impractical. I argue that this is a holdover from the
Cold War era in which democracy was counterpoised against totalitarianism; it is no longer clear
that this is an effective way to frame the issues that matter to us. It would perhaps be more effective
to promote and discuss specific human rights as elucidated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and to work more narrowly on cultivating the cultural pre-requisites to successful
democracy.
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E) Fund a switch to the free version of QualtricsXM instead of SurveyMonkey for PD
practitioners, and after an initial training period, purchase a one-license-per-post institutional
subscription to QualtricsXM.
I cannot speak highly enough about QualtricsXM as compared to SurveyMonkey. Simply
put, SurveyMonkey does not have the statistical power to do the types of measurement that PD
FSOs require to genuinely measure success.
F) Develop automated computational engagement tools for the field.
The 2017 AFCD report highlighted the need, in a world of state sponsored disinformation
promoted by bot farms, for “computational engagement tools” that would allow PD FSOs to
effectively respond. This recommendation appears to have been ignored, at least insofar as tools
are provided to PD FSOs in the field. Asking PD FSOs to fight Russian bot farms with their
individual Facebook pages is approximately as effective as when Japanese Emperor Hirohito asked
his subjects to fight the planned U.S. ground invasion with bamboo spears. It is time to consider
how to ethically use bot farms to advance our foreign policy, given the manifest inability of a few
thousand PD FSOs to engage in even a fraction of the disinformation narratives appearing on social
media. Given our ethical commitments and values, this could be structured as having bots which
automatically post links to verified news stories whenever disinformation narratives are posted;
the bots themselves could be clearly labeled as being operated by the U.S. government. Such
ethical botfarms should be deployed at the post level by PAOs, rather than centrally from
Washington.
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G) Develop a clear and explicit ethical code for public diplomacy, and implement universal
training on the ethics of persuasion. When doing so, take note of the existence of gendered
differences in ethical beliefs among current public diplomacy practitioners.
I have argued that modern American propaganda is fundamentally ethical because it hews
to clear ethical principles including truth, beneficence, reason, open information, and relevance.
However, while PD FSOs overwhelmingly agree with these ethical standards when asked, for the
most part, the only ethical rule they supply unprompted is that lying is unethical. Because
propaganda does carry with it inherent dangers to democracy, it is essential to develop at least a
basic ethical professional code for PD practitioners, along the lines of those found in journalism,
health care, and law. Though PD FSOs, in my experience, behave ethically almost without
exception, we open ourselves to unnecessary risk and confusion by not making it clear what our
ethical professional standards actually are. For those formulating such a code, it is important to
note the existence (see Chapter 5) of certain gendered differences on perceptions of ethics,
particularly should the code’s authors themselves have an unconscious, gendered bias towards one
formulation or another. Those in charge of this process should consult the remarkably thorough
appendix already developed for assessing ethical and other public diplomacy issues at the end of
Leo Bogart’s Premises for Propaganda.

5.5

Recommendation Four: Implement Strategic Development

A) Informally engage multinationals to help key policy makers understand the importance of public
diplomacy and the need for consistent, non-“acting” leadership at the Under Secretary level.
Possibly through relationships with retired U.S Ambassadors, U.S.-based multinationals
and think tanks should be encouraged to aggressively lobby Congress on the importance of
consistent public diplomacy leadership. Public diplomacy should be actively framed to Congress
as “making the world safe for U.S. business,” an argument which generally resonates well
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regardless of political party. Since integration, public diplomacy has not fared well from a
leadership perspective. During USIA’s existence, the institution had a Congressionally confirmed
Director 93% of the time, and the average tenure of any leader – confirmed or unconfirmed – was
27 months (see Appendix J). Within the State Department, however, the numbers are deeply
discomfiting, and speak to a lack of seriousness or commitment on the part of State towards public
diplomacy. At State, public diplomacy has had a Congressionally confirmed director only 56% of
the time, and directors – confirmed or unconfirmed – lasted an average of only 10 months. It is,
simply put, untenable to expect serious results from an organization without stable leadership. The
1964 ACPD report recommended creating a senior civil servant position who, serving as
something like chief of staff, would step in as Acting Director in the absence of a confirmed
propaganda chief. Given the likely political impossibility of divesting public diplomacy back into
an independent agency, I recommend the State Department immediately implement such a change.
B) Implement a once-in-a-generation review.
The State Department should work with the sponsors of HR 1253 to add language requiring
a once in a generation (20 years) “super-review,” a blend of ACPD and OIG inspections. Because
of the far-reaching nature of this review, it is unlikely that the Department would regularly
implement it without specific legislation that required it. Such a review team could number about
75 individuals, with State Department employees assigned to one-year tours on the team. The
assignments would include a variety of PD FSOs and civil servants, from all grades, as well as
locally engaged staff, and staffers from various State Department bureaus and offices including R,
P, S, J, E, M, H, BP, CA, DS, GWI, IRM, FSI, GTM, IRM, GEC, ECA, GPA, and the geographic
bureaus. From other parts of government, it would bring in (at least at times) representatives from
other foreign affairs agencies such as Commerce, Agriculture, FBI, USAID, USAGM, DOD, DHS,
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CBP, DOJ, DEA, FDA, CDC, ICE, INL, Peace Corps, and Treasury. Further, it would consult
with social scientists, pollsters, rhetoricians, and advertisers, historians, ethicists, academics, and
media and social media experts. The purpose of this 20-year review would be to question the
unquestioned assumptions about how public diplomacy is done, to argue in favor of retaining those
elements of institutional culture that are still serving us well, and to discard those elements that no
longer make sense within the context of that time.
Ideally, the review team would have OIG-like powers, and would be required to not only
identify problems, but to develop specific pathways by which changes could be effected, while
pinpointing the responsible offices. There is some precedent for this: in 1987, USIA put on a
major conference called “Public Diplomacy in the Information Age,” whose outcomes served as
that year’s ACPD report. However, this effort would necessarily be significantly more involved
than a single conference.
C) Recreate a PD-specific polling office.
During integration in 1999, USIA’s research and polling office was folded into the
Department of State’s bureau of intelligence and research. Unfortunately, as a result, public
diplomacy needs have always come second to political offices when polls are being developed.
While some of the State Department’s pollsters are exceptionally proactive about reaching out to
public diplomacy sections to include their equities, this is not a requirement, nor is it the norm.
Public Diplomacy is essentially crippled without meaningful polling data. I am hopeful that the
new research and evaluation unit within R/PPR will be able to take up some of this slack, but
significant additional funding will likely be necessary to reproduce the abilities of USIAs former
research and polling office.
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Appendix A. Various Definitions of Propaganda – A Partial List

undated

Harold Lasswell

Controlling the presentation of an object so that a
desired act will be elicited toward it on the part of
selected persons.1

1927

Harold Lasswell

The control of opinion by significant symbols
[including] stories, rumors, pictures, and other forms
of social communication. Propaganda is concerned
with the management of opinions and attitudes by the
direct manipulation of social suggestion.2

1928

Edward Bernays

Conscious and intelligent manipulation of the
organized habits and opinions of the masses.3

1942

Harold Lasswell

The manipulation of symbols as a means of
influencing attitudes on controversial matters.4

1943

Edgar Henderson

Any anti-rational process consisting of pressure
techniques used to induce the propagandist to
commit himself, before he can think the matter over,
to such attitudes, opinions or acts as the propagandist
desires of him.5

Lasswell, “Propaganda,” 18.
Lasswell, Harold, Propaganda Technique in the World War, 9.
3
Bernays, Propaganda, 9.
4
Lasswell, “Communications Research and Politics,” 106.
5
Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, 81.
1
2
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1946

James Warburg

Mobilizing certain of man’s emotions in such a way
that they will dominate his reason.6

1948

Leonard Doob

The attempt to affect the personalities and to control
the behavior of individuals toward ends considered
unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a
particular time.7

1959

Karin Dovring

Biased communication8

1961

Jacques Ellul

A set of methods employed by an organized group
that wants to bring about the active or passive
participation in its actions of a mass of individuals,
psychologically unified through psychological
manipulations and incorporated in an organization.

1968

Bernard Rubin

A universal phenomenon that everyone participates
in, encompassing the conscious and deliberate
attempt to foster a favorable reception for an idea, as
well as what we imbibe from our surroundings when
there is no particular intent.

1968

Thomas Sorensen

The selective but credible dissemination of truthful
ideas and information for the purpose of persuading
other people to think and act in ways that will further
the propagandist’s purposes.9 [Note: definition of
ethical propaganda]

6

Warburg, Unwritten Treaty, 17.
Doob, Public Opinion and Propaganda, 240.
8
Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, 84.
9
Sorensen, Thomas, The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda, (New York. Harper & Row, 1968): 5
7
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1979

Michael Balfour

Inducing people to leap to conclusions without
adequate examination of the evidence.10

1982

Fred Walker

Any form of communication in support of national
objectives designed to influence opinions and
emotions.11

1985

Terence Qualter

The deliberate attempt by the few to influence the
attitudes of and behavior of the many by the
manipulation of symbolic communication.12

1986

Garth Jowett & A deliberate attempt to shape perceptions to achieve
Victoria O’Donnell a response that furthers a desired action.13

1988

Noam Chomsky

Amusing, entertaining, and informing to inculcate
values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that integrate
audiences into society.14

1989

Nicholas Burnett

Discourse in the service of ideology, wherein
meaning serves to sustain or alter relations of
domination.15

2002

Stanley
Cunningham

An inherently unethical endeavor best understood
philosophically rather than sociologically, not
characterized by intentional or deliberate falsehood
so much as a mental posture or habit of careless
disregard for truth-conditions, and of choosing to

10

Balfour, Michael, Propaganda in War, 1939-1945: Organizations, Policies, and Publics, in Britain and Germany,
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979): 419.
11
Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, 84.
12
Qualter, Opinion Control in the Democracies, 124.
13
Jowett, Garth, and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, (Newbury Park: Sage Publishers, 1986): 16.
14
Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 1.
15
Burnett, Nicholas, “Ideology and Propaganda: Towards and Integrative Approach,” in Propaganda: A Pluralistic
Perspective, ed. Ted Smith, 127.
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ignore them, but which does not require specific
intent.16

2002

Daniel O’Keefe

A successful, intentional effort at influencing
another’s mental state through communication in a
circumstance in which the persuadee has some
measure of freedom.17

2003

Randal Marlin

The organized attempt through communication to
affect belief of action or inculcate attitudes in a large
audience in ways that circumvent or suppress an
individual’s adequately informed, rational, reflective
judgment.18

2003

Philip Taylor

The deliberate attempt to persuade people to think
and behave in a desired way, intended to benefit
those organizing the process.19

2016

Thomas Huckin

False or misleading information or ideas addressed
to a mass audience by parties who thereby gain
advantage. Propaganda is created and disseminated
systematically and does not invite critical analysis or
response.20

16

Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda, 52, 158.
O’Keefe, Daniel, Persuasion: Theory and Research, (Thousand Oaks. Sage Publications, 2002): 5.
18
Marlin, Randal, Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion, 22.
19
Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, 6.
20
Huckin, Thomas, “Propaganda Defined,” in Propaganda and Rhetoric in Democracy, ed. Gae Lyn Henderson and
M.J Braun, ( ): 125-6.
17
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Appendix C. Institutional History, 1942-1945

149

Appendix D. Institutional History, 1945-1949
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Appendix E. Institutional History, 1950-1954

151

Appendix F. List of Institutional Acronyms

ACPD

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy was established
by the 1948 Smith-Mundt Act to provide at least annual reports to
Congress on the effectiveness of U.S. propaganda programs.

CBS

Columbia Broadcasting Services is one of the first three major U.S.
television stations, and continues to operate today.

CPI

The Committee on Public Information was the first U.S. propaganda
institution. It was headed by George Creel, and operated in World War
I from April 1917 to November 1918. It was later deeply criticized as
a danger to democracy.

DOS

The Department of State is the U.S. foreign affairs agency. For most of
its history, it was deeply hostile to propaganda and public outreach,
though absorbed USIA’s propaganda functions in 1999.

FIS

The Foreign Information Service was part of OCOI, operating from July
1941 to July 1942, when it was absorbed into OWI. Playwright Robert
Sherwood was its chief.

IIA

The U.S. International Information Administration was a semiautonomous propaganda agency which operated within the State
Department from January 1952 until September 1953. It was run by
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Howland Sargeant.

IIS

The Interim International Information Service was a temporary
institution within the Department of State which operated from
September 1945 to December 1945, whose sole purpose was to transfer
the remaining functions of OWI and OIAA to the State Department.
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton ran the
service.

NEC

The National Emergency Council was a New Deal-era agency
established to handle various government programs, including the
domestic propaganda-focused U.S. Information Service and its branch
the U.S. Film Service. It was abolished in 1939.

OCCCRBAR

The Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations
was the first name for OIAA, from August 1940 until July 1941. Run
by Nelson Rockefeller, it was primarily an economic and trade agency,
but also coordinated U.S. propaganda within Latin America.
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OCD

The Office of Civilian Defense was established in May 1941 to handle
civilian protection, national morale and public opinion. It’s propaganda
functions were transferred to a new agency, the OFF, in October 1941.

OCOI

The Office of the Coordinator of Information was established in June
1941 and operated until June 1942 under William Donovan. An
intelligence gathering agency, it also handled covert and overt
propaganda until Roosevelt divided the office into the OWI and the
OSS.

OEM

The Office of Emergency Management was a World War II-era federal
agency, founded in May 1940. It included a Division of Information
until those functions were transferred to OWI in June 1942.

OEX

The Office of Educational Exchange was the State Department office
which handled educational, cultural and exchange programs from April
1948 until January 1952. It was divided from the pre-existing OIE, and
later subsumed by the IIA.

OFF

The Office of Facts and Figures operated from October 1941 until June
1942 under poet Archibald MacLeish. It took over OCD’s propaganda
functions until it was subsumed within the OWI.

OGR

The Office of Government Reports, headed by Lowell Mellett, was an
early domestic propaganda agency established in September 1939. It
was later folded into the OWI.

OIAA

The Office of Inter-American Affairs was the later and better known
name for OCCCRBAR. Unlike other propaganda agencies, it
maintained its independence from OWI. It continued formally
operating on paper until April 1946, though its remaining functions had
already been transferred to IIS by the end of 1945.

OIC

The first official propaganda agency within the Department of State, the
Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs operated from
September 1945 until autumn 1947, when its named was changed to
OIE. OIC absorbed the remaining functions of OWI and OIAA.
William Benton ran the service.

OIE

OIC changed its name for no ostensible reason to the Office of
International Information and Educational Exchange in autumn 1947.
This was the beginning in a long and storied history of name changes
with no ostensible purpose.

153

OII

In April 1948, OIE was split into the Office of International Information
(OII) and the Office of Educational Exchange (OEX). The two offices
remained split until they were recombined by Assistant Secretary
Barrett in January 1952 under the name IIA.

OPA

The Office of Public Affairs was a small office in the Department of
State that operated through WWII and the Cold War, which primarily
handled direct press inquiries to DOS. It is not comparable to the
present-day Bureau of Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy, but rather
closer in function to the Department spokesperson’s office.

OSS

The Office of Special Services was one of two agencies created in June
1942 when President Roosevelt split the OCOI into two. This office
handled intelligence gathering and covert propaganda, and was a
predecessor agency to the CIA.

OWI

The Office of War Information was the primary overt foreign (and, for
a short time, domestic) propaganda agency during World War II. It
operated from June 1942 until the end of August, 1945, when President
Truman abolished the agency and ordered its remaining functions to be
transferred to DOS.

PWB

The Psychological Warfare Branch was a tactical, covert, military
propaganda organization within the War Department during World War
II whose precursors date back to June 1942. Operating primarily out of
London, it also included representatives from OWI.

PWC

The Psychological Warfare Committee was the domestically –located
equivalent and parent of the PWB, founded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in March 1941 to coordinate tactical military propaganda.

PWE

The British Political Warfare Executive was the UK equivalent of the
PWC; its members were part of the London-based PWB.

USACPD

See ACPD

USIA

The U.S. Information Agency was the longest-running American overt,
foreign directed propaganda agency. It was established by Eisenhower
in September 1953 after several studied concluded that propaganda
operations within DOS were ineffective. It operated until 1999, when
it was merged again into DOS.

USIIA

See IIA

VOA

The Voice of America was the primary radio propaganda organization
for the U.S. government during WWII and the Cold War, launched in
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February 1942 within the FIS, then transitioning into OWI. In the
1970s, it achieved significant independence from the U.S. government,
and continues to operate as a quasi-independent agency today.
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Appendix G. Short Bios of Key Propagandists

Allen, George

A career Foreign Service Officer, Allen served as the secondever Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March,
1948, to November, 1949. Later, he was appointed Director of
USIA, where he served from November, 1957 to December,
1960.

Barnes, Joseph

A journalist who was first recruited by Sherwood into FIS, he
later served as a senior figure in the New York-based Overseas
Branch of OWI (deputy OWI director for Atlantic Operations)
he supported MacLeish and Warburg’s vision of propaganda
driving policy. As a result, he was fired in February 1944 along
with several others.

Barrett, Edward

Barrett was Newsweek journalist who first served as a
government propagandist within OCOI, before transitioning
into OWI News and Feature Bureau chief. He was then
promoted to head the Overseas Branch after Barnes, Johnson,
and Warburg were fired in 1944. After returning to Newsweek
following the war, he later served as Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Affairs from February 1950 until February 1952.

Benton, William

A little-known hero who essentially saved public diplomacy
from being defunded following WWII, Benton was an
advertising executive, investor, and university president who
was appointed as the first ever Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs, beginning in September 1945 and continuing
until September 1947. He successfully persuaded a hostile
Congress to continue funding propaganda operations, and not to
outsource the work to the private sector. Later, as a Senator, he
introduced an unsuccessful motion to expel Joseph McCarthy
from the Senate. See entry on Archibald MacLeish for more
information on my designation of Benton as the “first” Assistant
Secretary for Public Affair

Bernays, Edward

Bernays was a theater publicist who joined CPI during WWI to
build domestic and foreign support for U.S. entry into the war.
Often regarded as the founder of public relations, he became an
early propaganda theorist who worked political campaigns, and
advised OWI and later USIA. He embraced covert-source
propaganda and early social science research on persuasion, but
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wrongly concluded that individuals had no ability to resist
persuasion techniques.
Carroll, Wallace

A foreign correspondent based in Europe before WWII, in 1942
he joined OWI as its London Office Director, where he worked
closely with PWE. Frustrated by conflicts with Sherwood and
Warburg he resigned in late 1943, before returning at Davis’s
request to OWI in 1944 as its deputy director for Europe. He
later wrote the book Persuade or Perish chronicling his time
with OWI.

Cowles, Gardner

A former newspaper publisher, Cowles was appointed as chief
of OWI’s Domestic Branch, where he regularly clashed with
MacLeish over style and tactics. Cowles believed in using
persuasive advertising techniques rather than reasoned debate.
In February 1943, he hired several advertising executives,
leading to mass resignations among those who opposed using
these methods.

Creel, George

A politically progressive (for his time) investigative journalist,
Creel was appointed by President Wilson as head of the
Committee for Public Information, the WWI propaganda
agency. Using both censorship and PR techniques, he sought to
increase public support for U.S. entry into the war. He was later
deeply criticized for his mendacious techniques.

Davis, Elmer

A well known CBS radio journalist, President Roosevelt
appointed Davis as the first and only director of OWI, in charge
of over 3,000 employees. He argued for minimal censorship and
maximum information provided to the public, leading to
conflicts with the War Department and OSS. Following the war,
he returned to his radio career.

Dizard, Wilson

Previously a journalist with Architectural Forum, he joined the
State Department as a public affairs officer in 1951,
transitioning to USIA when it launched in 1953, where he
remained for almost 30 years. He published The Strategy of
Truth: The Story of the U.S. Information Service in 1961.

Donovan, William

Donovan was a lawyer and businessman who served in WWI,
ending as a Colonel. He returned to law following the war, but
in the late 30s helped establish an informal group of
businessmen and lawyers collecting intelligence on foreign
affairs. Believing U.S. entry into the war was inevitable, he
persuaded President Roosevelt to establish OCOI, naming him
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director. In 1942, OCOI was split into OWI and OSS, where he
remained as director and was promoted to the rank of major
general. He later helped launch the CIA.
Henderson, John

Biographical information on John Henderson is sparse, but he
served in the State Department’s propaganda organs in the late
1940s, moving on the USIA in 1953. In 1969, he published the
book The United States Information Agency.

Houseman, John

A Romanian artist, Hollywood actor and theater professional,
Houseman was the first Director of the VOA, where he
employed artistic rather than journalistic methods. He resigned
in spring 1943 after being accused of being a Communist
sympathizer, and encountering deep resistance to his artistic
methods, which were perceived as avant-garde and ineffective
by many.

Johnson, Ed

A journalist with Collier’s magazine, and then CBS, he joined
OCOI in 1941 as an expert on Europe before becoming chief of
the OWI overseas editorial board. He was fired in 1944 along
with Barnes and Warburg.

Klauber, Edward

A journalist with the New York Times and CBS, Klauber was
brought in by OWI Director Davis as OWI Associate Director
in 1944 to help fix the policy disputes between Sherwood and
Davis, he orchestrated the removal of Barnes, Warburg, and
Johnson.

Lippmann, Walter

Lippmann was a journalist and CPI advisor who first believed
that propaganda was value neutral, that the best ideas would rise
to the top, and that elites needed to direct democracy. In 1922,
he wrote Public Opinion, a seminal work on propaganda. Later,
partly based on the excesses he observed at CPI, he became
much more skeptical, believing it was antithetical to free choice
within a democracy. In 1947, he invented the term “Cold War.”

MacLeish, Archibald

A politically progressive, modernist poet, writer, and lawyer
who served in World War I, President Roosevelt controversially
appointed him Librarian of Congress in 1939.
After
successfully revamping the Library, Roosevelt made him chief
of the new Office of Facts and Figures in October 1941, where
he served until moving into OWI in June 1942 as head of policy
and planning. He resigned from OWI due to policy the same
policy disputes that caught Warburg, Johnson, and Barnes, but
was later appointed in December 1944 as the Assistant Secretary
of State for Public and Cultural Relations (rather than the later
designation of Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs) until he
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handed off the baton to William Benton in August 1945.
Though technically the first such comparable Assistant
Secretary, OWI was handling propaganda operations during his
entire tenure, making Benton the first such Assistant Secretary
genuinely in charge of the propaganda program. As MacLeish
never held either the exact title or the actual responsibilities, I
argue that Benton was the first of his lineage.
Mellett, Lowell

Mellett was a politically progressive journalist and WWI foreign
correspondent who also covered U.S. domestic politics and
social issues. Headed U.S. Film Service under NEC’s U.S.
Information Service from fall 1938-fall 1939, and it was
abolished soon after. Mellett transferred to be the head of the
new Office of Government Reports in fall 1939. In February
1942 he opened a separate Hollywood Branch to coordinate film
propaganda, and was then brought into OWI in June 1942 to
head its Bureau of Motion Pictures within the Domestic Branch.
After angering Hollywood in December 1942 with clumsy
attempts at censorship, his office was essentially defunded by
Congress in June 1943. He then supervised work with director
Frank Capra to film pro-war propaganda films for U.S. soldiers.
In June 1944, he resigned his government commission and
returned to his work as a journalist and author.

Merriam, Charles

Merriam was a politically progressive political scientist and
early backer of U.S. entry into WWI, who joined CPI as its
branch chief in Italy. He is considered the founder of the
“Chicago School” of political science, advocating quantitative
methods.

Michel, Werner

Werner was an Alsatian theater and stage producer who
Sherwood and Barnes hired to manage the OWI Radio Program
Bureau’s broadcasting division following Houseman’s
departure. He favored a much more emotionally neutral and
journalistic style, rather than Houseman’s artistic and emotional
style.

Rockefeller, Nelson

Rockefeller was a businessman, and later politician, who
shrewdly used his family’s inherited wealth to curry favor with
political elites. In 1940, he convinced President Roosevelt to
appoint him to establish and run the CIAA, which he directed
until the end of World War II. In 1944, he was dually appointed
as Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs.
After angering Roosevelt in 1945, Rockefeller was fired and the
CIAA absorbed into DOS. He remained engaged in government
under Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon, and eventually became
New York Governor and Ford’s Vice-President.
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Sherwood, Robert

A playwright and writer, the rise of the Third Reich moved him
from a pacifist stance to a pro-war position in defense of
democracy. A speechwriter for Roosevelt’s 1940 campaign, he
was recruited by Donovan as head of the COI’s new Foreign
Information Service in July 1941. His insistence on a ‘strategy
of truth’ and long-term goals rather than short term tactics led to
a falling out with Donovan, he was relieved to become OWI’s
Policy Development Branch director in June 1942. He recruited
a number of other key OWI propagandists, but was functionally
“exiled” to London following a policy dispute with Davis over
who was actually in charge. Unable to implement his vision, he
resigned in September 1944.
Credited with the phrase “arsenal of democracy,” he continued
to write and won a Pulitzer in 1949.

Streibert, Theodore

A film and radio executive, Eisenhower appointed Streibert as
the first Director of USIA in fall of 1953. He served until 1956.
He worked to move VOA away from the polemics of the
Campaign of Truth toward objective reporting focused on longterm cultural goals and “mutual understanding.” That said, he
was still occasionally accused of promoting too much of a “hard
sell.” He also established a system of work division and
organization at posts abroad that has largely endured to the
present day.

Sorensen, Thomas

A career USIA officer, Sorensen was promoted to the position
of USIA Deputy Director based largely on the fact that his
brother was special counsel to President Kennedy. He wrote an
excellent history of the USIA through the late 1960s called “The
Word War.”

Thomson, Charles

Thomson was a social scientist who worked closely with
Lasswell. He served in World War II, ending as a Colonel,
during which time he worked largely with military propaganda
in coordination with OWI, State, PWE and the War Department.
In 1948, he published an institutional history of U.S. propaganda
called “Overseas Information Service of the United States
Government.”

Warburg, James

(deputy OWI director for psychological operations)
Overseas Branch’s deputy director for propaganda policy. First
worked as COI special assistant, developing foreign language
staff for Sherwood’s FIS.
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Appendix H. Recommended Further Reading

Those interested in further reading on the early institutional history of overt U.S.
propaganda should start with Dr. Holly Cohen Shulman’s The Voice of America: Propaganda and
Democracy, 1941-1945 (1990). This book does an excellent, and enjoyable, job of charting the
both the institutional changes over time, as well as the individual ideological disputes that animated
the period.
Second, Thomas Sorensen’s The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda (1968)
provides a similarly robust pictures of both these issues during World War II, but extends its
analysis through the late 1960s.
Other strong recommendations on these topics, by publication date, include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Thomson, Charles A.H., Overseas Information Service (1948)
Barrett, Edward, Truth is Our Weapon (1953)
Dizard, Wilson, The Strategy of Truth (1961)
Meyerhoff, Arthur, The Strategy of Persuasion (1965)
Rubin, Ronald, The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency (1968)
Henderson, John, The United States Information Agency (1969)
MacCann, Richard D. and William Bluem, The People’s Films (1973)
Bogart, Leo and Agnes, Premises for Propaganda (1976)
Winkler, Allen, The Politics of Propaganda (1978)
Koppes, Clayton and Gregory Black, Hollywood Goes to War (1987)
Funk, Clayton, “The Committee on Public Information” (1994)
Snyder, Alvin, Warriors of Disinformation (1995)
Myers, James, The Bureau of Motion Pictures (1998)
Sproule, Michael J., Propaganda and Democracy (1997)
Cramer, Gisela and Ursula Prutsch. “Rockefeller’s OIAA” (2006)
Girona, Ramon and Jordi Xifra, “The Office of Facts and Figures” (2009)
Yarrow, Andrew, “Selling a New Vision of America” (2009)
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Appendix I. U.S. Overt Propaganda Budgets, 1941-2020

U.S. Public Diplomacy Funding 1941-Present
$3,000,000,000
$2,500,000,000
$2,000,000,000
$1,500,000,000

Then dollars
2022 dollars

$1,000,000,000
$500,000,000
$0

Note: This chart is best read as demonstrating trends over time rather than providing ‘accurate’
funding levels for overt, foreign-directed U.S. propaganda in any given year. This is due to the
fact that the constitution of various propaganda agencies has changed over time, as has the way
that the U.S. government counts and reports spending. Additionally, I have had to use four
separate data sources to compile this graph; in particular, I believe the apparent spike in funding
in 1967 to be an artifact of using different data sources, rather than an actual funding increase.
From 1941-1946, I relied on Robert Pirsein’s “The Voice of America: A History of the
International Broadcasting Activities of the United States Government, 1940-1962.”
From 1947-1953, I used U.S. government budget reports available at fraser.stlouisfed.org.
From 1954-1967, I used information found in John Henderson’s The United States Information
Agency.
Finally, for 1968 to the present, I found OMB data in “Table 3.2 – Outlays by Function and
Subfunction: 1962-2027,” at whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/
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Appendix J. U.S. Government Propaganda Chiefs

Agency

Director (or Acting*)

Years

Tenure
(months)

OWI

Elmer Davis

1942-1945

39

OIC

William Benton

1945-1947

24

OIE

Unknown*

1947-1948

7

OIE

George Allen

1948-1949

20

OIC

Unknown*

1949-1950

3

OIC

Edward Barrett

1950-1952

24

USIIA

Wilson Compton

1952-1953

12

USIIA

Unknown*

1953

5

USIA

Theodore Streibert

1953-1956

39

USIA

Arthur Larson

1956-1957

10

USIA

George Allen

1957-1960

36

USIA

Unknown*

1960-1961

3

USIA

Edward R Murrow

1961-1964

34

USIA

Carl Rowan

1964-1965

15

USIA

Leonard Marks

1965-1968

39

USIA

Unknown*

1968-1969

3

USIA

Frank Shakespeare

1969-1973

48

USIA

James Keogh

1973-1976

46

USIA

Unknown*

1976-1977

5

John Reinhardt

1977-1980

41

USIA/ICA
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ICA
ICA/USIA

Unknown*

1980-1981

10

Charles Wick

1981-1989

91

USIA

Unknown*

1989

3

USIA

Bruce Gelb

1989-1991

23

USIA

Unknown*

1991

3

USIA

Henry Catto Jr.

1991-1993

20

USIA

Unknown*

1993

4

USIA

Joe Duffey

1993-1999

73

State

Evelyn Lieberman

1999-2001

16

State

Unknown*

2001

8

State

Charlotte Beers

2001-2003

18

State

Unknown*

2003

10

State

Margaret Tutwiler

2003-2004

6

State

Unknown*

2004

5

State

Patricia Harrison*

2004-2005

4

State

Unknown*

2005

6

State

Karen Hughes

2005-2008

31

State

Unknown*

2008

2

State

James Glassman

2008-2009

7

State

Unknown*

2009

4

State

Judith McHale

2009-2011

25

State

Unknown*

2011-2012

7

State

Kathleen Stephens*

2012

2

State

Tara Sonenshine

2012-2013

14
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State

Unknown*

2013-2014

7

State

Richard Stengel

2014-2016

34

State

Bruce Wharton*

2016-2017

6

State

Unknown*

2017

4

State

Steve Goldstein

2017-2018

3

State

Heather Nauert*

2018

9

State

Unknown*

2018-2019

4

State

Michelle Giuda*

2019-2020

13

State

Ulrich Breichbuhl*

2020

7

State

Nilda Pedrosa*

2020-2021

4

State

Jennifer Hall Godfrey*

2021-2022

14

State

Elizabeth Allen*

2022-present

3

Note: Table does not indicate gaps of fewer than 8 weeks.
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Appendix K. Survey Questions

Filter Questions
Do you consent to participating in this study?
Are you currently a Public Diplomacy-coned Foreign Service Officer, employed by the U.S.
Department of State?
R/PPR is…
• The office that primarily handles PD grants
• The office that primarily handles PD research and policy
• The office that primarily handles press outreach
0.7 refers to…
• The section of the law that forbids domestic PD activities
• The ideal ratio between PD FSOs and LE staff.
• The budget code that funds many PD activities.
A PDIP is a…
• Annual plan which aligns goals and objectives with budgets
• Tool for determining the proper grade level for PD LE staff
• Mechanism for protecting public diplomacy intellectual property

Demographic Questions
What is your gender identity?
• Male
• Female
• Non-binary / third gender
• Prefer not to say
How many years have you served as a PD-coned FSO?
• 0-5 years
• 6-10 years
• 11-15 years
• 16+ years
Have you served in a PD capacity in an active warzone?
• Yes
• No
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Were you ever employed at USIA?
• Yes
• No

H1 (Likert Scale)
Misleading foreign audiences is effective at advancing U.S. foreign policy goals. Misleading
foreign audiences is ethical when advancing U.S. foreign policy goals.
I mislead foreign audiences to advance U.S. foreign policy goals.
Lying to foreign audiences is effective at advancing U.S. foreign policy goals.
Lying to foreign audiences is ethical when advancing U.S foreign policy goals.
I lie to foreign audiences to advance U.S. foreign policy goals.

H2 (Likert Scale)
Concealing the source of information is effective at advancing U.S. foreign policy goals.
Concealing the source of information is ethical when advancing U.S. foreign policy goals.
I conceal the source of information to advance U.S. foreign policy goals.

H3 (Likert Scale)
When in a warzone, what's ethical to do in public diplomacy changes.

H4 (Likert Scale)
Making self-righteous arguments to foreign audiences is effective.
Making self-righteous arguments to foreign audiences is ethical.
I use self-righteous argumentation with foreign audiences.
Denouncing bad nation state behavior to foreign audiences is effective.
Denouncing bad nation state behavior to foreign audiences is ethical.
I denounce bad nation state behavior with foreign audiences.
Using name-calling against bad nation state behavior is effective with foreign audiences.
Using name-calling against bad nation state behavior is ethical with foreign audiences.
I use name-calling against bad nation state behavior with foreign audiences.
The use of sarcasm with foreign audiences is effective.
The use of sarcasm with foreign audiences is ethical.
I use sarcasm with foreign audiences.
Employing stereotypes with foreign audiences is effective. Employing stereotypes with foreign
audiences is ethical.
I employ stereotypes with foreign audiences.
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Highlighting U.S. successes to foreign audiences is effective.
Highlighting U.S. successes to foreign audiences is ethical.
I highlight U.S. successes with foreign audiences.
Highlighting U.S. failures to foreign audiences is effective at advancing policy goals.
Highlighting U.S. failures to foreign audiences is ethical.
I highlight U.S. failures with foreign audiences to advance policy goals.

H5 (Likert Scale)
Telling partial truths to foreign audiences is effective at advancing U.S. foreign policy goals.
Telling partial truths to foreign audiences is ethical when advancing U.S. foreign policy goals.
I tell partial truths to foreign audiences to advance U.S. foreign policy goals.
Telling the whole truth to foreign audiences is effective at advancing U.S. foreign policy goals.
Telling the whole truth to foreign audiences is ethical when advancing U.S. foreign policy goals.
I tell the whole truth to foreign audiences to advance U.S. foreign policy goals.
I tell the whole truth to foreign audiences in my job to advance U.S. foreign policy goals, even
when it is detrimental to U.S. interests.

H6 (Likert Scale)
From a foreign policy perspective, there is an objective reality that can be agreed upon by third
party, disinterested observers.

H7 (Likert Scale)
Public diplomacy should be clearly linked to and driven by policy.
The best public diplomacy programs have no policy component.

H8 (Likert Scale)
Making moral arguments to foreign audiences is effective.
Making moral arguments to foreign audiences is ethical.
I use moral argumentation with foreign audiences.
Making rational arguments to foreign audiences is effective.
Making rational arguments to foreign audiences is ethical.
I use rational argumentation with foreign audiences.
U.S. public diplomacy outreach is too drab to be effective.
Using emotional arguments with foreign audiences is effective.
Using emotional arguments with foreign audiences is ethical.
I use emotional arguments with foreign audiences.

168

H10 (Likert Scale)
One main purpose of my job is to make the world safe for democracy.
Lessons from the United States are valuable for the rest of the world.
The United States government is the legitimate, official representive of the American people to
foreign audiences.

H11 (Likert Scale)
Long term goals are more important than short term goals.
Short term goals are more important than long term goals.
Colorful, emotional arguments are effective with public audiences over the short-term.
Colorful, emotional arguments are effective with public audiences over the long term.

H12 (Likert Scale)
United States engagement in the world is a good thing.
United States intervention in the world is a good thing.

H13 (Likert Scale)
The more foreign audiences know about us, the more they like us.
The more accurate information foreign audiences know about us, the more they like us.
The more experience foreign audiences have with the U.S., the more they like us.
I am well-versed in the latest science research on persuasion.
I am well-versed in academic theories of persuasion.
I have received State Department training in the latest science and theory of persuasion.
I have received non-State Department training in the latest science and theory of persuasion.
Understanding the latest science on persuasion makes PDOs more effective.
I would be interested in additional training on the latest science and theory of persuasion.
Other
What are some things you would never do as a PD officer because they are unethical? [text box]
Have you ever done anything you consider unethical as a PD Officer? [yes/no]
Public Diplomacy is a form of propaganda. [yes/no]
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